Table A3.

The moderating role of financial constraints on ESG disclosure in retirement village firms before and after the 2017 Code

Variables(1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6)(7)(8)
Before 2017Before 2017Before 2017Before 2017After 2017After 2017After 2017After 2017
ESGESGESGESG
Retire5.267*** (3.758)8.446 (1.729)10.349*** (2.768)3.366*** (3.797)5.306*** (5.529)3.802 (0.521)0.135 (0.045)3.853*** (3.379)
SA×Retire1.836*** (4.273)2.807** (1.852)3.508*** (2.964)1.207*** (4.415)1.645*** (5.822)1.305 (0.598)0.017 (0.019)1.158*** (3.371)
SA0.119 (0.201)0.483 (0.167)1.792 (1.014)0.677 (1.299)0.133 (0.631)0.358 (0.329)0.108 (0.231)0.064 (0.264)
Constant2.960*** (2.821)2.546 (0.372)3.721 (1.028)3.224*** (3.669)2.029*** (3.680)6.764** (2.111)0.606 (0.453)3.776*** (7.416)
ControlsYesYesYesYesYesYesYesYes
Observations180180180180334334334334
Adjusted R-squared0.4740.4470.4460.3700.6410.6290.5290.310
Industry FEYesYesYesYesYesYesYesYes
Year FEYesYesYesYesYesYesYesYes
Note(s):

 Appendix 5 presents the results of the moderating effect of financial constraints in retirement village firms across the period before and after the 2017 Code. We interact the retirement village dummy with the financial constraint measure and find that prior to 2017, financially constrained retirement village firms are more likely to disclose ESG information – presumably to attract capital and reduce information asymmetry. However, this effect diminishes after 2017, when disclosure pressure became more uniformly expected through the updated Code. This result supports the idea that ESG disclosure is likely driven by a cost–benefit calculation in a weak regulatory environment

Source(s): Authors’ own work

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