This paper aims at discussing the determinants of strategic transparency and the governance structure of the East Asian firms. The relatively weak institutional infrastructure in East Asia raises the question about the adaptable governance structure and transparency in the East Asian firms.
The paper presents theoretical underpinnings of the literature on corporate governance, corporate strategy and international business. This paper argues that one of the common factors that determine the success of corporate governance structure is the extent to which it is transparent to the market forces within particular institutional arrangements.
When the institutional arrangements favor mandatory versus voluntary corporate disclosure, this study suggests a reform measure for the East Asian corporate governance system that relies, inter alia, on the percentages of long‐term and short‐term financing to total financing. The higher the percentage of long‐term financing, the more we can infer the extent of outside investors' confidence in the future of the East Asian firms. When more active role of banks involvements with the firms' business is permitted and an effective banks' and firms' strategic transparency can be assured, the East Asian banks and stock market can both lead firms to long‐term favorable achievements. This study also suggests that the protection of both shareholder's rights and creditors' rights can go in parallel lines with the latter is to be given first priority until the investors' confidence in the near and far future of East Asia corporate governance system is built.
This paper extends the value of corporate governance structure to the East Asian firms through advocating the determinants of strategic transparency in East Asia.
