Mechanisms
| Panel A: Trust and moral self-discipline: the ethics channels | ||||||||||||
| Channel = Trust | Channel = Moral | |||||||||||
| Stage 1 | Stage 2 | Stage 1 | Stage 2 | |||||||||
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) | (12) | |
| Trust | Trust | Trust | Big10 | Big10 | Big10 | Moral | Moral | Moral | Big10 | Big10 | Big10 | |
| ln_con_1 | 0.015*** (33.013) | 0.052*** (4.889) | 0.070*** (31.385) | 0.049*** (4.677) | ||||||||
| ln_con_2 | 0.009*** (20.592) | 0.071*** (6.935) | 0.078*** (36.612) | 0.067*** (6.490) | ||||||||
| ln_con_3 | 0.011*** (24.662) | 0.019*(1.810) | 0.083*** (37.840) | 0.015(1.393) | ||||||||
| Channel | 0.332*** (2.601) | 0.349*** (2.756) | 0.410*** (3.234) | 0.135*** (5.165) | 0.125*** (4.749) | 0.147*** (5.601) | ||||||
| Controls | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Industry | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Year | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Indirect effect | 0.0019*** | 0.0012*** | 0.0017*** | 0.0032*** | 0.0032*** | 0.0042*** | ||||||
| Direct effect | 0.0172*** | 0.0238*** | 0.0056 | 0.0162*** | 0.0222*** | 0.0037 | ||||||
| Total effect | 0.0191*** | 0.0250*** | 0.0073** | 0.0194*** | 0.0254*** | 0.0079** | ||||||
| N | 33406 | 33406 | 33406 | 33406 | 33406 | 33406 | 33500 | 33500 | 33500 | 33500 | 33500 | 33500 |
| Adj/Pseudo R2 | 0.446 | 0.435 | 0.438 | 0.105 | 0.106 | 0.105 | 0.693 | 0.697 | 0.697 | 0.106 | 0.106 | 0.105 |
| Panel B: The information disclosure quality channel | ||||||||||||
| Channel= disclosure score (DS) | ||||||||||||
| Stage 1 | Stage 2 | |||||||||||
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | |||||||
| DS | DS | DS | Big10 | Big10 | Big10 | |||||||
| ln_con_1 | −0.040*** (−7.294) | 0.009(0.712) | ||||||||||
| ln_con_2 | −0.028*** (−5.216) | 0.037*** (2.948) | ||||||||||
| ln_con_3 | −0.024*** (−4.477) | 0.003(0.207) | ||||||||||
| Channel | −0.105*** (−6.755) | −0.104*** (−6.696) | −0.106*** (−6.785) | |||||||||
| Controls | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | ||||||
| Industry | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | ||||||
| Year | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | ||||||
| N | 22,913 | 22,913 | 22,913 | 22,913 | 22,913 | 22,913 | ||||||
| Adj R2/Pseudo R2 | 0.2090 | 0.2081 | 0.2078 | 0.091 | 0.092 | 0.091 | ||||||
| Indirect effect | 0.0014*** | 0.0010*** | 0.0009*** | |||||||||
| Direct effect | 0.0030 | 0.0131*** | 0.0008 | |||||||||
| Total effect | 0.0045 | 0.0141*** | 0.0017 | |||||||||
| Panel C: Mitigation of agency problems: the tunnelling channel | ||||||||||||
| Channel = tunneling by large shareholders (tunnel) | ||||||||||||
| Stage 1 | Stage 2 | |||||||||||
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | |||||||
| Tunnel | Tunnel | Tunnel | Big10 | Big10 | Big10 | |||||||
| ln_con_1 | −0.001** (−2.075) | 0.054*** (5.256) | ||||||||||
| ln_con_2 | −0.001** (−2.233) | 0.069*** (7.064) | ||||||||||
| ln_con_3 | −0.001*** (−2.951) | 0.020** (2.032) | ||||||||||
| Channel | −1.152*** (−4.811) | −1.152*** (−4.806) | −1.151*** (−4.808) | |||||||||
| Controls | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | ||||||
| Industry | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | ||||||
| Year | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | ||||||
| N | 34,046 | 34,046 | 34,046 | 34,046 | 34,046 | 34,046 | ||||||
| Adj R2/Pseudo R2 | 0.2405 | 0.2405 | 0.2406 | 0.105 | 0.105 | 0.104 | ||||||
| Indirect effect | 0.0001*** | 0.0001*** | 0.0020** | |||||||||
| Direct effect | 0.0181*** | 0.0234*** | 0.0064* | |||||||||
| Total effect | 0.0182*** | 0.0235*** | 0.0084* | |||||||||
| Channel = | Channel = | |||||||||||
| Stage 1 | Stage 2 | Stage 1 | Stage 2 | |||||||||
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) | (12) | |
| 0.015*** (33.013) | 0.052*** (4.889) | 0.070*** (31.385) | 0.049*** (4.677) | |||||||||
| 0.009*** (20.592) | 0.071*** (6.935) | 0.078*** (36.612) | 0.067*** (6.490) | |||||||||
| 0.011*** (24.662) | 0.019*(1.810) | 0.083*** (37.840) | 0.015(1.393) | |||||||||
| 0.332*** (2.601) | 0.349*** (2.756) | 0.410*** (3.234) | 0.135*** (5.165) | 0.125*** (4.749) | 0.147*** (5.601) | |||||||
| Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | |
| Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | |
| Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | |
| 0.0019*** | 0.0012*** | 0.0017*** | 0.0032*** | 0.0032*** | 0.0042*** | |||||||
| 0.0172*** | 0.0238*** | 0.0056 | 0.0162*** | 0.0222*** | 0.0037 | |||||||
| 0.0191*** | 0.0250*** | 0.0073** | 0.0194*** | 0.0254*** | 0.0079** | |||||||
| 33406 | 33406 | 33406 | 33406 | 33406 | 33406 | 33500 | 33500 | 33500 | 33500 | 33500 | 33500 | |
| 0.446 | 0.435 | 0.438 | 0.105 | 0.106 | 0.105 | 0.693 | 0.697 | 0.697 | 0.106 | 0.106 | 0.105 | |
| Channel= | ||||||||||||
| Stage 1 | Stage 2 | |||||||||||
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | |||||||
| −0.040*** (−7.294) | 0.009(0.712) | |||||||||||
| −0.028*** (−5.216) | 0.037*** (2.948) | |||||||||||
| −0.024*** (−4.477) | 0.003(0.207) | |||||||||||
| −0.105*** (−6.755) | −0.104*** (−6.696) | −0.106*** (−6.785) | ||||||||||
| Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | |||||||
| Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | |||||||
| Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | |||||||
| 22,913 | 22,913 | 22,913 | 22,913 | 22,913 | 22,913 | |||||||
| 0.2090 | 0.2081 | 0.2078 | 0.091 | 0.092 | 0.091 | |||||||
| 0.0014*** | 0.0010*** | 0.0009*** | ||||||||||
| 0.0030 | 0.0131*** | 0.0008 | ||||||||||
| 0.0045 | 0.0141*** | 0.0017 | ||||||||||
| Channel = | ||||||||||||
| Stage 1 | Stage 2 | |||||||||||
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | |||||||
| −0.001** (−2.075) | 0.054*** (5.256) | |||||||||||
| −0.001** (−2.233) | 0.069*** (7.064) | |||||||||||
| −0.001*** (−2.951) | 0.020** (2.032) | |||||||||||
| −1.152*** (−4.811) | −1.152*** (−4.806) | −1.151*** (−4.808) | ||||||||||
| Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | |||||||
| Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | |||||||
| Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | |||||||
| 34,046 | 34,046 | 34,046 | 34,046 | 34,046 | 34,046 | |||||||
| 0.2405 | 0.2405 | 0.2406 | 0.105 | 0.105 | 0.104 | |||||||
| 0.0001*** | 0.0001*** | 0.0020** | ||||||||||
| 0.0181*** | 0.0234*** | 0.0064* | ||||||||||
| 0.0182*** | 0.0235*** | 0.0084* | ||||||||||
Note(s): Panel A presents results for mediation tests of ethics (measured by Trust and Moral) on the selection of high-quality auditors. Panel B presents results for mediation tests of information disclosure quality (measured by DS) on the selection of high-quality auditors. Panel C presents results for mediation tests of tunneling by large shareholders (measured by tunnel) on the selection of high-quality auditors. All variables are defined in Appendix. All continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1%. Year and industry fixed effects are included. We report two-sided t-statistics computed using standard errors clustered by firm. *, ** and ***indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels
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