This paper aims to review the performance of the flood forecasting, warning, and response system (FFWRS) during the 1997 Red River of the North flood to identify the factors that contributed to FFWRS underperformance during this flood disaster.
The individual components of the FFWRS are reviewed – data collection, flood forecasting, forecast dissemination, decision‐making, and action implementation, as well as the communication linkages between each system category. The unique challenges and breakdowns that occurred at each system category and communication linkage are identified for this catastrophic flood event.
Forecast uncertainty was poorly communicated by flood forecasters, and misunderstood by decision makers. Both forecasters and decision makers were rigidly committed to probability‐thinking based on what they thought was most likely to happen; neither group adequately considered the possibility of a worst‐case scenario.
Forecast uncertainty must be clearly communicated to and understood by local decision makers. Significant efforts at improved knowledge transfer to decision makers should be made to improve their ability to make rapid and informed decisions during catastrophic hazard events.
Decision makers would benefit from adopting a possibility‐thinking approach that thoroughly considered the possibility of a worst‐case scenario before such an event actually occurred.
