The purpose of this paper is to explore the enhancement mechanism of quality improvement consulting services in mega water conservancy projects and offer some suggestions to ensure a high level of quality management for such projects which are characterized by their immense scale and lengthy construction periods and exert significant influence on the national economy and social security through their quality.
In this paper, a Stackelberg leader–follower game model based on differential game theory involving four parties—the original supervision party, construction party and owner, along with the newly introduced quality consulting party is constructed. Through simulation and analysis, the effects of incorporating quality improvement consulting services in mega water conservancy projects on eliminating engineering quality issues and changes in the benefits and efforts of each party are analyzed, and the changes in quality management efforts of different parties are obtained.
The research findings indicate that the involvement of a quality consulting party significantly reduces engineering quality issues; the quality management efforts of both the supervision and construction parties are enhanced, playing a positive role in engineering quality control. Moreover, the introduction of a quality consulting party effectively boosts the project’s capacity to manage quality accident risks. Measures such as increasing the penalty intensity of the project owner and improving the efficiency of quality consulting party's quality management work can effectively elevate the quality management efforts of all parties, further enhancing the level of engineering quality management.
Quality improvement consulting is an effective quality management model and related policies can be formulated to encourage the introduction of quality consulting services, especially in large-scale water conservancy projects. Under its introduction, an increase in the owner’s penalty intensity for quality issues can significantly enhance the quality management efforts of both the supervision party and construction party, providing support for the owner to set appropriate quality control clauses in contracts and strengthen quality supervision.
This study combines Stackelberg leader–follower game theory with differential game theory to create a four-party dynamic game model involving a quality consulting party to analyze its enhancement mechanism. This provides a novel theoretical analysis tool for quality management in mega water conservancy projects. By introducing differential game theory to describe the dynamic process of quality management, this study overcomes the limitation of traditional static analysis, which cannot reflect the impact of the time dimension. The study also proposes a management method including quality consulting party intervention and owner punishment mechanism, offering an innovative approach to implement high-quality, efficient construction of mega water conservancy projects.
