The impact of size variables on bidder announcement returns can be decomposed into two effects, the “size as proxy effect” which was the focus of the prior M&A literature, and a “scaling effect” which magnifies per-dollar value created in a given deal. Using data of US takeovers from 1981 to 2014, we document that small bidders make better acquisitions than large bidders when they acquire non-public firms, but worse acquisitions when they acquire public firms, which is inconsistent with size as proxy explanations (e.g., size proxying for overconfidence of a firm’s managers or agency problems). The pattern is consistent with scaling, because value created for bidders is on average negative for public target deals, but positive for non-public target deals. Scaling creates additional predictions for target size, relative size, and international M&A deals we show are borne out by the data.
Bidder and Target Size Effects in M&A Are Not Driven by Overconfidence or Agency Problems Available to Purchase
We would like to thank Kenneth Ahern, Nihat Aktas, Sugato Bhattacharyya, Joost Driessen, Gerard Hoberg, Matthias Kahl, Ron Masulis, Ernst Maug, Han Kim, Gordon Phillips, Per Stromberg, Toni Whited, Dong Yan, Ke Yang, and seminar participants at Australian National University, University of Cologne, University of Frankfurt, Frankfurt School of Finance & Management, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Mannheim, University of Michigan, Monash University, University of Mϋnster, University Paris Dauphine, University of St. Gallen, University of Technology Sydney, Tilburg University, the 2016 DGF conference, the 2016 Stockholm School of Economics Finance Symposium, the 2016 Western Finance Association Conference, and the 2018 SFS Cavalcade Asia-Pacific for valuable comments and suggestions. We are responsible for any remaining errors or omissions. A previous version of this paper was titled: “Why does size matter so much for bidder announcement returns?”
Schneider C, Spalt O (2025), "Bidder and Target Size Effects in M&A Are Not Driven by Overconfidence or Agency Problems". Critical Finance Review, Vol. 14 No. 2 pp. 187–215, doi: https://doi.org/10.1561/104.00000156
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