Chapter 5: The Circumstantiality of Bivariate Relationships in The Theory of Moral Sentiments

In Theory of Moral Sentiments, Adam Smith reasons about how a change in one thing, A, is attended by a change in another thing, B. In expounding on such bivariate relationships, Smith sometimes seems to go out of his way to posit a state of the world in which the relationship would break down. That feature suggests an irony about knowing how a change in B attends a change in A. We might think we understand the bivariate relationship, but it holds only for certain states of the world. The relationship is circumstanced. The more one studies the Moral Sentiments, the more one realizes that circumstantiality suffuses its teachings. My discussion arrives at a place of doubt about the most important bivariate relationship – that between approval from our conscience and doing good. Smith seems to suggest, particularly at the end of his life, that a person can best know the relationship between his conscience’s approval and his doing good under circumstances of his having frank and open friendships. The implication for politics is that we want that kind of government that best conduces to frank and open friendships.