Reprinted Article Appropriability hazards and governance in strategic alliances: A transaction cost approach

A key argument in transaction cost economics (TCE) is that transactions are aligned with governance structures so as to effect a discriminating – mainly transaction cost economizing – match (Williamson, 1991). The archetypical problem in TCE is the vertical integration or “make-versus-buy” decision, and the focus of transaction cost economizing in this context is on mitigation of “holdup” problems associated with investments in specific assets (Klein, Crawford, & Alchian, 1978; Williamson, 1985). However, this asset specificity condition in only one example (albeit a significant one) of a more general class of contractual hazards. Indeed, in his most recent discussion of the TCE agenda, Williamson (1996, p. 3) suggests that “identification, explication, and mitigation of contractual hazards – which take many forms, many of which long went unremarked – are central to the exercise.”