Top ten papers pre-2019 ranked by number of citations per year
| Studies | Theoretical framework | Topics | Aim | Type of EM | EM model | Findings | Setting | CPY/TC |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ali et al. (2007) | Agency theory | Family ownership | To examine how the agency conflicts of family firms influence earnings quality | AEM | Kothari et al. (2005) | Earnings are of superior quality in FF than in non-FF. This difference is ascribable to FF with a founder CEO and FF without dual-class shares | USA (1998–2002) | CPY: 37.78 TC: 680 |
| Wang (2006) | Entrenchment effect theory; alignment effect theory | Family ownership | To investigate the association between founding family ownership and earnings quality | AEM | Dechow and Dichev (2002); Ball and Shivakumar (2005) | Founding family ownership is associated with lower AEM, greater earnings informativeness and lower persistence of transitory loss components in earnings | USA (1994–2002) | CPY: 33.84 TC: 643 |
| Sáenz González and García-Meca (2014) | Agency theory | Corporate governance | To examine the relationship between various attributes of corporate governance and EM | AEM | Modified Jones model by Dechow et al. (1995) | Internal ownership, ownership concentration, number of board meetings and independent directors lower EM. Conversely, larger boards increase EM. Family ownership, institutional ownership and CEO duality do not influence EM | Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico (2006–2009) | CPY: 22.45 TC: 247 |
| Jaggi et al. (2009) | Agency theory | Board independence | To verify the relationship between board independence and EM, controlling for the moderating effect of family ownership | AEM | AEM: Kothari et al. (2005) | Board independence positively influences earning quality, but family control and the presence of family members on the board mitigates this effect | Hong Kong (1998–2000) | CPY: 22.19 TC: 355 |
| Achleitner et al. (2014) | SEW | Family ownership | To investigate the effects of family companies on REM and AEM | AEM/REM | AEM: Dechow and Dichev (2002); Ball and Shivakumar (2005) REM: Roychowdhury (2006) | FF are less engaged in REM than non-FF, but they show more negative discretionary accruals | Germany (1998–2008) | CPY: 17.36 TC: 191 |
| Martin et al. (2016) | Agency theory; SEW | Corporate governance | To analyze EM behavior in family and nonfamily firms and within family firms | AEM | Modified Jones model by Dechow et al. (1995) | FF engage less in EM than non-FF. The use of EM is lower in founder family firms. The positive family effect on earning quality is amplified by CEO tenure, while it is weaker in larger companies and in those with a dual-class stock structure | USA (1992–1999) | CPY: 14.56 TC: 131 |
| Cascino et al. (2010) | Entrenchment effect theory; alignment effect theory | Family ownership | To analyze accounting quality in family firms as well as the determinants of accounting quality in family and nonfamily businesses | AEM | Dechow and Dichev (2002) model in the McNichols (2002) version | Financial information is of better quality FF than in non-FF, and the determinants of accounting quality are different in FF than in non-FF | Italy (1998–2004) | CPY: 14 TC: 210 |
| Siregar and Utama (2008) | Agency theory | Family ownership/corporate governance | To examine the underlying motives for EM: opportunistic behavior or efficient contracting | AEM | Kasznik (1999) | FF with higher family ownership and not belonging to a business group are more prone to use efficient EM | Indonesia (1995–1996 and 1999–2002) | CPY: 13.65 TC: 232 |
| Stockmans et al. (2010) | Agency theory; SEW | Corporate governance | To examine SEW motivations for EM | AEM | Modified Jones model by Dechow et al. (1995) | First-generation and founder-led private FF are more engaged in upward earnings management | Flanders (2000) | CPY: 13.33 TC: 200 |
| Chi et al. (2015) | Agency theory; stewardship theory | Board independence | To investigate the relationship between FF and EM, controlling for the moderating effect of board independence | AEM | Modified Jones model by Dechow et al. (1995) | FF are more prone to resort to EM than non-FF. Board independence mitigates the positive relationship between FF and EM | Taiwan (2006–2012) | CPY: 13.10 TC: 131 |
| Studies | Theoretical framework | Topics | Aim | Type of EM | EM model | Findings | Setting | CPY/TC |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Agency theory | Family ownership | To examine how the agency conflicts of family firms influence earnings quality | AEM | Earnings are of superior quality in FF than in non-FF. This difference is ascribable to FF with a founder CEO and FF without dual-class shares | USA (1998–2002) | CPY: 37.78 | ||
| Entrenchment effect theory; alignment effect theory | Family ownership | To investigate the association between founding family ownership and earnings quality | AEM | Founding family ownership is associated with lower AEM, greater earnings informativeness and lower persistence of transitory loss components in earnings | USA (1994–2002) | CPY: 33.84 | ||
| Agency theory | Corporate governance | To examine the relationship between various attributes of corporate governance and EM | AEM | Modified Jones model by | Internal ownership, ownership concentration, number of board meetings and independent directors lower EM. Conversely, larger boards increase EM. Family ownership, institutional ownership and CEO duality do not influence EM | Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico (2006–2009) | CPY: 22.45 | |
| Agency theory | Board independence | To verify the relationship between board independence and EM, controlling for the moderating effect of family ownership | AEM | AEM: | Board independence positively influences earning quality, but family control and the presence of family members on the board mitigates this effect | Hong Kong (1998–2000) | CPY: 22.19 | |
| SEW | Family ownership | To investigate the effects of family companies on REM and AEM | AEM/REM | AEM: | FF are less engaged in REM than non-FF, but they show more negative discretionary accruals | Germany (1998–2008) | CPY: 17.36 | |
| Agency theory; SEW | Corporate governance | To analyze | AEM | Modified Jones model by | FF engage less in EM than non-FF. The use of EM is lower in founder family firms. The positive family effect on earning quality is amplified by CEO tenure, while it is weaker in larger companies and in those with a dual-class stock structure | USA (1992–1999) | CPY: 14.56 | |
| Entrenchment effect theory; alignment effect theory | Family ownership | To analyze accounting quality in family firms as well as the determinants of accounting quality in family and nonfamily businesses | AEM | Financial information is of better quality FF than in non-FF, and the determinants of accounting quality are different in FF than in non-FF | Italy (1998–2004) | CPY: 14 | ||
| Agency theory | Family ownership/corporate governance | To examine the underlying motives for EM: opportunistic behavior or efficient contracting | AEM | FF with higher family ownership and not belonging to a business group are more prone to use efficient EM | Indonesia (1995–1996 and 1999–2002) | CPY: 13.65 | ||
| Agency theory; SEW | Corporate governance | To examine SEW motivations for EM | AEM | Modified Jones model by | First-generation and founder-led private FF are more engaged in upward earnings management | Flanders (2000) | CPY: 13.33 | |
| Agency theory; stewardship theory | Board independence | To investigate the relationship between FF and EM, controlling for the moderating effect of board independence | AEM | Modified Jones model by | FF are more prone to resort to EM than non-FF. | Taiwan (2006–2012) | CPY: 13.10 |
Source(s): Table created by authors
Sharing content requires targeting cookies to be enabled. Please update your cookie preferences to use this feature.