FRAGILE FIXED EXCHANGE RATES WITH BANKING SAFETY NET GUARANTEES

Our paper presents an extension of the Diamond-Dybvig (1983) model of bank runs to an open market economy. We examine domestic banks that are subject to potential runs by domestic depositors who worry that they will not be able to be repaid in full, because the domestic banks may not be able to refinance in the international financial markets. A loss in confidence in the banking system might precipitate a bank run. A bank run might be costly to safety net guarantors, for example, the central bank. Further, a bank run might lead to a breaking of the fixed exchange rate. Our model shows that adding central bank and International Monetary Fund guarantees, increasing long term debt as well as more equity financing reduces financial fragility, but consistent with economic intuition, these policy levers cannot eliminate the possibility of a bank run or a banking crisis leading to a currency crisis.