Since the late 1990s, developing countries have been encouraged by international financial organisations to adopt a shareholder primacy corporate governance model. It was anticipated that in an increasingly globalised financial market, countries which introduced corporate governance practices that favour investors would gain a comparative advantage and attract more capital leading to financial market growth. This paper aims to empirically test this hypothesis.
The present research paper quantitatively investigates whether adopting shareholder primacy corporate governance norms has had any impact on the growth of the financial market, focusing on nineteen developing countries between 1995 and 2014. Time series indices are prepared for corporate governance regulations, financial market development along with three control indices. Then a lagged multilevel regression between these indices is used to investigate the strength of causality between the adoption of pro-shareholder corporate governance and the growth of the financial market.
The research paper finds that shifting towards a shareholder primacy model in corporate governance has a very small effect on growth of financial market in developing countries. Overall the financial, economic and technological controls have much more impact on the growth of financial markets.
This paper conclusively ends the discussion as to whether change in corporate governance has any impact on financial market growth of a country. The papers uses Bayesian econometric model. The paper thus signals the end of LLSV led question as to whether law can affect finance.
