This study aims to investigate the relationship between managerial entrenchment (ME) and classification shifting, with integrated reporting (IR) serving as a mediating variable.
To test the study’s hypotheses, the authors used a multiple regression analysis on panel data from 254 European companies listed on Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) indices between 2015 and 2023, using Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) estimation for the panel data models.
The results confirm a significant positive relationship between unexpected core earnings and nonrecurring items, indicating the prevalence of classification shifting practices among European companies. Furthermore, the analysis reveals a significant negative association between ME and classification shifting, suggesting that entrenched managers are less likely to engage in such manipulative financial reporting practices. The findings also demonstrate that IR significantly mediates this relationship: entrenched managers not only directly reduce classification shifting but also do so indirectly through the adoption of higher-quality IR.
This study highlights the critical role of IR quality and ME in enhancing transparency and accountability, thereby mitigating the risks of classification shifting. The findings provide valuable insights for improving corporate governance and financial reporting mechanisms.
The results provide valuable guidance for policymakers, regulators and corporate stakeholders seeking to reduce financial misrepresentation and enhance reporting quality through effective governance structures and IR implementation.
This research presents novel evidence on how ME and IR quality collectively reduce classification shifting practices. It contributes original insights by demonstrating IR’s mediating role in the relationship between ME and financial misrepresentation, addressing a significant gap in the literature.
