Chapter 11: Common European Values

Philosophical reflection on ethics and public morality is often based on the assumption that one system of values fits all mankind. Aristotle did not write for the Greeks, nor Kant for the Germans, or Mill for the British. But such an approach can be considered too bold and too naïve. Aristotle, Kant, or Mill may have tried to reform mankind, but they have not managed to influence many individuals. They produced theories rather than educational programs, and whether we like it or not, social expectations and deep-rooted behavior within groups have more persuasive power than philosophical ideas. Thus, if one wishes to think in practical terms, a reference to already existing, widespread attitudes is more effective than an appeal to philosophical arguments. These considerations offer a strong support to the project of identifying core European values. It is sound and promising because many individuals in Europe do not consider themselves members of a local community as much as they consider themselves Europeans. They feel they are citizens of the continent rather than of their close localities. For many, a broadly shared European attitude is an appealing middle ground between unreflective parochialism and abstract universalism. It is a very promising attitude, but its practical significance depends on whether we will be able to say more or less precisely what it means to be European: “Defining Europe is fraught with problems, for Europe is a protean idea and not something self-evident. It is erroneous to regard Europe as merely a region for the simple reason that it means different things to different people in different contexts” (Delanty, 1995, p. 3).