Firm fixed effects and excess disclosure quality ratings
| Panel A: Market reactions to the announcement of disclosure quality ratings | |
|---|---|
| Dependent variable | CAR |
| (1) | |
| INFO_FE | 0.0002 |
| [0.181] | |
| Controls | Yes |
| No. of obs | 21,250 |
| Adj. R2 | 3.3% |
| Panel A: Market reactions to the announcement of disclosure quality ratings | |
|---|---|
| Dependent variable | CAR |
| (1) | |
| INFO_FE | 0.0002 |
| [0.181] | |
| Controls | Yes |
| No. of obs | 21,250 |
| Adj. | 3.3% |
| Panel B: Association with market−based and accounting−based information quality measures | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dependent variable | ZERORET | ILLIQ | NCSKEW | CONSERV | PERSIST | DD |
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | |
| INFO_FE | −0.0006* | 0.0015 | −0.0331*** | −0.9856 | 0.0214** | −0.0004 |
| [−1.874] | [0.479] | [−3.417] | [−0.869] | [2.350] | [−0.423] | |
| Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| No. of obs | 22,954 | 22,953 | 22,939 | 10,760 | 9,817 | 10,068 |
| Adj. R2 | 39.6% | 44.1% | 11.6% | 0.3% | 14.5% | 26.1% |
| Panel B: Association with market−based and accounting−based information quality measures | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dependent variable | ZERORET | ILLIQ | NCSKEW | CONSERV | PERSIST | DD |
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | |
| INFO_FE | −0.0006* | 0.0015 | −0.0331*** | −0.9856 | 0.0214** | −0.0004 |
| [−1.874] | [0.479] | [−3.417] | [−0.869] | [2.350] | [−0.423] | |
| Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| No. of obs | 22,954 | 22,953 | 22,939 | 10,760 | 9,817 | 10,068 |
| Adj. | 39.6% | 44.1% | 11.6% | 0.3% | 14.5% | 26.1% |
| Panel C: Predictability of future outcomes | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dependent variable | F_INST | F_ANA | F_FERRORS | F_DISPERSION | F_ENFORCE | F_ANNLETT |
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | |
| INFO_FE | 0.0040** | −0.1252 | −0.0019* | −0.0005 | −0.0199*** | −0.0164*** |
| [1.978] | [−0.972] | [−1.733] | [−1.405] | [−3.122] | [−3.261] | |
| Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| No. of obs | 18,991 | 18,991 | 12,891 | 10,690 | 21,560 | 21,560 |
| Adj. R2/Pseudo R2 | 83.5% | 59.7% | 10.4% | 8.7% | 15.9% | 28.4% |
| Panel C: Predictability of future outcomes | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dependent variable | F_INST | F_ANA | F_FERRORS | F_DISPERSION | F_ENFORCE | F_ANNLETT |
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | |
| INFO_FE | 0.0040** | −0.1252 | −0.0019* | −0.0005 | −0.0199*** | −0.0164*** |
| [1.978] | [−0.972] | [−1.733] | [−1.405] | [−3.122] | [−3.261] | |
| Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| No. of obs | 18,991 | 18,991 | 12,891 | 10,690 | 21,560 | 21,560 |
| Adj. | 83.5% | 59.7% | 10.4% | 8.7% | 15.9% | 28.4% |
Note(s): Table 6 replicates all the results using an alternative measure of excess disclosure quality ratings when public signals include firm fixed effects. The test variable INFO_FE is the residuals from estimating the model in column (1) of Table 2 with firm fixed effects. Panel A reports the relation between INFO_FE and market reactions to the announcement of disclosure quality ratings (CAR). Panel B reports the association between INFO_FE and market-based information quality measures (ZERORET, ILLIQ, and NCSKEW) and accounting-based information quality measures (CONSERV, PERSIST and DD). Panel C reports the relation between INFO_FE and future outcomes (F_INST, F_ANA, F_FERRORS, F_DISPERSION, F_ENFORCE and F_ANNLETT). The models in columns (5) and (6) of Panel C are Probit and the other models are OLS. Marginal effects at the mean are reported as coefficients for the Probit models. Detailed variable definitions are in Appendix 2. t-statistics or z-statistics underneath the coefficients are based on standard errors clustered at the firm. ***, **, and * denote two-tailed statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively
Source(s): Table created by authors