The study seeks to reveal actual experiences of decision-making about the choice of audit system and the consequential choice of audit firm in an international humanitarian organisation.
The investigation comprises a qualitative historical case based on primary sources. It utilises the Governmental (Bureaucratic) Politics Model, applied to decision-making in international organisations, as its analytical framework.
The paper reveals the politics of decision-making about auditing regimes in an international organisation. It demonstrates that choices made represent the outcome of a game played by nation-states who adopt diverse stances and possess varying degrees of influence over the political resultant. In the focal case, the bargaining power of the USA is revealed as a potent determinant of audit architecture. Choice of audit firm was based on consideration of territorial presence and an altruistic approach to fee-setting. It is shown that projecting the cost of the audit for a new international organisation operating during a global conflict was highly problematic.
The paper responds to calls for research into the real-world audit practice, audit histories beyond the corporation and the development of audit systems in international organisations. The study provides insights to demand- and supply-side dimensions of auditor choice.
