Chapter 4: Turning Neoliberalism On its Head¹: A Historical and Pedagogical Analysis

In today’s polarized political climate, different sides tend to vilify one another and criticism of different political positions become reduced to sound bites and fragments. This situation tends to lead to incomplete understandings of complex political topics and subsequent misinformed actions (Drew, Lyons, & Svehla, 2010). Scholars who criticize neoliberalism must take heed of this phenomenon. As criticism of neoliberalism expands, scholars must be wary not to reify the term. Peck (2010) cautioned that neoliberalism is not a universal notion, which operates in the same way in all places. Rather, neoliberalism should be seen as a series of local endeavors which operate according to the various conditions in specific areas (Peck, 2010). Peck’s (2010) assertion calls attention to the fluidity and uniqueness of neoliberalism. Extending Peck’s (2010) ideas further, in this chapter I argue that neoliberalism should not only be viewed as particular and distinct, scholars must also begin to disentangle the historical antecedents that comprise neoliberalism. Neoliberalism should not be viewed as a superficial ideology, but as a rich and complex theory. Stanley (2007) argues that we cannot dismiss rival ideologies like our opponents dismiss critical theory as a bankrupt theory. This chapter works from this premise. Perhaps most ironically, liberalism, socialism, communism and other radical political theory sprouted, at least in some sense, from the same revolutionary seedbed over the course of the 18th and 19th centuries before taking radically different trajectories (Breckman, 1999; Hobsbawm, 1962; Peet, 2003). Thus, neoliberalism demands serious scrutiny. By disentangling the different threads that comprise neoliberalism, scholars can mount ever more effective defenses against it. More than this, scholars can actually begin to develop defenses against neoliberalism by actually drawing on ideas contained in neoliberalism. This chapter however does not call for a return to some idealized liberal state. Rather, it calls for a dialectical supersession of the present state of affairs, to a higher and more just state, specifically for education. Dialectical movement entails the simultaneous destruction or negation of what is unjust and the preservation of what is just in a present state of affairs (Forester, 1993). If education is to move past neoliberalism, neoliberalism cannot simply be discarded. Rather, neoliberalism must be negated, by superseding its unjust elements and retaining and transforming its more just elements and using these transformed elements as part of a new foundation of education.This new just foundation incorporates and retains ideas from neoliberalism’s namesake: liberalism. Certain (but by no means all) strands of liberalism, as they developed in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, saw the individual not simply as a consumer or economic agent (as in neoliberalism), but as a progressive entity which stood for freedom against superstition, tyranny and despotism (Hobsbawm, 1962; Sheehan, 1993). In short, many strands of liberalism were equated with progress (Hobsbawm, 1962; Sheehan, 1993). This chapter develops this conception of the individual, uses it against the prevailing atomistic conception of neoliberalism, and specifically applies this new vision to education. As Dotts (2015) argues, this vision echoes Jefferson’s vision of democracy, which consisted of citizens with a high level of autonomy or negative freedom nestled within a larger communal and moral universe. Perhaps the most important aspect of neoliberalism, however distorted it has been by policymakers and corporate lobbyists for the sake of avoiding paying taxes, is the notion of individual freedom and the subsequent freedom from oppression. Like any political theory, neoliberalism is complex with a number of variations (Plant, 2010). Some neoliberal thinkers do argue for certain aspects of government intervention or at least some minimal restraints on freedom, while others, such as libertarians, eschew virtually any type of individual constraint (Plant, 2010). Neoliberal thinkers however generally argue for a conception of freedom called negative freedom (Marginson, 2009; Plant, 2010). Of course, neoliberalism is not strictly guided by negative freedom; it has a strong element of coercion, specifically when it comes to upholding and creating markets (Marginson, 2009). This will be explored in more detail shortly (Marginson, 2009; Plant, 2010). Nevertheless, negative freedom is crucial to neoliberalism. Negative freedom is usually read as a “freedom from,” a freedom to be left alone, freedom from oppression. In contrast, positive freedom is usually characterized as “freedom to.” Some common conceptions of positive freedoms are “freedom to work” and “freedom to employment.” In the most extreme sense, positive freedoms can usually entail the negation of certain negative freedoms in furthering of a goal, such as a just society (Berlin, 1969; Plant, 2010). Berlin (1969) argues that positive freedoms can actually become repressive, if they curtail an individual’s liberty and force that individual to adopt some higher goal, which is usually seen as rational or beneficial. Berlin (1969, p. 161) also argues, that “No doubt every interpretation of the word liberty, however, unusual, must include a minimum of what I have called negative liberty. There must be an area within which I am not frustrated.” I agree. Where neoliberals go astray however is that they tend to glorify negative freedom and hold negative freedom as an end, not a means. Justice in neoliberalism is largely the freedom to be left alone. Traditional ideas of justice are seen as undue government intervention and meddling (Marginson, 2009). And the exception to this rule is the enforcement of markets (Marginson, 2009). Yet, when all individuals have negative freedoms, some can and do obtain power to oppress others. The negative freedom of neoliberalism is necessary, but only to a point and only in conjunction with positive freedoms of justice (not just the enforcement of markets). Once this point is exceeded, as neoliberalism has done, the individual which neoliberals seek to exalt and protect is isolated and oppressed further.