Interaction effects of Chair-CEO age dissimilarity and board monitoring intensity on firm value (moderation effects)
| Variables | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| TOBINQ | TOBINQ | MKTBK | MKTBK | |
| GAPS | −0.004*** | −0.004*** | −0.000*** | −0.000*** |
| (−3.881) | (−4.228) | (−3.883) | (−3.798) | |
| BMEET_median | 0.072*** | 0.001*** | ||
| (3.877) | (6.473) | |||
| GAPS*BMEET_median | 0.003* | 0.000** | ||
| (1.662) | (2.385) | |||
| LNBMEET_median | 0.079*** | 0.002*** | ||
| (4.604) | (8.358) | |||
| GAPS*LNBMEET_median | 0.003** | 0.000** | ||
| (2.167) | (2.118) | |||
| Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Constant | 16.823*** | 16.851*** | 2.408*** | 2.409*** |
| (22.717) | (22.888) | (315.754) | (318.096) | |
| Industry | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 37,200 | 37,200 | 37,200 | 37,200 |
| Adjusted-R2 | 0.4168 | 0.4169 | 0.8905 | 0.8906 |
| Variables | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| TOBINQ | TOBINQ | MKTBK | MKTBK | |
| −0.004*** | −0.004*** | −0.000*** | −0.000*** | |
| (−3.881) | (−4.228) | (−3.883) | (−3.798) | |
| 0.072*** | 0.001*** | |||
| (3.877) | (6.473) | |||
| 0.003* | 0.000** | |||
| (1.662) | (2.385) | |||
| 0.079*** | 0.002*** | |||
| (4.604) | (8.358) | |||
| 0.003** | 0.000** | |||
| (2.167) | (2.118) | |||
| Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | |
| 16.823*** | 16.851*** | 2.408*** | 2.409*** | |
| (22.717) | (22.888) | (315.754) | (318.096) | |
| Industry | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 37,200 | 37,200 | 37,200 | 37,200 |
| Adjusted- | 0.4168 | 0.4169 | 0.8905 | 0.8906 |
Note(s): Table 8 reports the interactive effects of the Chair-CEO age dissimilarity and board monitoring intensity on firm value (Tobin’s Q) (Moderation effects). t-statistics in parentheses. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Robust t-statistics (in parentheses) are based on standard errors clustered by industry and year. All the variables are defined in Appendix
Source(s): Authors’ own calculation