Purpose − This study explains a puzzle: most countries realize the mutual benefit of tariff cutting, but tariffs never become zero.

Approach − The method is decision-theoretic, and proves the results by example.

Findings − The Johnson tariff-ridden equilibrium may be unique, but not the free-trade equilibrium, and tariff cutting may cause a ‘decision problem under uncertainty’ (d.p.u.u.) of Luce, R.D., Raiffa, H. (1989), in which mutual tariff-cutting benefits both parties only up to some point.

Originality/value − This approach addresses a pragmatic problem with global analysis and suggests institutional rearrangement to avoid such conundrum.

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