David Carpenter argues in favour of Internal Review Boards taking a virtue ethics approach to their reviews of research proposals. Carpenter views principle- and code-based approaches as in competition with virtue ethics, and he describes reliance on principles and codes as neither necessary nor sufficient. We agree with Carpenter’s thesis that a virtue ethics approach would be beneficial and even necessary for exemplary review of research proposals. We disagree with Carpenter, however, about the weight that should be given to principles and codes. We defend here our view that principles and regulations are indispensible to ethical review of research, in spite of the fact that principles often conflict with each other. In those situations, the reviewer’s virtue of practical wisdom is necessary to adjudicate between competing ethical claims.

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