Table 2. Three groundbreaking chapters... | Emerald Publishing

Table 2.

Three groundbreaking chapters of Boddewyn’s seminal contributions to international business political behavior and nonmarket strategy

1. Ideation Chapter		2. Integration Chapter		3. Broadening Chapter
Article	Contribution	Article	Contribution	Article	Contribution
Boddewyn and Cracco (1972); Boddewyn (1993a, 1993b)	The ideation of MNEs’ political behavior by conceptualizing the government as another factor of production or resource that MNE executives need to consider in their management of the MNE’s chain of economic value-adding activities that cross borders	Boddewyn (1988b)	Expanding Dunning’s (1988) eclectic paradigm by proposing to explicitly integrate political dimensions, arguing that political elements could provide a better understanding of why particular MNEs have succeeded where a purely economic analysis may fail to account for their success	Boddewyn (1995)	The idea that MNEs’ legitimacy is granted by all types of nonmarket actors based on three dimensions: legality, or adherence of the MNE to governmental rules; conformity of the MNE with mores and customs (as in definitions of “fair” and “loyal” competition); and contribution of the MNE to societal (including economic) goals
Boddewyn and Kapoor (1972); Boddewyn (2003)	The notion that, beyond governments, other sociopolitical stakeholders (such as activists and the public at large) can assist or hamper MNEs’ operations and expansion. Thus, MNEs should engage in external relations because society must be continuously convinced to give and maintain its support to business and to stop short of unduly restraining it. These stakeholders are the actors who constitute the MNE’s nonmarket environment, which is distinct from the market environment for the MNE’s inputs and outputs, and from its internal micromanagement	Boddewyn and Brewer (1994)	Developed an integrated model of business political behavior that explains that political behavior is not developed in a vacuum but is conditioned by firm, industry, and nonmarket environment factors. Political behavior aims for MNEs to achieve their strategic objectives related to efficiency, market power, or legitimacy through varying political behavior intensities and forms of the bargaining and nonbargaining types. The authors highlighted that conditioning factors, political behavior, and strategic objectives, all interact in an integrated manner	Boddewyn and Doh (2011)	Introduced a model to explain and predict when public goods such as health care, education, transportation, and utilities, are supplied through collaborations among public as well as private for-profit and not-for-profit actors via contracting, alliance formation, internationalization, or charitable assistance
Boddewyn (1986, 1993b); Salorio et al. (2005)	The idea that managing external relations with nonmarket actors (the government and other sociopolitical stakeholders) relatively better than rivals, could provide MNEs with competitive advantages. This extended Porter’s (1979) five competitive market forces by adding nonmarket forces, namely the “bargaining power of nonmarket actors”, which may influence the forces that shape competition in the marketplace. This also extended Porter’s (1980) three “generic” competitive strategies by suggesting that if an MNE cannot be a cost, differentiation, or focus/niche leader in the marketplace, it may still beat the competition on another ground, namely, the nonmarket environment	Dieleman and Boddewyn (2012)	Explained how business groups depending on political ties can protect themselves against the negative effects of political ties by using organizational design to obtain such protection. Specifically, the authors suggested that a fragmented business group structure could allow to partially include government actors through bargaining in one part of the group, without having knowledge of or power over other group firms	Buckley and Boddewyn (2015, 2016); Boddewyn and Buckley (2017)	Demonstrated that the market-internalization framework could be applied to noneconomic institutions. Argued that the conventional definition of internalization theory had been too limited and that broadening its scope to include nonmarket transactions, institutions and actors, as well as widening society’s welfare criteria, enhanced its contemporary relevance and potential utility. Demonstrated that MNEs can use social and political activities to obtain goods from others without having to transact with them but rather via noncontractual reciprocity
		White et al. (2015, 2018, 2020, 2025)	Explained that there is a positive association between managerial perceptions of ex ante commercial law inadequacy and the intensification of political ties that grows stronger when an MNE’s subsidiary is committed to organizational adaptation of capabilities to the local context. There is also a positive association between managerial perceptions of ex post judicial arbitrariness and the intensification of political ties that grows stronger when an MNE’s subsidiary is engaged in strategically positioning operations in an emerging market environment. Uncovered that managerial perceptions of regulator vulnerability to political pressures positively enhance the intensification of MNE subsidiaries’ political ties. Identified that in a flawed democracy, perceived deficient legal services enhance the intensity of an MNE’s subsidiary political ties with government actors in both the regulatory and legal arena. However, in a hybrid regime, perceived deficient legal services enhance only the intensity of an MNE’s subsidiary political ties with government actors in the regulatory arena. Clarified that MNE subsidiaries’ political ties intensity has a curvilinear relationship with performance, which grows stronger when an MNE’s subsidiary operates in a heavily regulated industry or managers perceive regulatory excessiveness to be high rather than low	Boddewyn (2017); Boddewyn and Peng (2021)	Pointed out that in the remote areas of emerging markets, MNEs can use noncontractual reciprocity to develop the collective goods they require to operate. Explained how informal institutions provide some of the conditions, motivations, and precipitating circumstances behind MNEs’ use of noncontractual reciprocity Specifically, they clarified that noncontractual reciprocity may be useful when there is reliance on informality, perceived importance of contributions, and estimated probability of returning favors, which, respectively, correspond with the conditions, motivations, and precipitating circumstances related to using noncontractual reciprocity.

1. Ideation Chapter		2. Integration Chapter		3. Broadening Chapter
Article	Contribution	Article	Contribution	Article	Contribution
Boddewyn and Cracco (1972); Boddewyn (1993a, 1993b)	The ideation of MNEs’ political behavior by conceptualizing the government as another factor of production or resource that MNE executives need to consider in their management of the MNE’s chain of economic value-adding activities that cross borders	Boddewyn (1988b)	Expanding Dunning’s (1988) eclectic paradigm by proposing to explicitly integrate political dimensions, arguing that political elements could provide a better understanding of why particular MNEs have succeeded where a purely economic analysis may fail to account for their success	Boddewyn (1995)	The idea that MNEs’ legitimacy is granted by all types of nonmarket actors based on three dimensions: legality, or adherence of the MNE to governmental rules; conformity of the MNE with mores and customs (as in definitions of “fair” and “loyal” competition); and contribution of the MNE to societal (including economic) goals
Boddewyn and Kapoor (1972); Boddewyn (2003)	The notion that, beyond governments, other sociopolitical stakeholders (such as activists and the public at large) can assist or hamper MNEs’ operations and expansion. Thus, MNEs should engage in external relations because society must be continuously convinced to give and maintain its support to business and to stop short of unduly restraining it. These stakeholders are the actors who constitute the MNE’s nonmarket environment, which is distinct from the market environment for the MNE’s inputs and outputs, and from its internal micromanagement	Boddewyn and Brewer (1994)	Developed an integrated model of business political behavior that explains that political behavior is not developed in a vacuum but is conditioned by firm, industry, and nonmarket environment factors. Political behavior aims for MNEs to achieve their strategic objectives related to efficiency, market power, or legitimacy through varying political behavior intensities and forms of the bargaining and nonbargaining types. The authors highlighted that conditioning factors, political behavior, and strategic objectives, all interact in an integrated manner	Boddewyn and Doh (2011)	Introduced a model to explain and predict when public goods such as health care, education, transportation, and utilities, are supplied through collaborations among public as well as private for-profit and not-for-profit actors via contracting, alliance formation, internationalization, or charitable assistance
Boddewyn (1986, 1993b); Salorio et al. (2005)	The idea that managing external relations with nonmarket actors (the government and other sociopolitical stakeholders) relatively better than rivals, could provide MNEs with competitive advantages. This extended Porter’s (1979) five competitive market forces by adding nonmarket forces, namely the “bargaining power of nonmarket actors”, which may influence the forces that shape competition in the marketplace. This also extended Porter’s (1980) three “generic” competitive strategies by suggesting that if an MNE cannot be a cost, differentiation, or focus/niche leader in the marketplace, it may still beat the competition on another ground, namely, the nonmarket environment	Dieleman and Boddewyn (2012)	Explained how business groups depending on political ties can protect themselves against the negative effects of political ties by using organizational design to obtain such protection.Specifically, the authors suggested that a fragmented business group structure could allow to partially include government actors through bargaining in one part of the group, without having knowledge of or power over other group firms	Buckley and Boddewyn (2015, 2016); Boddewyn and Buckley (2017)	Demonstrated that the market-internalization framework could be applied to noneconomic institutions. Argued that the conventional definition of internalization theory had been too limited and that broadening its scope to include nonmarket transactions, institutions and actors, as well as widening society’s welfare criteria, enhanced its contemporary relevance and potential utility. Demonstrated that MNEs can use social and political activities to obtain goods from others without having to transact with them but rather via noncontractual reciprocity
		White et al. (2015, 2018, 2020, 2025)	Explained that there is a positive association between managerial perceptions of ex ante commercial law inadequacy and the intensification of political ties that grows stronger when an MNE’s subsidiary is committed to organizational adaptation of capabilities to the local context. There is also a positive association between managerial perceptions of ex post judicial arbitrariness and the intensification of political ties that grows stronger when an MNE’s subsidiary is engaged in strategically positioning operations in an emerging market environment.Uncovered that managerial perceptions of regulator vulnerability to political pressures positively enhance the intensification of MNE subsidiaries’ political ties.Identified that in a flawed democracy, perceived deficient legal services enhance the intensity of an MNE’s subsidiary political ties with government actors in both the regulatory and legal arena. However, in a hybrid regime, perceived deficient legal services enhance only the intensity of an MNE’s subsidiary political ties with government actors in the regulatory arena.Clarified that MNE subsidiaries’ political ties intensity has a curvilinear relationship with performance, which grows stronger when an MNE’s subsidiary operates in a heavily regulated industry or managers perceive regulatory excessiveness to be high rather than low	Boddewyn (2017); Boddewyn and Peng (2021)	Pointed out that in the remote areas of emerging markets, MNEs can use noncontractual reciprocity to develop the collective goods they require to operate.Explained how informal institutions provide some of the conditions, motivations, and precipitating circumstances behind MNEs’ use of noncontractual reciprocity Specifically, they clarified that noncontractual reciprocity may be useful when there is reliance on informality, perceived importance of contributions, and estimated probability of returning favors, which, respectively, correspond with the conditions, motivations, and precipitating circumstances related to using noncontractual reciprocity.

Source(s): Authors’ own work