There is a growing recognition in Kenya that citizens should play a role in contributing to policy formation. This is a shift from a conventional approach where the elite in society or selected few would largely define policy problems and determine actions. One of the approaches that underpins such views is deliberative inclusionary processes (DIPs). DIPs emerged in the 1980s with the rise of civil societies that challenged various approaches by governments and authorities. While most countries have embarked on developing climate change policies, this paper aims to discuss DIPs and report on a study of the Kenya Climate Bill 2014 policy-making process.
Semi-structured interviews were used to obtain valuable information from stakeholders. The study aims at understanding how policy space and outcomes are shaped by policy discourses and narratives; actors, networks and institutions; and politics and interests.
The Kenyan case of a policy-making process represents a typical DIP. However, it had a unique start from social movement action to government ownership which was characterized by serious problems of inclusion and exclusion, relations, conflict of interests and a real play of power and control of the policy process. The findings underscore how politics and interests; actors, networks and institutions; and narratives and discourses are among the elements that shape policy outcomes.
Kenya being among the first countries to have a policy document on climate change, this study provides an insight for future policymakers and practitioners and a basis for comparative studies.
1. Introduction
Conventional environmental policies are largely characterized by “top-down” approaches. “Top-down” approaches relate to higher authorities defining and deciding how things should work at the community level. “Top-down” approaches are based on the assumption that national and elite groups are able to design policies that will be implemented at the local level. Such approaches have given limited democratic space for the people who are affected at the local level. Most policies that have followed this approach to some extent have failed in a number of regions both in the “north”[1] and “south” during the late 1960 and throughout 1970s (Kamruzzaman, 2012). In the aftermath, democratic freedom was given to local communities to participate in policy processes, resulting in a growth of social movements where the local communities and concerned parties come up with other means to rise against certain policies that affect them or may be of interest to them (Holmes and Scoones, 2000; Kamruzzaman, 2012). Such processes not only produce surprises and uncertainty but also involve complex engagement of elements within a system (Ratter, 2013)
Gaventa and Robinson (1999), cited in Holmes and Scoones (2000), argue that there are four ways through which local communities, especially the “non-elite” citizens, are able to shape policy outcomes. The first is through “resistance”. Scott, who studied how peasant and oppressed persons resist the dominating group, argues that the oppressed do not speak their mind before the dominant group but rather find a way of advancing their discourse of concern among themselves through gossips, which provides a platform for information sharing that may build up to social resistance Scott (1990a, 1990b). The second way is through community-based action groups, social unions, social movements and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). These movements are important in creating public awareness of the issue at hand, mobilization of group resources and, more important, media awareness (Dalton et al., 2003). The third route is via formal representation through democratically elected representatives. These representatives become agents of the electorates and are entrusted to represent their interests. The final course is by way of an expanded democratic space where the greater “public” is invited to participate in consultation and decision-making processes (Holmes and Scoones, 2000). This is an approach that has gained popularity in the past three decades.
Under the UNFCCC convention, countries have been urged to fast-track their national and local climate change policies, especially those in the south that are extremely vulnerable to climate change impacts. Each of these southern states has been put to task in coming up with a national climate change policy to benefit from adaptation funds that have been proposed under Conference of the Parties (COP) of 2012 in Doha, Qatar. Kenya is one of the first few countries in the global south that have been able to come up with a national policy under the Kenya Climate Bill of 2014. This bill is a product of tough engagement among stakeholders between the year 2008 and 2014, including rejection of the bill when it was subjected to the parliamentary process for the first time in the year 2010.
Despite having the climate bill that waits presidential signing into to law, the bill has come a long way. Considering that Kenya has seen a tremendous change in democratic space in the past 20 years, a shift from a single-party and autocratic regime to a multiparty regime and now a move from a national system to a federal system of governance, the current climate bill awaiting action presents an interesting case on how challenges of choices on inclusion, namely, heterogeneous actors with different interests, wit, tact, power and control, play in a democratic space shift.
This paper presents a study on how policy space and outcomes are shaped by deliberative inclusionary processes (DIPs) using Kenya’s Climate Change policy-making process between 2008-2014, which culminated by the drafting of the Climate Change Bill of 2014. Using the DIP lenses, the study analyzes key discourses on: who were the key actors and institutions; what politics and interests are attached to narratives, actors and institutions; what is the role of power and control over the outcome; which challenges were encountered; and highlights of strategies used to overcome those challenges. Secondary materials including minutes of meetings, stakeholders’ web pages, policy documents and stakeholders’ interviews undertaken between November 2014 and January 2015 are also used in the analysis.
1.1 Kenya climate change status analysis
The IPCC recognizes climate change as one of the greatest threats facing humanity in the twenty-first century (IPCC, 2007). It threatens social economic advancement of many nations and states, especially countries and territories in the global south. In Kenya, climate change threatens key social economic sectors that contribute to a large share of its GDP. These sectors include the agriculture, tourism, livestock farming, fishing and energy sectors, according to the GoK (2010), Maina et al. (2012) and Njoroge (2015). Despite limited studies on climate change risks and vulnerability in Kenya, few studies have attempted to examine climate change impacts in different sectors and regions. In a literature review by Awuor et al. (2008), Mombasa is described as being vulnerable to heat stress, disease outbreaks and loss of biodiversity, both marine and terrestrial. The authors further note that Mombasa is an LLCZ with unplanned settlements that have encroached drainage systems, hence making it vulnerable to flooding during extreme rainy seasons. A further GIS-based analysis reveals that sea level rise and storm surges expose more than 210,000 people to danger and more than US$500m in assets are vulnerable (Kabede et al., 2010). Further media analysis on climate change can be found in the article by Atieno and Njoroge (2014). Below is a summary of climate change impacts and risks as per sector and group.
2. What is a policy process?
To understand a policy process, it is important to understand the characteristics of a policy-making process. According to Scoones et al. (2006), a policy process is a political process and not a technically rational process. It is also a complex and chaotic process which involves learning from mistakes made in the process. Moreover, it is not discrete and technical but rather an amalgamation of values and facts. These values are normally attached to different interested parties who influence the policy outcome. Furthermore, a policy process involves discretion and negotiation, hence policy outcomes can be seen as a product of technical experts and policymakers. In the process, some ideologies may be preferred over others depending on the power over control of the policy process. Finally, it is believed that scientists largely define the policy issues, whereas policymakers decide on priority areas based on interest and resources, and it can be concluded that a policy process is constructed by both technical experts and policymakers (Scoones et al., 2006).
There are two distinct policy-making processes: conventional and deliberative. The conventional policy-making process is highly associated with pre-civil movements of the 1970s and 1980s that gave birth to typical policy-making processes, which are discussed here below.
2.1 Conventional policy-making process
Conventionally, policy-making processes have been thought to take a linear clear process with a number of stages of rational decisions that lead to a policy (Maina et al., 2012). These steps are captured in Table I. The process starts by understanding the issue or policy problem at hand. This is followed by exploration of possible options for resolving the problem. The policy options are weighed based on cost, efficiency, etc., and the most favorable response is implemented. Next is policy evaluation, which may be an ongoing process.
This conventional approach has been criticized for separation of facts, which is largely thought to be guided by rational scientific basis, objective knowledge and value, as a separate issue that can be handled by political processes, as noted in a review on of IDS3 research on the environment (Leach et al., 2010).
Going by the view presented above by Leach et al. (2010), it is evident that the elite are believed to be able to come up with policy solutions that will work given best technical minds and resources. While such an approach has seen a rise in grassroots resistance, especially when the solutions proposed go against the local interests, there has been a shift toward wider inclusion of parties that are ought to be affected by the policy outcome. It is in this line of thought that new approaches such as DIPs are considered (Figure 1).
2.2 Contemporary policy-making process
So, what are DIPs? To understand DIPs, it is important to answer these questions around DIPs. What is the objective of DIPs? Who defines the discourse? Who is included or excluded? Who defines the problem? Who defines the rules of engagement? Who convenes and supports the deliberations? In doing so, attempts are made to illustrate (Figure 2) the DIPs in relation with top-down approaches and bottom-up approaches. We hereby argue that DIPs aim at appreciating the value of interests among different stakeholders; hence, while interests remain heterogeneous, resource of the elite and the value knowledge of local communities must not be neglected. However, a critical question to the deliberation process is who defines the problem and the policy objectives? In a climate change policy process, it is evident that the global discourse has been largely driven by the IPCC reports addressing mainly global climate change issues; however, the political processes to mitigate or adapt to climate change happen at the national and municipality levels. Therefore, the definition of the policy problem is highly likely to be shaped by different narratives and interests among stakeholders. The discourse is likely to be shaped by the extent of negotiation and conviction. The problem of who convenes the negotiation would depend on modalities of the process and, more important, trust and transparency among different stakeholders.
The figure below demonstrates the DIP policy process, where the process represents an imbalance of opinions feeding into policy actions. Assuming the policy process has attracted relevant stakeholders to be included, the process is nonlinear, dynamic and complex in the sense of complexity theory. Colloquially one can say, rather chaotic. The policy space will be highly influenced by power and relations, politics and interests, actors’ institutions and networks. In the process, more awareness will prevail among actors. But as well, interaction of agents at the micro level (local) can result in surprises and frustrations at the macro level (national) of a society (Ratter, 2013). Shift of interests will be experienced depending on the ability of actors to convince each other. Learning is produced and strategies for unlocking policy hurdles are developed, again shaped largely by interests.
Leach et al. (2010) describe policy process as political, incremental, complex and messy with competing agendas. This is so because different actors have different ways of understanding and framing policy problems. Furthermore, the process may see changes in constitution and structure of engagement while more interested parties are included or excluded from the process.
2.3 Participation in policy context
The late 1970s is noted to be the period where “participation” found its way in development agenda, as noted by Cohen and Uphoff (1980). However, despite its popularity, the term “participation” remains an elusive one and has attracted different meanings categorically (Cornwall, 2008). Arnstein (1969) provides an illustrative ladder of participation with three levels which literally demonstrates participation variation in term of “good” and “bad” participation (Figure 3). The good participation is seen to be the one with citizenry empowerment in decision making. It is at this level that the highest level of “citizen control”, “delegation of power” and “partnership” ought to have been enhanced. At the lowest level of the ladder of participation is “non-participation” (Figure 3).
Manipulation (1) and Therapy (2) main aim is to educate the participants about proposed plans or policies and the request to participate is viewed as a public relations activity.
Informing (3) is an important step to citizenry participation because it helps to bring participants up to date with what is happening. However, more often than not communication remains a one-sided channel with no feedback from participants.
Consultation (4), on the other hand, is an important aspect of planning and/or policy formulation especially in measuring participants’ attitudes. However, more often than not, decisions may have been made.
Placation (5) occurs when some participants are handpicked into committees to legitimize the process. Participants who support power holder’s ideologies are more favored to join the committees.
Partnership (6) is a situation where plans and policy-making process remain a shared responsibility. Partners are seen as equally important in the process.
Delegated (7) power is where the citizens elect their representatives into committees. In the process, accountability is assured.
Citizen control (8) is where citizen have control of the whole process including policy making, planning and management of projects in their communities.
2.4 Concepts of deliberative inclusionary processes
In an extensive review of literature, it emerges that policy outcomes can be summarized by three distinct yet inter-related elements, namely, discourses and narratives; actors and institutions; and politics and interests (Holmes and Scoones, 2000). For actors, institutions and networks, it is argued that maintaining a discourse or narrative is a key for shared vision. Leach et al. (2010) argue that networks and actors with a shared vision and interests usually build a system of codes of conduct and behavior which is important in maintaining common discourse and narratives as shared within the network. Furthermore, these relations produced by networks determine the policy output (Adam et al., 2008; Erridge and Greer, 2000; Bressers, and O’Toole, 1998); Marsh 1998; Knoke et al., 1996), which can be “pluralist policy” owing to amalgamation of different interests (Knowledge, Technology and Society Team, 2006).
As negotiations and bargaining play a part in the policy process often than not, the narratives may face gradual change as ideas from different actors are discussed, leading to submission to popular narratives of certain actors or a reinforcement of existing ones. It is also noted that actors do occur at different scales and levels of the policy process (Maina et al., 2012). Furthermore, while it is acknowledged that different institutions have different levels of resources, power and control, which are also attached to certain interests and narratives, their role shapes policy outcomes.
Policy narratives are stories about a policy problem in a special political discourse. Its occurrence and effects create new demands of policy response. Some DIPs that are set up can be considered a form of a “joint force for policy making”. In DIPs, context narratives are sourced from a wide range of actors who have different levels of understanding and experiences and associate differently to the policy problems, including those experiencing the problem at the grassroots and technocrats detached from the policy problem.
Moreover, in the policy process, some narratives get more attention and authority than others, whereas politicians override on the attractiveness of simplicity and popularity of the phenomenon. For example, in the 2007 Australian election campaign, ecological modernization and climate justice were considered to have propelled the politicians to power (Curran, 2011). The tendency for advancement of a narrative will largely therefore depend on whose interest it suits, ease of communication through catchy phrases, insertion to a given institutional structure, bureaucratic system or actor network group and “normalization”: where narratives become a way of life of the people (Knowledge, Technology and Society Team, 2006).
Referring to politics and interests, policies are politically affiliated and contested (Maina et al., 2012). Following the Knowledge, Technology and Society Team (2006), there are four ways in which politics manifests. The political context is molded by the political regime in power. The political interest of the regime will eventually influence the outcome of a policy process, which will also depend on certain institutional structures in place that may influence the democratic space. In summary, the following are observed:
Policy process is influenced by a range of interest groups who have heterogeneous interest, ideologies, power and authority over certain processes that affect the policy outcome.
Policy is set out as objective, neutral and value-free and more often than not legal and scientific terms are attached to them to emphasize rationality.
Personal political agenda plays a part in bureaucracy rather than neutral execution of policies.
Because of this complex interaction of politics, heterogeneous actors and interests, power over control, ideologies and values, the policy outcome will reflect all these factors in play. In reference to policy space and outcome, it is the policy space which defines the level of democracy in the policy-making process. It allows for inclusion or exclusion, for free expression or suppression of ideologies among actors. It is the “fair play in cast” which may take different shapes. The level of such democratic conditions will vary from case to case depending largely on the political condition, history and experience of the society involved. Moreover, the shape of policy space has a direct influence on the policy outcome.
Understanding the interactions among actors, institutions and networks demands for an analysis of the politics and interests and a disclosure of discourse and policy narratives which can help to understand the policy space much better (Figure 4; Knowledge, Technology and Society Team, 2006).
3. Methodology
This research was conducted between October 2014 and mid-January 2015, involving two phases of research methods. The first phase was a review of existing literature and material to explore the policy context of climate change and, more important, dynamics of sectoral representation based on conceptual lenses for analyzing policy processes. The literature reviewed includes minutes of meetings, written communication materials, published reports, websites and blogs. Key actors were mapped and identified considering the climate change policy-making period of 2009-2014. Discourses and narratives were explored, which made a basis for follow-up in the second phase. A further review of media coverage was undertaken to get statements of key political figures involved who could not be interviewed. The second phase involved a field study undertaken between mid-November 2014 and January 2015. Having identified as key actors a group of 13 actors informing this research, a stratified random sampling method was used to get the subjects. A total of 49 interviewees and key informants were interviewed. The representation mix included government departments, local and international NGOs, tourism sector representatives, Kenya private sector associations, research institutions and a religious organization.
4. Findings and discussion: Kenya’s way to the Climate Change Bill
Kenya’s climate change policy can be traced back to the year 2006, the start through activism. However, no tangible policy paper had been achieved by the year 2009. This is because activists and their organizations not only had serious problems with the government but also lacked coordinated efforts, climate change knowledge and technical, financial and human resources, which delayed the establishment of concrete structures for advocacy (KCCWG, Road to COP Task Force, 2010).
It was also observed that the actual Kenya Climate Change policy-making process started in early 2009 – the so-called “exodus” year, which was very important for the Climate Bill of 2014. This is because despite the Kenyan Government ratifying all resolutions of UNFCCC, their commitment to mainstream climate change policy had been wanting until 2009/2010. It is also in this period that global advocacy was taking place ahead of COP 15. Under the UNFCCC framework, the role of civil society organizations (CSOs) is acknowledged in terms of education, training and public awareness to matters regarding to climate change. Thus, the convention has allowed inclusion of these important actors as observers in climate meetings.
To ensure Kenya’s civil society representation in COP 15, a number of civil societies held several forums to coordinate CSOs which were hosted at the African Centre for Technology Studies and Climate Network Africa with support from the International Institute for Environment Development. A few months later, more interested groups came on board and the forum expanded to include Kenya Climate Change Forum and National Climate Change Consortium of Kenya. These forums were facilitated by NGOs, including Forest Action Network and Kenya National Federation of Agricultural Producers. All groups would later merge to form the Kenya Climate Change Working Group (KCCWG) in April 2009. KCCWG was a forum that brought together CSOs in Kenya and donor partners as the government disassociated itself from it (KCCWG, Road to COP Task Force, 2010). KCCWG had three key objectives: climate change legislation, climate policy development and advocacy. To achieve this, KCCWG needed to gather knowledge around climate change. Nine thematic groups were identified and tasked to explore climate change issues around the themes. The thematic groups included:
Water thematic group;
Energy thematic group;
Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries thematic group;
Tourism, Trade and Industry thematic group;
Conservation, Pastorals and Conflict over Natural Resources thematic group;
Health thematic group;
Forestry thematic group;
Urbanization, Housing and Infrastructure thematic group; and
Education thematic group.
Having established the thematic groups, a series of “climate hearing”, conferences and workshops took place, which shaped the narratives around climate change. The thematic groups executed their roles in three phases.
In Phase 1, each thematic group was tasked to design and undertake research in their thematic areas. The objective of the research was to explore and evaluate impacts of climate change. Key concerns for each thematic area were summarized and presented to the KCCWG, so that the findings could be incorporated in the draft bill dubbed as “Draft Zero”. Three task forces were also established, including:
a Climate Change Bill task force, which was to coordinate the Climate Change Bill making process;
a task force on Policy; and
a Road to COP task force, which was to advice KCCWG on international climate change negotiation process.
In Phase 2, the first draft of the policy paper was presented to stakeholders who gave their input that would pave way for a better draft. This was done four times until the last preliminary draft was developed. Later, a meeting with the members of parliament and other stakeholders in the government, including the Ministry of Environment, was organized to get their views, which would be incorporated in the preliminary draft.
The final phase, Phase 3, was mainly going back to the grassroots to get the community’s view of the draft. A simplified policy paper was drafted that would be easier for the members of the community to comprehend. Climate hearings were done across the country. This was an important step because as per the 2010 Constitution of Kenya, members of the public must be involved and consulted on any policy paper that aims at addressing issues that concern them. A final draft was prepared after community hearing, which was later shared at regional workshops. Members of parliament were also sensitized to achieve support for the bill once it was tabled in parliament. After the final drafting, the bill was presented to the attorney general for review.
4.1 Discourse and policy narratives
Narratives on climate change in the Kenyan context are captured in the National Climate Change Response Strategy (NCCRS), National Climate Change Action Plan (NCCAP) and KCCWG documents, including minutes of meetings and reports. The general discourse pursued that climate change poses a great challenge to humanity. The impacts of climate change are already being felt in social, economic, ecological, and human systems, including sectors such as water, tourism, livestock, health, transport, energy, agriculture, natural resources and disaster management.
Kenya is “extremely vulnerable” because of its “relative position on the equator”, nearness to Lake Victoria and “varied topology as well as inter-tropical convergence zone (ITCC)” (GoK, 2010). Documents produced by policy stakeholders outlined evidence that Kenya is experiencing varied weather conditions, as demonstrated by recent floods which have become “frequent and intense”, evidence of the melting ice cap on Mt. Kenya and a long drought period which affects the rural and urban poor populations (GoK, 2010).
Agriculture is the backbone of the economy which accounts for about 60 per cent of the country’s export and supports 5.5 million households, both directly and indirectly. Lack of precipitation would translate to food insecurity in the country, shrinking foreign income earnings. Furthermore, long droughts are thought to affect the livestock sector, which represents 13 per cent of the GDP. Evidence of loss of livestock through deaths due to drought has been reported in Northern Kenya, and resource conflicts between pastoralists and agro-farmers have been reported in the Tana River basin (GoK, 2010; KCCWG, Road to COP Task Force, 2010).
Melting of the ice cap on Mt. Kenya has led to loss of river tributaries and water volumes in general, which not only affects the ecosystem functionality but also water-dependent sectors like hydroelectric generation and domestic water use. Urban populations were also considered vulnerable to flash floods, especially in unplanned settlement areas in cities of Mombasa and Nairobi.
Tourism narratives were aggregated in effects on rangelands and wildlife resources, coastal and marine ecosystems and infrastructure, but limited on tourism-dependent livelihood, as “droughts have hit on the country since 1990s”, “reducing forage in rangeland” and “water in rivers hence affecting wildlife”, which forms the core of tourism (GoK, 2010). According to KWS, wildlife deaths have been reported in the recent past, including the death of 14 elephants in 2007, 28 in 2008 and 37 in 2009 – demonstrating a tremendous increase (GoK, 2010). Reduced river water volumes in wildlife zones have also been reported, as “extraordinary and prolonged dry season” has been observed in the Maasai Mara ecosystem. This has exacerbated human–animal conflict owing to migration of animals, which tend to move to water points near human settlements.
Tourist sites also face destruction, for example melting of the ice cap in Mt. Kenya, deterioration of the coastal rainforest, affected fragile ecosystems like corals and parks. Furthermore, impacts of sea level rise and storm have led to the construction of sea wall barriers by some hotels along the beach. Drought-induced diseases, including anthrax, babesiosis and trypanosomiasis, as well as a number of internal and external parasites are also on the rise. Animal migration patterns are also expected to change in search for pasture and water resources. Although much was mentioned on how tourism would be affected, more weight was put on how climate change will or ought to affect ecosystems, tourist attractions and infrastructure. Limited information was provided on how climate change would affect communities dependent on tourism. This led to poor representation of tourism-related climate change cancers.
Although the policy-making process seeks to have participation by a wide array of stakeholders, it is reported that the government depended on “expert reports”, where the expert was a “consultant”, and validation of the policy problem was done through “climate hearings” at the community and regional levels. Likewise, the KCCWG used thematic groups to “study and recommend” to the drafters of the policy. As one of the interviewees reports, the job was already done and their work was to comment and “endorse” the document:
Much of the job was already done by experts and consultants so on a typical meeting that I attended we were required to comment on the report where we would add and/or subtract what we didn’t feel was right. At the end we would agree and endorse the document. (University Lecturer)
From these sentiments, it can be concluded that policy processes not only faced an inclusion problem, which is largely deliberate, but also the problem of who informs what is to be included in a policy document. Hence, participation can bear different meanings, as demonstrated by Arnstein (1969).
4.2 Actors, institutions and networks
The KWCCG operated an open-door policy where any interested actor would join the forum under a thematic area of interest. Consequently, many actors were getting involved. Local multinational NGOs seconded by foreign governments and NGOs were important partners because prior to 2013, the Kenyan Government disassociated itself from KWCCG activities.
Despite lack of government involvement in the policy-making process when the document was ready for tabling in parliament, KWCCG identified Dr Otichilo, who presented the draft bill as a private member bill. Being an active member of KCCWG, it was easier for him to argue for the bill, which then successfully went through all the stages of the parliamentary bill process.
The role of institutions and networks also played a part in financing the research in the thematic areas. For example, the thematic group on Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries received better material support from actors in KCCWG member organizations that had an interest in the thematic area. This led to imbalanced knowledge contribution into the “Task force” that was drafting the policy paper. Sectors like tourism gained very little consideration in the policy document, as acknowledged by a representative of the thematic group on Tourism. The member cited lack of representation from both tourism stakeholders and strong networks, including tourism-dependent communities, as a causative factor for the scant attention given to the sector. In a submission to the working group meeting, the member noted that:
[…] gap exists in terms of climate change awareness […] and […] wildlife does not come up clearly in climate change discussions and the group was keen in incorporating wildlife in the debates and to this end the group was forming a partnership with KWS and members of the Tourism thematic group that would also see development of training tools in climate change adaptation in the wildlife sector and a climate change strategy for the wildlife sector as key output for the anticipated partnership. (Representative, thematic group of Tourism)
Contrary, in an analysis of the NCCRS report, which was developed by the government parallel to the KCCWG draft bill, it was noticed that thorough scientific work was done through a government-funded consultant. The support of development partners with strong technical expertise and funding demonstrates sound research work that culminates with several conclusions on climate change impacts on specific sectors of the economy and a possible way forward in responding to climate change. By examining the two documents, the KCCWG draft bill had several information gaps, with an example provided in the tourism sector.
4.3 Politics and interests
While KCCWG was working toward drafting the policy paper, the activism “noise” was too loud to be ignored by the government. The government therefore established a team to draft an NCCRS white paper. The NCCRS was supported by development partners who provided both technical and financial support for the process. Development partners have been seen as an interested party in the policy reforms in Kenya. In April 2010, the strategy paper was published. However, the strategy did not provide any feasible policy paper on climate change but rather recommendations on how to respond to climate change. KCCWG was a step ahead with its policy draft paper.
Nevertheless, when the KWCCG policy paper was subjected to the parliamentary process, power and control went into play. KCCWG had no power over the bill and was now under the mercy of politicians. Even so, KCCWG rallied for advocacy pushing for the legislature to fast-track the parliamentary process by declaring the bill as “urgent” and “overdue”. After two years of tough negotiations, the bill was passed by members of parliament. However, in 2012, the president rejected the bill citing lack of “public input”, which many stakeholders did not agree with. In response, a member of the draft team from KCCWG expressed that they had engaged local communities in climate hearings across the country, hence the president’s statements were seen as provoking.
In an analysis by Transparency International (TI)-Kenya, failure of the draft bill to pass parliamentary reading hurdles is viewed as a matter of contested interest between the government and KCCWG. This is because the paper was largely informed by “comprehensive research” and stakeholders’ input, who were drawn from far and wide. Later the bill was “mutilated” during the third reading in parliament, where members felt their proposed Climate Change Council should be lowered to an authority. A list of members proposed to the council was also slit-in to include the following parts of the draft bill:
Four persons, one each nominated by each of the following bodies:
Maendeleo ya Wanawake Organisation;
Institute of Climate Change, University of Nairobi;
Association of Professional Societies of East Africa; and
Kenya Climate Change Working Group.”
Two persons appointed by the Cabinet Secretary.”
The inclusion of the four groups was suspicious because among the organizations in the list, three were civil society groups and there was no clear criterion to be applied by the cabinet secretary in appointing the two members of the council. It could also be interpreted as if civil society groups were pushing for their stake by creating opportunities for themselves in the council (Transparency International Kenya, 2012).
Similar observations were made by the KCCWG. In her statement to the media, the chief executive of KCCWG expressed fear that the draft bill was not rejected based on the content but rather on the contested intention to create an independent authority with powers of a parastatal. This was a clear show of conflict of interest between the government and civil society because the nature of institutionalization was highly dictated by the type and amount of funding from government. This fact may speculate the problem of politics and interests among stakeholders, which is addressed in the next section.
After the rejection of the bill, KCCWG members went back to the drawing board. The government, on the other hand, established an NCCAP, which was to inform the review of the rejected draft bill. This was seen as a second chance for the stakeholders to push through the bill for the second time.
In the post rejection period, both the government and the KCCWG learned their lesson. The government well understood the importance of the bill presented in parliament, hence it was forced to act. On the other hand, the KCCWG realized that the power and control over the bill once in parliament rested on the government, hence there was a need for compromise. A “meet me half way” strategy was used which guided the processing of the bill. KCCWG let the government take over the coordination process. This led to the dedication of more resources by the government. As a result, this marked the debut of an important phase of cooperation and collaboration. The Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Environment, Water and Natural Resources launched and gazetted a task force with 15 members to develop a national Climate Change Policy and Law. The task force constituted members from KCCWG, TI (K), Kenya Association of Manufacturers and University of Nairobi, among other stakeholders who provided technical support. The task force was mandated to “spearhead dialogue” and “advocacy at National and County levels” to ensure “stakeholders were aware and understood the implications of the policy and Bill”. As a result, the policy document was tabled in parliament for the second time.
After the first reading, KCCWG in collaboration with the Government of Kenya and through a multinational NGO organized a workshop to sensitize the members of parliament, which took place on 8 May 2014 at Flamingo Beach Resort in Mombasa. The forum brought together stakeholders from the national assembly, the senate, media, KCCWG and other CSOs, providing a platform for negotiation and advocacy. The meeting succeeded in gaining support from members of parliament, which is seen as a strategic move by the workshop organizers.
In a news report by Inter Press Services (IPS), the deputy speaker expressed a “significant political good will” in support for the bill, while the chairperson of KCCWG termed it as “resurrection of the bill”. Furthermore, Kenya’s National Assembly deputy speaker Joyce Laboso told IPS that while the 2012 bill was rejected because of a lack of public involvement in its discussion, the bill had received overwhelming support. This was seen as a “great step” in ensuring that the climate change policy was back on track according to Dr Otichilo, who was an instrumental person in the policy paper both in and out of parliament (Business Daily, March 14, 2013, Njagi, 2013; Waruru, 2013).
5. Discussion
The civil society has become an important integral part in designing, implementing and monitoring public policies (Houtzager and Gurza Lavalle, 2010). The aim of this study was to understand how policy space and outcome are shaped by narratives and discourses, institutions and networks and politics and interest. It takes DIP lenses to understand the Kenyan climate change policy deliberation, which was largely influenced by the CSOs. This study reveals no action by the government in mainstreaming climate change adaptation and mitigation, despite strong push by the CSOs in the earlier years. This led NGOs to picket and push for the government to take action. The pressing on later gave the way for communities to influence the climate change policy process (Gaventa and Robinson, 1999). These findings concur with a study by Bradshaw and Linneker (2003) in the case of a civil society responding to poverty in Nicaragua.
Cox’s (1999) views show civil society as a factor of global power relations with an aim of reproducing capitalist objectives but has a potential for stabilizing social political status quo. NGOs were used to push for global discourse by global multinationals at the local level, which is a clear indicator on how certain interest groups (local and global) can influence discourses in public policy-making processes. Nevertheless, these CSOs are important in raising awareness, as observed in this case. These NGOs were also able to bring together all CSOs into a negotiation table and played a major role in resource supply and providing technical support which was important for KCCWG activities. Policy problems were explored through thematic groups which established different networks of interested parties. Certain thematic groups received better facilitation and support within and without KCCWG. It was observed that institutions and networks were important elements in offering financial and technical support. However, this led to imbalance of knowledge among different groups, e.g. tourism, which had limited networks and little input into the policy paper, as compared to the agricultural sector.
The leading narrative debates are on the climate change burden for socioeconomic sectors and regions. The KCCWG saw the need to solve the problem at the policy level, and thus used the platform to propagate a policy in climate change responses, taking a multi-sectoral approach where some segments had limited knowledge about climate change.
Lack of basic knowledge and information about climate change impacts, risks and vulnerability or opportunities presented led to advancement of speculative and unsubstantiated discourses within networks. However, these networks shaped narratives through information sharing and more often than not they helped achieve popular policy discourses. Furthermore, scientific affirmation was observed as a means of underscoring certain unconfirmed facts which advanced the discourses, as in the case of Australia (Curran, 2011).
The process also faces the challenge of participation. Participation has been criticized as just “consultation” and “cooption” and not “joint responsibility” or “joint decision making” process (Bradshaw and Linneker, 2003; Kamruzzaman, 2012). In some cases, it can be mainly benefiting selfish needs of the few elite in power and at the same time exalting unjust systems in society. Even though through DIP lenses, participation is ensured in the entire process, inputs to the process may give certain stakeholders dominance over others. This was observed especially when certain discourses were popularized. It has been argued that frames shape an actor’s interest, but may be used deliberately by the actor to promote his or her interests (Skovgaard, 2014).
Main policy actors come into conflict over the issue of participation, which is two-way pronged aligning to either the top-down or bottom-up scenario. In this case, despite community climate hearings, the first bill was rejected, but later, the paper was passed and endorsed after the government’s demands were met. In neighboring Uganda, Olsen (2006) situates national climate change response strategies as illustrative of the typical downward streaming of global climate mitigation priorities to a country with conflicting adaptation needs. As such, stakeholder participation within like structures is uneven, especially when dominated by global climate standpoints mismatched to local views of the climate change problem.
Following the draft bill rejection, a twist in the constitution of the climate change was tabled. The government objected to the proposal of a climate change authority in favor of a council. This was seen as a problem of politics and interest considering that climate change adaptation funds for developing countries have been proposed. It is therefore a conflict of interests in governance of climate change funds. Power struggle for coordination of activities was evident, with key questions on who will have final authority on climate issues in the country. Currently the housing of the climate change unit at the Ministry of Environment is contentious. Given the scale of corruption in institutions in developing countries, the underlying motive for disputes over the location of the climate change secretariat would be pegged on control climate funds, for either the nation’s interest or in unfortunate cases for institutions’ selfish gains. It has been observed that such interests in participating groups (stakeholders of climate talk) can frustrate climate change negotiation efforts (Pandey, 2014).
Could this blinded opinion be a contributing reason as to why inputs from the tourism sector were significantly absent from the policy documents? As much as the policy-making process takes a multi-sectoral approach, the policy subsystem fails to be all inclusive. Berkhout (2005, p. 381) lists climate-sensitive socioeconomic sectors as agriculture, forestry, fresh water resources, coastal zones, built environment and tourism and insists on non-coordination of mitigation and adaptation strategies but a focus on embedding adaptation to aforementioned sectoral policies. Development concerns of all sectors of the economy affected by climate change should be factored in the policy development process. Institutionalizing sectoral participation in public policy making requires a political process, and this according to Piron and Evans (2004) should be more open and participative.
So whose interest matters? The nation’s interest matters and that is enshrined at the people’s perspectives of specific climate change policy problems (Patt, 2012). However, this does not rule out the existence of other interests. National interest is pegged on providing solutions to those problems being faced by regions at the moment. This same interest should guide the processes of policy development. National interest is multilevel, taking into consideration multi-stage development needs. Through DIPs it can be assumed that the policy intent is the public interest, but the same is negotiated through reconciliation with other interests in the policy arena.
Was it then a game of wits, tact and strategies or “just meet me half way” for the situation in Kenya? Powerful interests are involved in the policy-making process, and an aim for a consensus may not guarantee a win-win situation for participating actors. There is a myriad of other drivers for public policy (Dessai and Hulme, 2004), for example limited financial resources.
For the Climate Change Bill in Kenya, parliamentary support is an indication that the bill proposes enormous deliverables. But their true motivations of policy choices are put to question over their negotiated position in reading the perceived policy problem being addressed. The climate change problem can only be solved with coordinated efforts of all social actors. Anchoring the adaptation strategy on policy was a plus on the KCCWG. The policy, on the one hand, is presented as a binding goal for sustained climate change response. On the other hand, policy gridlock may undermine its outcomes.
Climate change remains a public policy dispute even though its development may be disguised as a simple outcome of linear undisturbed processes. A detailed view of the chaos within the policy space is a step in developing evaluation capacity of the effects of a policy for the climate change problem in Kenya. However, the process faces a myriad of underplays that shape the policy outcome.
6. Conclusion
This study aimed at analyzing climate change policy-making process in Kenya in the period 2008-2014. The study reveals that this particular process was chaotic rather than swift. Our analysis shows how the process plays in a wavering space of deliberations, as well as conventionality, to reach policy outcome. The complexity of such an oscillating approach is a snarl up to policy outcome occasioned by possible grassroots resistance to the conventional approach, and the impasse of a deliberative route being complicated by disparity in participation level of represented groups. Policymakers thus should consider the fact that the policy-making process cannot be confined to a linear approach, and embark on tactics that are sensitive to the complexities of inclusion, deliberations and negotiations.
The role of a civil society was revealed as instrumental in advocacy, as observed in this case. The CSOs were important in kickstarting the process and advocating for government action on climate change response through policy formulation. The journey toward developing the climate change process was kicked off by inviting interested parties through an inclusionary process. That process is deliberate and determines the nature of narratives, networks and interests.
As mentioned before, it was also revealed that policy outcomes are shaped by three core elements, including discourses and narratives; actors, institutions and network; and politics and interests. Other factors include financial strength, power over control, information and abilities to convince. This can be categorically demonstrated by the policies on different sectors where certain sectors had concrete policies than others, e.g. agriculture vs tourism.
It is also revealed that the policy process produces learning as different stakeholders come in with differentiated understanding and narratives, and in the process, views may change among stakeholders.
Furthermore, the importance of participation is also underlined. This provides for interested parties to bring in their views and contribute largely to the policy document. However, participation is a slippery term, as it has different meanings and levels which can be misused by the elite in a policy-making process.
Finally, it was also revealed that the process is characterized by compromises, as observed in the tug of war between government and the KCCWG. The KCCWG compromised the composition of the climate change secretariat among other issues introduced during parliament debates.
7. Recommendations
From this research, we suggest the following for practitioners to moderate the complexities involved in deliberative approaches to policy making:
To ensure an inclusive policy, one must ensure collective and equitable participation.
While networks are important, financial support is paramount, especially for weak institutions.
Power over control of the process should be minimized.
The CSOs should be strengthened by providing them with democratic space.
There is a need for enlightenment on the subject matter for any policy to thrive.
The process must be objective.
For policy scholars/researchers, the following is recommended:
While many other countries, especially in the global south, have embarked in the development of national climate change policies, we recommend comparative studies to compare notes from experiences in those countries.
There is also a need to compare studies from global north to south.
There is a need to examine the extent at which each element of DIP influences the policy outcome in different cases.
Note
For the purpose of this paper, “north” refers to developed countries, whereas “south” refers to developing countries or those in transition.
First, the authors wish to acknowledge funding from The Cluster of Excellence CliSAP of the University of Hamburg for financing the field work and the input of Dr Njoroge’s PhD committee, including Prof Dr Jurgen OBenbrugge and Dr Michael Link, PhD, of the Institute of Geography, University of Hamburg. Further acknowledgement goes to Dr Jan Pedzol (PhD), Ms Qian and Mr Giedrius in the development stage of this manuscript. The authors also wish to acknowledge the constructive input of the reviewers who have helped enhance this manuscript.
