Factors predicting the probability of winning a trade dispute
| Author and article | Main idea | Significant results for our research |
|---|---|---|
| Haftel (2004) | States that strengthen trade blocs face an increasing number of complainants | Deeper economic integration results in more complainants |
| Improvements in legal procedures increase the number of complainants | ||
| Bown (2004b) | Defining what factors stimulate the respondent to commit to liberalization | The authors used the following variables: size of exports, real income growth, the size of imports before and after the trade dispute in the respondent country, etc |
| Bown (2005) | Defining factors influencing the degree of participation | The article proves the importance of the complainant's share of the respondent's market, the share of the respondent in the exports of the complainant, the level of gross domestic product (GDP) and the presence of a preferential agreement |
| Ziaul and Sumimaru (2005) | Defining the factors that influence whether a country is involved in a trade dispute and what factors define the possibility of winning it | The rate of winning for developed countries is higher than for developing countries |
| The size of the GDP influences the result | ||
| The size of exports influences the level of participation in trade disputes | ||
| Guzman and Simmons (2005) | Countries with low incomes tend to initiate disputes | Low-income countries initiate a trade dispute to get a higher expected return in the future. The authors used the following variables: GDP, number of embassies, exports, etc |
| Conti (2010) | The experience of a participant influences the process and result | Previous experience in the WTO trade disputes is significant |
| Lee (2012) | How macroeconomic factors influence decisions on initiating trade disputes | Macroeconomic factors determine trade dispute activity. The paper examines GDP, global imports, balance of goods and services, etc. It also confirms that there are different effects for high-, middle- and low-income countries |
| Johns and Pelc (2014) | WTO members might manipulate the trade dispute process | The complainant could increase the number of third parties to increase the probability of winning |
| Poletti et al. (2015) | The ability to impose retaliatory measures increases the complainant's bargaining power | The complainant's trade power may influence the result |
| Johns and Pelc (2016) | The number of third parties reduces the likelihood of an early conclusion of a trade dispute. Therefore, some states decide not to participate in a trade dispute as a third party | The number of third parties defines the duration of the trade dispute |
| Maggi and Staiger (2018) | The type of trade dispute affects the possibility of its early conclusion and the outcome | It is necessary to include variables that consider different types of trade disputes. It is possible to add a type of trade dispute depending on the category of the contested measure (tariff/non-tariff) |
| Author and article | Main idea | Significant results for our research |
|---|---|---|
| States that strengthen trade blocs face an increasing number of complainants | Deeper economic integration results in more complainants | |
| Improvements in legal procedures increase the number of complainants | ||
| Defining what factors stimulate the respondent to commit to liberalization | The authors used the following variables: size of exports, real income growth, the size of imports before and after the trade dispute in the respondent country, etc | |
| Defining factors influencing the degree of participation | The article proves the importance of the complainant's share of the respondent's market, the share of the respondent in the exports of the complainant, the level of gross domestic product (GDP) and the presence of a preferential agreement | |
| Defining the factors that influence whether a country is involved in a trade dispute and what factors define the possibility of winning it | The rate of winning for developed countries is higher than for developing countries | |
| The size of the GDP influences the result | ||
| The size of exports influences the level of participation in trade disputes | ||
| Countries with low incomes tend to initiate disputes | Low-income countries initiate a trade dispute to get a higher expected return in the future. The authors used the following variables: GDP, number of embassies, exports, etc | |
| The experience of a participant influences the process and result | Previous experience in the WTO trade disputes is significant | |
| How macroeconomic factors influence decisions on initiating trade disputes | Macroeconomic factors determine trade dispute activity. The paper examines GDP, global imports, balance of goods and services, etc. It also confirms that there are different effects for high-, middle- and low-income countries | |
| WTO members might manipulate the trade dispute process | The complainant could increase the number of third parties to increase the probability of winning | |
| The ability to impose retaliatory measures increases the complainant's bargaining power | The complainant's trade power may influence the result | |
| The number of third parties reduces the likelihood of an early conclusion of a trade dispute. Therefore, some states decide not to participate in a trade dispute as a third party | The number of third parties defines the duration of the trade dispute | |
| The type of trade dispute affects the possibility of its early conclusion and the outcome | It is necessary to include variables that consider different types of trade disputes. It is possible to add a type of trade dispute depending on the category of the contested measure (tariff/non-tariff) |
Source(s): Own elaboration
Sharing content requires targeting cookies to be enabled. Please update your cookie preferences to use this feature.