This study aims to examine the effects on Tobin's Q of various dimensions of the Spanish ownership structure likely to represent conflicting interests: ownership concentration, insider ownership and bank ownership.
The sample of firms is drawn from the population of Spanish non‐financial firms listed on the Madrid Stock Exchange during 1999‐2002. This paper uses data that have both cross‐sectional and time variation, which allows us to control for unobservable firm heterogeneity and obtain consistent estimates of the coefficients.
Contrary to most previous evidence, the results show that the main ownership structure mechanism that affects firm value is ownership concentration. The findings suggest that ownership concentration appears to influence firm value favourably, but at high levels a detrimental effect causes market valuation to be negatively affected by high levels of large shareholder ownership. These findings, which are different from the linear or non‐significant relationships found in other countries, can be explained by the differences in corporate governance systems.
The evidence indicates that controlling owners tend to misuse their dominant position at high levels of concentration and to make decisions that destroy market value. The findings also highlight the necessity of alternative corporate governance mechanisms that lead Spanish firms to lower their agency costs and to maximise their market value when blockholders' and minority shareholders' interests do not converge.
The study builds on prior research in several ways. First, the paper offers new insights into the relationship between corporate governance and economic performance by using data from Spanish listed firms. Second, the study focuses on three dimensions: ownership concentration, insider ownership, and bank ownership, which allow one to get a more accurate picture of the ownership structure‐firm value relation. Finally, the study controls for unobservable firm effects by applying the econometrics of panel data.
