Globally, co-production is of great significance in promoting neighborhood regeneration. However, in the Chinese context, characterized by a governance system with strong government discourse power and a tradition of passive public participation, co-production has faced significant challenges. To address issues, this paper aims to deeply understand the co-production behaviors and strategy choices of local governments and residents in the co-produced neighborhood regeneration.
An evolutionary game approach was utilized as the research method to analyze the interest interactions between the two parties, the differences and similarities in strategy choices and the influencing factors in government and resident-initiated project types, respectively. Chongqing was selected as the case area for empirical analysis, with data derived from project materials and in-depth interviews.
This study revealed dynamic interactions between local governments and residents, significant differences between the two project types regarding co-production levels, the positive role of residents' perceived loss and the effect of marginal benefits on critical influencing factors.
Drawing upon co-production theory, this paper elucidates how different levels of co-production are implemented and highlights the differences between the two types of neighborhood regeneration projects within governance systems characterized by strong state discourse power and a lack of public participation tradition. It addresses current issues and provides critical references for government policymakers and urban planners to make informed decisions and promote co-produced neighborhood rehabilitation projects.
