This paper aims to investigate the impact of corporate governance (CG) mechanisms on real (REM), accrual-based earnings management (AEM) and REM/AEM interaction in Jordan following the 2009 Jordanian CG Code (JCGC).
The study used a sample of 108 Jordanian public firms covering 2010-2014. Hypotheses are tested using pooled OLS-regression models.
The authors find that both institutional and managerial ownership constrain the use of REM and AEM. In contrast, both independent directors and large shareholders are found to exaggerate such practices, and CEO-duality is found to exaggerate REM only. However, foreign ownership does not appear to have a significant impact. They further find that managers use REM and AEM jointly to obtain the greatest earnings impact.
The findings have important implications for policymakers, regulators, audit professionals and investors in their attempts to constrain earnings management (EM) practices and improve financial reporting quality in Jordan.
The authors believe this to be the first Jordanian study examining the relationship between CG mechanisms and both REM and AEM following the introduction of the 2009 JCGC, as well as the first in Jordan and the Middle East to examine board characteristics and REM. Moreover, it is the first to test for the potential substitution of REM and AEM since the 2009 JCGC enactment. As such, the findings draw attention to EM practices and the role of monitoring mechanisms in Jordan.
