Table 7

Composite-ESG regressions (Eq 1–Eq 3)

Explanatory variableEq (1) Baseline FE
Coef (std. err.)
SigEq (2) Moderation FE
Coef (std. err.)
SigEq (3) System-GMM
Coef (std. err.)
Sig
Board Size−0.113 (0.081)0.164−0.182 (0.088)0.038*−0.020 (0.026)0.447
Board Independence0.091 (0.016)<0.001***0.070 (0.018)<0.001***0.002 (0.007)0.737
Gender Diversity0.023 (0.029)0.4390.069 (0.032)0.031**0.018 (0.008)0.019**
CEO Duality−0.963 (0.497)0.053*−0.579 (0.619)0.351−0.138 (0.159)0.386
Board Transparency3.392 (0.387)<0.001***3.027 (0.409)<0.001***0.800 (0.183)<0.001***
Board Skills Disclosure4.195 (0.758)<0.001***4.267 (0.918)<0.001***0.027 (0.379)0.943
State-Ownership Dummy3.901 (4.356)0.371−0.048 (1.076)0.964
SOE × Board InteractionsWald F(6) = 5.73<0.001***
Size4.850 (0.633)<0.001***4.786 (0.915)<0.001***0.320 (0.101)0.001***
Age1.410 (0.067)<0.001***1.356 (0.149)<0.001***0.002 (0.009)0.856
Leverage−0.001 (0.002)0.6850.000 (0.003)0.853−0.002 (0.001)0.002***
Within R2/Pseudo R2-10.4780.4450.964
Model F /Wald χ280.94<0.001***44.23<0.001***7.64 × 105<0.001***
DiagnosticsAR(2) p = 0.050; Hansen p = 0.007
Observations (firms)10,653 (845)7,719 (837)7,659 (836)

Note(s): 1 Pseudo-R2 for system GMM from Anderson–Hsiao

Robust standard errors (clustered by firm) in parentheses for FE models; two-step Windmeijer-corrected errors for GMM. Year dummies and constants suppressed. Significance (“Sig.”) column gives exact p-value and stars (***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10)

Source(s): Calculated by authors

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