This paper aims to examine the question of whether external auditors incorporate equity holdings by overlapping audit committee members as a priced governance factor and tests whether this attribute, as a mechanism for ensuring good governance, affects the propensity for external auditors to issue modified audit opinions.
Overlapping membership in this context refers to the arrangement where at least one audit committee member also sits on the compensation committee. Both ordinarily least square and logistic regression are used to capture the impact of overlapping committee members and equity holding of those overlapping committee members.
Using archival data from Australian Stock Exchange listed companies, the authors find support for the beneficial effect of having overlapping audit committee members with equity holdings. The authors also find that auditor propensity to issue modified audit opinions is lower for firms with equity holdings by overlapping audit committee members.
The finding has practical implication to the investors and regulators as overlapping audit committee members with equity holdings may provide especially effective oversight by monitoring opportunistic accounting policy choices for maximizing compensation pay. To the extent that this occurs, audit risk will decrease, requiring less audit effort and lower audit fees than would otherwise be necessary. Similarly, such oversight is likely to make financial reporting more credible and will reduce the possibility of receiving modified audit opinions by reporting organizations.
Both audit and compensation committees are equally important in modern organizations. While both of the committee have distinctive responsibilities, questions remain on the desirability of overlapping audit committee. Also, this is the first study to the authors’ knowledge that incorporates overlapping membership on audit and compensation committee as an important component of auditor risk perception which regards in pricing the audit fees.
