This paper uses a historical case study, the controversy over the possibility of climatic extremes caused by hydrogen bomb tests on Pacific Ocean atolls during the 1950s, to show how, in a context of few scientific data and high uncertainty, political affiliations and public concerns shaped two types of argumentation, the “energy” and the “precautionary” arguments.
Systematic analysis of publications 1954–1956: scientific and semiscientific articles, publications of C.-N. Martin and contemporary newspaper articles, especially from the Asia–Pacific region.
First, epistemological and scientific reasoning about the likelihood of extreme natural events aligned to political convictions and pressure. Second, a geographical and social distribution of arguments: the relativizing “energy argument” prevailed in English-language scientific journals, while the “precautionary argument” dominated in popular journals and newspapers published worldwide. Third, while the “energy argument” attained general scientific consensus within two years, it lost out in the long run. The proponents of the “precautionary argument” raised relevant research questions that, though first rejected in the 1950s, later exposed the fallacies of the “energy argument” (shown for the case of the climatologist William W. Kellogg).
In contrast to the existing secondary literature, this paper presents a balanced view of the weaknesses and strengths of two lines of arguments in the 1950s. Further, this historical study sheds light on how once-discarded scientific theories may ultimately be reconsidered in a completely different political and scientific context, thus justifying the original precautionary argument.
