Does Independence Guarantee Infallibility?

Reading the above chapter raises the question about central banks that is often asked about judges: does their independence, which is now enshrined as a pillar of the rule of law and free enterprise, ensure their infallibility? Combined with exceptionally long terms of office (eight years, sometimes renewable), isn't it actually a considerable risk factor given the potentially tragic consequences of any errors? The previous chapter showed how their forecasting tools had led central bankers to underestimate systemic risks between 2005 and 2008. Factual study of key interest rate guidance decisions in the 1920s–1930s¹ as well as in the 1990s–2010s also exposes them to a severe criticism due to anachronism and/or misinterpretation. Finally, both the weight of history and the careers of the people themselves raise the question, when it comes to a subject as difficult to treat objectively as political economy, of whether independence can really go hand-in-hand with infallibility? Or even simply impartiality?