... CEO compensation rigging stock options repricing G34 G38 J31 J33 Smith and Swan (2013) , hereafter referred to as SS, question the robustness of the findings of Hartzell and Starks (2003) , referred to as HS, and by extension Almazan et al. (2005) , referred to as AHS...

...Adair Morse; Vikram Nanda; Amit Seru Wan (2013) argues that the statistical inferences in our Journal of Finance (2011) paper are not robust, as we do not prove that it is powerful CEOs that rig incentive contracts. Wan makes the theoretical claim that the rigging results are consistent...

..., newly-hired CEOs often receive large one-time startup packages. These firms should be broken out, because the MNS theory is not about newly-hired CEOs as new CEOs could not have rigged a previously-set compensation. Third, the results are sensitive to how industry performance is adjusted for. Fourth...