Top ten papers, from 2019 onwards, ranked by number of citations per year
| Studies | Theoretical framework | Topics | Aim | Type of EM | EM model | Findings | Setting | CPY /TC |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Borralho et al. (2022) | Stakeholder theory; agency theory | CSR/family ownership | To analyze how each component of environmental, social and governance (ESG) disclosure individually affects EM in FF and non-FF | AEM/REM | AEM: Modified Jones model Dechow et al. (1995) REM: Roychowdhury (2006) | ESG dimensions are not equally important for reducing EM, and family status affects the association between ESG disclosure and EM | France and Spain (2009–2018) | CPY: 12.67 TC: 38 |
| Gavana et al. (2024) | SEW; agency theory | Corporate governance | To analyze the impact of family control on the association between RPTs and different types of EM and the possible moderating effect of board characteristics | AEM/REM | AEM: Kothari et al. (2005) REM: Roychowdhury (2006) | FF use RPTs in association with or as a substitute for various types of EM. CEO duality, board gender diversity and the presence of the family on the board differently moderate the association | Italy (2014–2019) | CPY: 12 TC: 12 |
| Ghaleb et al. (2020) | Entrenchment effect theory; alignment effect theory | Family ownership | To analyze the effect of family ownership concentration on REM in Malaysian manufacturing listed companies | REM | Roychowdhury (2006) | There is a negative association between family ownership concentration and REM | Malaysia (2013–2016) | CPY: 10 TC: 50 |
| Eng et al. (2019) | Institutional theory | Family ownership | To compare REM between Chinese family companies and US companies after the financial crisis of 2008 | REM | Roychowdhury (2006) | REM is greater for FF than non-FF in the USA and in China. In the USA, REM is greater for FF in the pre- and post-financial crisis period, while Chinese FF show lower REM after the crisis | USA and China (2004–2014) | CPY: 9.67 TC: 58 |
| Wan Mohammad and Wasiuzzaman (2020) | Managerial hegemony theory; entrenchment effect theory; alignment effect theory | Corporate governance/audit committee | To analyze the effect of family ownership, board ethnicity and audit committee independence on EM in Malaysia | AEM | Jones (1991) | Family ownership lowers EM. Independent non-executive directors in the audit committee increase EM practices and family control moderates the effect | Malaysia (2004–2009) | CPY: 9.60 TC: 48 |
| Kumala and Siregar (2021) | Stakeholder theory; legitimacy theory; agency theory | CSR/family ownership | To analyze the association of CSR disclosure (CSRD), EM and family ownership | AEM | Kothari et al. (2005) | CSRD and EM are negatively related. Family ownership is negatively related to EM and positively affects the negative relationship between CSRD and EM | Indonesia (2012–2014) | CPY: 9.50 TC: 38 |
| Rahman and Zheng (2023) | SEW | CSR/family ownership | To analyze the association between CSR and EM in China and the possible impact of family ownership on the relationship | REM/AEM | REM: Roychowdhury (2006) AEM: Kothari et al. (2005) | CSR positively affects AEM but does not affect REM. Family ownership reduces the effect | China (2010–2020) | CPY: 9 TC: 18 |
| Mnif and Cherif (2021) | SEW; agency theory; entrenchment effect theory; alignment effect theory | Corporate governance | To investigate the influence of independent family directors and family-affiliated female directors on EM | AEM | Modified Jones model by Dechow et al. (1995) | There is a negative association between independent female directors and AEM, while family-affiliated female directors are positively related to AEM | France (2010–2018) | CPY: 7.40 TC: 37 |
| Avabruth and Padhi (2023) | SEW | Family ownership/capital structure | To study the relationship between EM in family firms and the debt | AEM/REM | AEM: (Francis et al. (2005) REM: Roychowdhury (2006) | EM is higher for companies with above-average debt. REM is positively associated with bank financing | India (2010–2018) | CPY: 6 TC: 12 |
| Paiva et al. (2019) | Agency theory; SEW | Family ownership | To compare the level of EM in FF and non-FF controlling for the effect of analyst coverage | AEM | Kothari et al. (2005) | FF present higher levels of EM compared to non-FF unless they are experiencing a significant level of analyst coverage | UK (2006–2010) | CPY: 5,83 TC: 36 |
| Studies | Theoretical framework | Topics | Aim | Type of EM | EM model | Findings | Setting | CPY /TC |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Stakeholder theory; agency theory | CSR/family ownership | To analyze how each component of environmental, social and governance (ESG) disclosure individually affects EM in FF and non-FF | AEM/REM | AEM: Modified Jones model Dechow | ESG dimensions are not equally important for reducing EM, and family status affects the association between ESG disclosure and EM | France and Spain (2009–2018) | CPY: 12.67 | |
| SEW; agency theory | Corporate governance | To analyze the impact of family control on the association between RPTs and different types of EM and the possible moderating effect of board characteristics | AEM/REM | AEM: Kothari | FF use RPTs in association with or as a substitute for various types of EM. CEO duality, board gender diversity and the presence of the family on the board differently moderate the association | Italy (2014–2019) | CPY: 12 | |
| Entrenchment effect theory; alignment effect theory | Family ownership | To analyze the effect of family ownership concentration on REM in Malaysian manufacturing listed companies | REM | There is a negative association between family ownership concentration and REM | Malaysia (2013–2016) | CPY: 10 | ||
| Institutional theory | Family ownership | To compare REM between Chinese family companies and US companies after the financial crisis of 2008 | REM | REM is greater for FF than non-FF in the USA and in China. In the USA, REM is greater for FF in the pre- and post-financial crisis period, while Chinese FF show lower REM after the crisis | USA and China (2004–2014) | CPY: 9.67 | ||
| Managerial hegemony theory; entrenchment effect theory; alignment effect theory | Corporate governance/audit committee | To analyze the effect of family ownership, board ethnicity and audit committee independence on EM in Malaysia | AEM | Family ownership lowers EM. Independent non-executive directors in the audit committee increase EM practices and family control moderates the effect | Malaysia (2004–2009) | CPY: 9.60 | ||
| Stakeholder theory; legitimacy theory; agency theory | CSR/family ownership | To analyze the association of CSR disclosure (CSRD), EM and family ownership | AEM | Kothari | CSRD and EM are negatively related. Family ownership is negatively related to EM and positively affects the negative relationship between CSRD and EM | Indonesia (2012–2014) | CPY: 9.50 | |
| SEW | CSR/family ownership | To analyze the association between CSR and EM in China and the possible impact of family ownership on the relationship | REM/AEM | REM: | CSR positively affects AEM but does not affect REM. Family ownership reduces the effect | China (2010–2020) | CPY: 9 | |
| Mnif and Cherif (2021) | SEW; agency theory; entrenchment effect theory; alignment effect theory | Corporate governance | To investigate the influence of independent family directors and family-affiliated female directors on EM | AEM | Modified Jones model by Dechow | There is a negative association between independent female directors and AEM, while family-affiliated female directors are positively related to AEM | France (2010–2018) | CPY: 7.40 |
| SEW | Family ownership/capital structure | To study the relationship between EM in family firms and the debt | AEM/REM | AEM: ( | EM is higher for companies with above-average debt. REM is positively associated with bank financing | India (2010–2018) | CPY: 6 | |
| Agency theory; SEW | Family ownership | To compare the level of EM in FF and non-FF controlling for the effect of analyst coverage | AEM | Kothari | FF present higher levels of EM compared to non-FF unless they are experiencing a significant level of analyst coverage | UK (2006–2010) | CPY: 5,83 |
Source(s): Table created by authors
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