Without denying the well-documented conflicts between agents and principals in the private sector, both parties in that sector stand to benefit from an overall objective of capital maintenance and gtrth. In the public sector, the desirability of capital maintenance and gtrth cannot be assumed and the incentives developed in New Zealand—and likely to be adopted elsewhere—seem designed to achieve the opposite. Commercial accounting, which is based on the notion of capital maintenance and gtrth, may be inappropriate. Furthermore, there is not only a potential lack of goal congruence between agents and principals but also one between ultimate principals (in particular, between taxpayers who seek lower taxes and beneficiaries of services who want these services enhanced or at least maintained.) To complicate matters still further, as the development of the purchase and ownership interest incentives illustrates, central agencies such as the Treasury act as a sort of intermediate agent and have the opportunity to impose their own agenda which may or may not be that of ultimate principals. Where there is “performance ambiguity” (difficulty in measuring outputs) and lack of “goal congruence” (goals shared by agents and principals) market governance models may be inoperable (Ouchi, 1980). If problems of performance ambiguity and lack of goal congruence exist even in the private sector, they are surely exacerbated in the public sector.