7: Conclusions

By analyzing five American federations this book has discussed two questions: how have the institutional design and political agency of the presidents, governors, and mayors affected actions to combat the COVID-19 pandemic? Second and more specifically, what institutional and political factors within federal systems could be related to the success or failure of their attempts to face this crisis? For this purpose, the analytical model considered three issues related to the federal design (autonomy of subnational governments, mechanisms of coordination, and policy portfolio) and performance of political leadership (national presidents, governors, and mayors).

The five federations are different taking into account the two ideal types: the dual and cooperative models. Dual federalism assumes that each entity has strict constitutional autonomy over different areas to prevent the centralization of power (Loughlin, Kincaid, & Sweden, 2013). Its premise is that subnational governments spend and collect tax more efficiently, are more accountable to their constituencies, and their public policies are more responsive to local particularities. Federal coordination would be contingent, circumstantial, and, ultimately, unnecessary, as it would be detrimental to efficient decision-making and resource allocation.