Chapter 6: Principle-Based Legal Reasoning in Ronald Dworkin's Legal Theory
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Published:2025
Celestine Edozie Anyaorah, 2025. "Principle-Based Legal Reasoning in Ronald Dworkin's Legal Theory", Rethinking Philosophy for Education, Society and Human Development in Sub-Saharan Africa, Kingsley Ekene Amaechi, Stephen Azubuike Oguji
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Ronald Dworkin's work on legal reasoning arguably provides a framework for understanding the relationship between individual rights and collective goals. In conceptualizing legal reasoning, he makes a distinction between principles (that which judges should base their reasoning) and policies (that which judges should draw from or should avoid in making their judgment). While principles have to do with individual rights, which the judiciary is often concerned with, policies have to do with achieving the societal goals, which is the concern of the elected members of the legislature. Both elements work together and are in fact inter-connected. This chapter appraises Dworkin's argument by analyzing how his understanding of principle-based legal reasoning (if adopted) helps build up a good legal system and a better society. Based on a philosophical analytic method, the study concludes that Dworkin's principle-based legal reasoning with its over-emphasis on individual rights as trumps against collective goals, if put into practice, will result in social chaos and conflicts. Also, it will hinder dialogues that might lead toward consensus or common ground. This is because it will lead to the view that having a legal right to do something is a sufficient reason to do it. This actually should not be the case because individual rights and collective goals should be complementary, rather than contradictory.
