The moderating role of financial constraints on ESG disclosure in retirement village firms before and after the 2017 Code
| Variables | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Before 2017 | Before 2017 | Before 2017 | Before 2017 | After 2017 | After 2017 | After 2017 | After 2017 | |
| ESG | E | S | G | ESG | E | S | G | |
| Retire | 5.267*** (3.758) | 8.446 (1.729) | 10.349*** (2.768) | 3.366*** (3.797) | 5.306*** (5.529) | 3.802 (0.521) | 0.135 (0.045) | 3.853*** (3.379) |
| 1.836*** (4.273) | 2.807** (1.852) | 3.508*** (2.964) | 1.207*** (4.415) | 1.645*** (5.822) | 1.305 (0.598) | () | 1.158*** (3.371) | |
| SA | () | () | () | () | 0.133 (0.631) | () | () | 0.064 (0.264) |
| Constant | 2.960*** (2.821) | () | () | 3.224*** (3.669) | 2.029*** (3.680) | ** () | () | 3.776*** (7.416) |
| Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 180 | 180 | 180 | 180 | 334 | 334 | 334 | 334 |
| Adjusted R-squared | 0.474 | 0.447 | 0.446 | 0.370 | 0.641 | 0.629 | 0.529 | 0.310 |
| Industry FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Variables | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Before 2017 | Before 2017 | Before 2017 | Before 2017 | After 2017 | After 2017 | After 2017 | After 2017 | |
| 5.267 | 8.446 (1.729) | 10.349 | 3.366 | 5.306 | 3.802 (0.521) | 0.135 (0.045) | 3.853 | |
| 1.836 | 2.807 | 3.508 | 1.207 | 1.645 | 1.305 (0.598) | 1.158 | ||
| 0.133 (0.631) | 0.064 (0.264) | |||||||
| Constant | 2.960 | 3.224 | 2.029 | 3.776 | ||||
| Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 180 | 180 | 180 | 180 | 334 | 334 | 334 | 334 |
| Adjusted | 0.474 | 0.447 | 0.446 | 0.370 | 0.641 | 0.629 | 0.529 | 0.310 |
| Industry | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Appendix 5 presents the results of the moderating effect of financial constraints in retirement village firms across the period before and after the 2017 Code. We interact the retirement village dummy with the financial constraint measure and find that prior to 2017, financially constrained retirement village firms are more likely to disclose ESG information – presumably to attract capital and reduce information asymmetry. However, this effect diminishes after 2017, when disclosure pressure became more uniformly expected through the updated Code. This result supports the idea that ESG disclosure is likely driven by a cost–benefit calculation in a weak regulatory environment
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