Scholarly and political books about democracy that have been published in the course of the past years tend to start out with the claim that contemporary liberal-representative democracies are “challenged,” “under threat,” or in “in deep crisis.” The election of Donald Trump, the Brexit referendum, or the rise of populism in many established Western democracies and beyond are seen as symptoms of the current democratic malaise (e.g., Brennan, 2017; Bridle, 2018; Klein, 2017; Lafont, 2020; Landemore, 2020; Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018).

Let's put these debates aside for a moment. Let's assume that the mainstream of social science and political commentaries is generally right and that democracy as we know it is in great peril. As both the precise diagnosis and the cure of the problem crucially depend on the presupposed normative ideal of democracy, this observation in itself has limited analytical and practical value (see Della Porta, 2013; Ercan & Gagnon, 2014; Merkel, 2014; Merkel & Kneip, 2018). Rather, it points toward some of the most intricate and longest-standing disputes in political philosophy and political theory: What are the sources and standards of democratic legitimacy and how are we supposed to detect deviations from this ideal? What are “legitimate” political institutions in the context of contemporary pluralistic societies and perennial (philosophical and political) disagreements about values and visions of the good life?

Licensed reuse rights only
You do not currently have access to this chapter.
Don't already have an account? Register

Purchased this content as a guest? Enter your email address to restore access.

Please enter valid email address.
Email address must be 94 characters or fewer.