Expectations and Coordination in Small Groups

Expectations ostensibly lead to the formation of hierarchies, and hierarchies are thought to improve coordination. A simulation model is introduced to determine whether expectations directly improve coordination.

Agent-based simulations of small group behavior are used to determine what rules for expectation formation best coordinate groups. Within groups of agents that have differing but unknown task abilities, pairs take turns playing a coordination game with one another. The group receives a positive payoff when one agent chooses to take a high-importance role (leader) and the other chooses a low-importance role (follower), where the payoff is proportional to the ability of the “leader.” When both individuals vie to be leader, a costly conflict gives the group information about which agent has a higher task-ability.

The rules governing individuals’ formation of expectations about one another often lead to coordination that is suboptimal: They do not capitalize on the differential abilities of group members. The rules do, however, minimize costly conflicts between individuals. Therefore, standard rules of expectation formation are only optimal when conflicts are costly or provide poor information.

Rules that govern the formation of expectations may have served an evolutionary purpose in guiding individuals towards coordination while minimizing conflict, but these psychologically hardwired rules lead to suboptimal hierarchies.

This paper looks at how well empirically observed expectation-generating rules lead to group coordination by adding a game theoretic conception of interaction to the e-state structuralism model of hierarchy formation.