Resilience antecedents of energy companies: comparing the public and private sectors in Switzerland Open Access

CEO

= Chief Executive Officer;

LAE

= large enterprise (more than 250 FTEs);

MCE

= micro enterprise;

MDE

= medium enterprise;

OR

= organizational resilience;

PSO

= public sector organization; and

SME

= small and medium-sized enterprise.

Disruptive events, such as geopolitical tensions, environmental crises and pandemics, challenge the robustness of the energy sector, a sector that is of the highest functional importance for contemporary societies. In this context, the degree of resilience of energy companies has gained paramount importance. An organizational approach was chosen for this article, which means that organizations must enhance their resilience to better anticipate, adapt to and recover from disruptions, potentially even achieving a more advantageous post-disruption position. The COVID-19 pandemic renewed interest in resilience, as disruptions increased vulnerability across public and private organizations (Gustafsson et al., 2021). As a consequence, an increasing number of studies are more specifically dedicated to resilience within the public sector (Bao et al., 2024).

Research on organizational resilience (OR) has proliferated in recent years across a variety of fields, from health care and emergency services to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Studies in these sectors consistently point to both tangible antecedents (financial buffers, digital infrastructures and capital reserves) and intangible antecedents (culture, leadership, networks and communication) as central determinants of resilience (Barasa et al., 2018; Morales et al., 2019; Chen et al., 2021). Methodologically, most contributions have relied on quantitative approaches such as regression analysis and structural equation modeling (SEM) to test predictors, while more recent works adopt mixed-methods designs to capture cultural and leadership dimensions (Giovannini and Giauque, 2024). This growing body of evidence provides a strong foundation but also raises questions about how these antecedents interact and whether their relative importance varies across different organizational contexts.

Recent reviews (Ingram et al., 2023) emphasize that energy resilience research remains dominated by macro-level analyses (policy, national security), with insufficient attention to the organizational level. Yet these insights have not yet been systematically tested in the energy sector. Moreover, De Medeiros and Saurin (2025) show that resilience entails trade-offs between organizational and individual practices, yielding not only efficiency but also hidden human and global costs – an aspect largely absent from studies on energy firms.

Despite this context, comparative evidence is scarce. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, no study has examined how legal form and size shape resilience antecedents in Swiss firms, or even how renewable strategies interact with culture and governance. Furthermore, prior research has largely ignored the dual outcomes of resilience, focusing on efficiency while neglecting hidden human and global costs. Addressing these gaps requires a comparative organizational-level study of Swiss energy companies.

This study addresses these gaps by focusing on three research questions:

The case of Swiss energy companies is particularly suitable to examine the role attributed to resilience antecedents for the following two reasons. First, because of Switzerland’s federal character and despite its small size, a high number of energy-producing and distributing firms with various legal forms and sizes exist. This empirical setting allows us to easily examine the influence of the variables of legal forms and size. Second, Swiss energy firms are exposed to a challenging context that forces them to make important strategic choices. Indeed, Switzerland is strongly dependent on foreign energy imports, in particular regarding foreign fossil and nuclear fuels ^[1]. The suspension of negotiations on an electricity agreement between Switzerland and the European Union in 2018 brings grid insecurity (IEA, 2023). Simultaneously, national political decisions, such as the “Energy Strategy 2050,” aim at the successive replacement of nuclear and fossil energy by renewable energy (Díaz et al., 2017). Hence, the pressure on Swiss energy-producing and distributing firms to contribute to the realization of such national policies is high. The arrival of important geopolitical crises, such as the war in Ukraine, adds further pressure to increasingly produce renewable energy. Indeed, it is often argued that the national vulnerability regarding foreign energy supply can be reduced by producing more renewable energy within the country. Therefore, the limitation of the study to energy-producing and distribution companies also allows us to address the issue of sustainability by examining particularly the role played by renewable energies as a resilience antecedent. A mixed methodology will be mobilized for this endeavor. In so doing we expect to contribute to the design of a more robust concept of “organizational resilience” for energy production and distribution companies.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. First, a comprehensive overview of OR within both private and public sector organizations (PSOs) is provided. This section further examines the specific challenges faced by PSOs, focusing on the resilience of public energy companies in Switzerland. The methodological section details the selection criteria for the interviewed participants, the interview questions and the analytical approach for examining the annual reports of Swiss energy companies. Our findings highlight the key resilience factors and identify their perceived importance in the context of the energy supply crisis. The implications and key contributions of the paper are finally discussed in light of existing literature on OR.

OR is commonly defined as the ability to absorb shocks, adapt and leverage disruptions through strategic processes, human capital and partnerships (Giovannini and Giauque, 2024). Resilience is generally acknowledged to operate at multiple levels (individual, team and organization), though this study focuses on the organizational dimension, where strategic and structural choices are most visible (Gover and Duxbury, 2018). External factors, such as the nature of relationships with partner organizations, also play a role in shaping OR at an external level (Baitan et al., 2020). Despite this apparent consensus, the literature remains fragmented, with competing paradigms emphasizing different aspects of resilience. More recent studies stress that resilience should be conceptualized not only as a capacity but also as a dynamic capability that unfolds through organizational processes, interactions and trade-offs (Tokalić et al., 2021; Giovannini and Giauque, 2024).

In contemporary conceptualizations of OR, there at least three perspectives:

1. resilience engineering (RE);

2. ecological resilience (ER); and

3. the more recent socio-technical resilience (STR).

RE conceptualizes OR as the ability to bounce back to the functional “acceptable” state. Key levers therein are the maintenance of functions and rapid recovery through the mobilization of specific resources. In the energy sector, RE is critical because of the need for continuous service provision (Panteli and Mancarella, 2015). In parallel, scholars have proposed the antifragile paradigm, arguing that organizations may not only recover but emerge stronger after disruptions by embedding new routines and technologies (Ruiz-Martin et al., 2018; Tokalić et al., 2021). In addition to RE and ER, STR emphasizes the interaction between social systems, such as organizational culture and management and technological systems, namely, grid infrastructures.

In recent studies, we learn that resilience is not neutral but rather a distribution of adaptation efforts between individuals and organizations. De Medeiros and Saurin (2025) argue that while rising constraints trigger both individual improvisation and organizational practices, effective organizational investments reduce the need for costly individual adaptations. That said, over-reliance on individuals may yield short-term efficiency but at the expense of human costs (stress, safety risks) and global costs (corrective expenses, turnover). Conversely, organizational slack, redesign and learning demand upfront resources but ensure sustainable resilience. This perspective underscores that resilience entails a politics of distribution, raising the question of who ultimately bears the costs of adaptation (de Medeiros and Saurin, 2025).

Antecedents of OR are manifold and can be divided into organizational “hardware” and organizational “software.” Specifically, material resources, financial resources and technological resources are generally considered as the hardware determinants of OR, whereas intangible aspects of the system (values, culture and networks) allude to organizational software (Barasa et al., 2018). These two perspectives of OR articulate at least six dimensions: capital (structure, reserve and debt service); strategy (operation strategy); organizational culture (sensemaking, flexibility and employee commitment); internal relationships and networking (emotional connection and customer service); and learning and competency management (Chen et al., 2021).

Most empirical studies over the past decade have used SPSS-based regression models or SEM approaches to test specific predictors. For instance, Morales et al. (2019) confirmed organizational culture as a key driver using regression, Kim et al. (2021) applied ANOVA to highlight the role of two-way symmetrical communication and Sindhwani et al. (2022) used SEM (SmartPLS) to demonstrate the importance of digital adoption and leadership support in energy firms. Mixed-methods approaches, such as Giovannini and Giauque (2024), triangulate surveys with interviews to show how anticipatory cultures and liminal leadership foster resilience in public organizations.

Besides, the case of SMEs has lately received important scrutiny, with several interesting findings (Iborra et al., 2020); for instance, strategic communication and relationship management are emphasized as subdimensions of the OR capacity of SMEs (Kim et al., 2021). In addition, a study (n = 830) of full-time employees in the USA highlights the importance of two-way symmetrical communication (manager vs collaborators) strategies and positive employee relationships (Kim et al., 2021). From the perspective of social/human capital and the Relational Activation of Resilience model, organizational connections are critical (Plimmer et al., 2021). OR can also rely on strategic human resources management: this means developing competencies (expertise, opportunism and creativity) and capitalize on behavioral assets (such as experimentation and problem-solving mindset), networks, empowerment and open communication.

While antecedents have been widely studied, fewer works have explored the outcomes of resilience beyond efficiency. For de Medeiros and Saurin (2025), resilience yields dual consequences: on one hand, efficiency and operational continuity; on the other, hidden costs when the balance shifts excessively toward individual improvisation. Such costs may manifest in employee exhaustion, safety incidents or systemic inefficiencies that accumulate over time. We note that current literature tends to overemphasize robustness and under-theorize these costs, which risks presenting an overly optimistic view of resilience (de Medeiros and Saurin, 2025).

Our interest in differences of resilience antecedents between public and private organizations is predicated on the well-established literature on public–private differences concerning their missions, goals, governance, culture and the professional identities and motivations of their employees (Perry and Vandenabeele, 2015; Kouadio and Emery, 2020). As suggested by Linnenluecke and Griffiths (2010), the factors promoting or inhibiting resilience may be context-dependent. In the case of PSO, studies invariably consider legal and bureaucratic constraints. Moreover, the efficiency values promoted by New Public Management may have undermined the resilience of public administration, as these values inherently oppose resilience strategies that rely on redundancy (Hillmann and Guenther, 2021). Conversely, public administrations’ running based on network governance (NG) principles seems to have the best predispositions to develop their resilience. This is because, contrary to hierarchical forms of governance, NG-based organizations are controlled through relationships based on reciprocity and trust (Sellberg et al., 2018).

Despite these interesting insights, the literature on PSOs remains limited in scope, because most studies remain descriptive and fail to compare antecedents across sectors or industries. Moreover, little is known about whether bureaucratic constraints and public service values alter the weight of resilience drivers relative to private firms (Ingram et al., 2023). This constitutes a major research gap.

A recent systematic review of 124 studies by Ingram et al. (2023) highlights three blind spots in the literature:

1. the dominance of macro-level analyses (policy, national security) over organizational-level studies;

2. the neglect of SMEs compared to large utilities; and

3. the lack of distinction between sudden shocks (e.g. blackouts, disasters) and long-term stressors (e.g. decarbonization, persistent price volatility).

Addressing these gaps requires a finer-grained focus on how energy firms – especially at the organizational level – adapt strategically and structurally to ongoing pressures (Ingram et al., 2023). As critical infrastructure, the energy sector’s failure can trigger cascading effects across other sectors such as health care, transportation and communication, which highlights the importance of systemic stability beyond internal survival (Panteli and Mancarella, 2015). Additionally, the energy sector is characterized by high capital intensity and long investment cycles, thus making it difficult to adapt quickly to sudden market changes or shifts in regulatory environments (Zio, 2016). The latter adds further complexity, with policy changes, such as decarbonization efforts, which require a balance between maintaining resilience and fostering innovation. Moreover, energy companies often operate within highly complex and interdependent supply chains, thus increasing their vulnerability to external shocks, namely, geopolitical tensions, natural disasters or cyberattacks. This is compounded by their reliance on finite natural resources such as oil, gas and coal, where supply disruptions can severely impact operations, necessitating robust risk management strategies (Panteli and Mancarella, 2015).

All these factors make resilience in the energy sector challenging, requiring a multifaceted approach to mitigate risks, comply with regulations and innovate. Public energy utilities face additional challenges, navigating political and bureaucratic hurdles. They also often have stronger ties with local governments (which means additional support during crises). In fine, the public mandate to ensure service continuity makes resilience an integral component of their operations.

While they make important contributions, the scholarly studies on energy companies remain limited and feature inconsistent findings. Some issues nevertheless emerge as inevitable redlights for SMEs and even for larger energy companies. Relatedly, insights are pinpointed concerning the necessity to pay particular attention to supply chain disruptions, regulatory and market frameworks, national energy policies and the impact of concurrent disasters, for example, pandemics (Sindhwani et al., 2022). For instance, Kong and Zhang (2019)’s study confirm that the effects of sequential hazards on infrastructure resilience heavily depend on the magnitude of the hazards, their spatiotemporal relationship and dynamic combined impacts and infrastructure interdependencies (Kong and Zhang, 2019). Drawing lessons from the USA case, Clark-Ginsberg et al. (2020) explore the challenges and strategies for maintaining critical infrastructure resilience, including energy utilities, during the COVID-19 pandemic. For the authors, critical infrastructure resilience should be understood as a sociotechnical construct: here, key competent actors are at least as important as the availability of technical infrastructures (Clark-Ginsberg et al., 2020).

In an era of decarbonization, Oyewunmi (2021) takes a broader view. He examines the requirements for the resilience and reliability of energy companies, emphasizing regulatory frameworks and market mechanisms. He points out the importance of making the right investments in resilience and systems planning. It follows suit that investments in resilience and system planning should also be based on:

• acquiring strategic human resources;

• building on corporate purpose; or

• leaving space for innovation (Cheggag and Chams-Eddoha, 2023).

Recent contributions on the oil and gas sector further identify enablers such as renewable adoption, supply-chain resilience, green business process management (GBPM) and accelerated digitalization (Sindhwani et al., 2022). For entities within the energy sector, the evolution of business models to incorporate greater adaptability emerges as an imperative trajectory (Linnenluecke, 2017). In addressing the vulnerabilities inherent to specific energy production and distribution frameworks, Pellegrino and Marika (2023) elucidate the role of virtual power plants as serving to bolster both the flexibility and, thereby, the individual companies’ resilience (Pellegrino and Marika, 2023).

The Swiss energy sector presents a unique and compelling case for studying OR because of the country’s diverse landscape of energy companies, which include public non-autonomous entities, public independent entities and private companies. We are thus offered an intriguing opportunity to explore how such diversity influences the resilience capacities of energy companies. Additionally, Switzerland’s commitment to transitioning toward renewable energy, as outlined in the “Energy Strategy 2050” underscores the need to assess these organizations’ adaptation capabilities to challenges such as decarbonization, energy storage and supply security in a volatile global environment. Given the critical role of energy in national sustainability, security and economic stability, Switzerland’s approach to balancing public and private sector contributions provides essential insights into how countries can foster resilience in their energy infrastructures amidst global climate pressures and shifting geopolitical dynamics.

Despite this promising context, comparative evidence remains scarce. No study to date has systematically examined whether the legal form (public vs private) and size of energy firms influence the salience of resilience antecedents, nor how renewable strategies interact with cultural and governance dimensions. Recent papers, in the Swiss context, by Giauque and Giovannini (2024) and Romano and Eggimann (2023) have focused on key factors of OR in the Swiss public sector. These are anticipatory culture, information management, leadership and learning from crises, which were crucial during the pandemic (Giovannini and Giauque, 2024; Romano and Eggimann, 2023). The authors also present public sector resilience as a set of proactive and reactive measures, culturally and operationally embedded within organizations, highlighting the special context of emergency services, which are accustomed to handling crises. These works provide valuable insights into the resilience of PSOs and offer potential applications for energy companies. They importantly contribute to our comprehension of the resilience capacities of emergency services such as police and prison institutions, modeled in a three-stage process:

1. preparation before the shock;

2. response during the shock; and

3. learning after the shock.

Other key factors of OR have been pointed out, such as anticipatory and proactive organizational culture, effective information management and communication and liminal leadership practices. In fact, important levers of OR in the Swiss public sector during the COVID-19 pandemic (Giovannini and Giauque, 2024). When crises erupt, public information platforms can support coordination and demand management (e.g. Switzerland’s Energy Dashboard [BFE, 2022–23]). Studies emphasize that resilience not only concerns robust defenses but also adaptability, learning and transformation. For energy companies and other companies in general, this means integrating flexible and anticipatory approaches into their operational and strategic planning, ensuring they can withstand and evolve from both anticipated and unforeseen challenges.

Private energy companies generally prioritize flexibility and innovation (Gaudenzi et al., 2023). In contrast, public energy utilities must navigate additional bureaucratic and political constraints, even if they benefit from stronger ties to local governments, particularly as they operate under a mandate to guarantee service continuity. Despite these advantages, public energy companies’ ability to modernize infrastructures and adopt innovative technologies is limited by longer investment cycles and political oversight (Oyewunmi, 2021).

As in many OECD countries, the security of energy supply has become crucial in the later years. Examining the responses of Swiss public and private energy companies to these challenges may offer valuable insights for future strategies (Panteli and Mancarella, 2015). Our work thus aims to address the following questions:

• RQ1: What are the central resilience antecedents of Swiss energy companies?

• RQ2: What is the respective importance of each of the identified resilience antecedents, especially concerning companies’ renewable energy strategy?

• RQ3: Does the respective importance of Swiss energy companies’ resilience antecedents vary according to the legal form and/or size of the energy companies?

This study adopts a mixed-method research design combining both qualitative and quantitative data sources, consistent with established methodological frameworks (Corbière and Larivière, 2020). While the overarching aim is primarily descriptive – to identify and rank the antecedents of resilience in Swiss energy companies – the use of integrated qualitative and quantitative approaches enables a more comprehensive and nuanced analysis than would be possible with a single method.

The qualitative data collection in this study is based on semi-structured interviews conducted with Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) from six different energy companies, as well as with two experts in the Swiss energy sector. The average interview duration is 60 min. Companies and related interview partners were selected to cover the two important variables examined, i.e. legal form and size. Thus, a large and a small company were selected for each of the following three legal forms that dominate in the Swiss energy market:

1. non-autonomous public energy companies (partly public administration without legal personality);

2. independent public energy companies (legal personality under public law); and

3. private energy companies (operating under private law).

The selected small energy enterprises have between 20 and 200 collaborators, whereas the large ones have between 400 and several thousand collaborators. Because of numerous rejections of interview requests, as well as the actual size distribution of existing firms, the predefined firm-size criterion for small firms – i.e. under 50 employees – could not be met in one case. Each selected company is involved in both energy production and distribution, which allows for an in-depth exploration of renewable energy production as a factor of resilience. In addition, the companies provide ancillary services, including water supply, telecommunications and infrastructure for building energy efficiency. The interviews provided a broader perspective on the energy sector. They were framed within the context of the recent energy crisis caused by the war in Ukraine, with questions focusing on factors influencing resilience, the strategies implemented in response and the future orientations to strengthen energy companies (see  Appendix with interview questions).

To complement the qualitative analysis, annual reports from Swiss energy-producing and distribution companies were analyzed. Publicly available reports for 2022 (the year of the energy crisis) were used to assess the presence of resilience factors (grouped by themes). To select the companies, we used the member list of the Swiss Association of Electricity Companies ^[2]: 408 members, representing over 90% of Switzerland’s energy production and distribution. Of the 408 members, 177 companies that both produce and distribute electricity were identified by the authors through systematic reading of all 408 members’ webpages. Among the latter, 105 companies published their annual report for the year 2022 on their website. Out of these, annual reports of seven companies were excluded because of insufficient detail, leaving a final sample of 98 reports for the final analysis.

The qualitative data from the CEOs and expert interviews were analyzed thematically. Interviewees were asked to discuss factors that contributed to or hindered their organization’s resilience during the recent energy crisis. They were also asked to evaluate the significance of various resilience factors and detail the strategies implemented or planned to enhance the resilience of their companies. This thematic approach was crucial for identifying key resilience drivers within the energy sector. The themes derived from the data were analyzed and aggregated to build up patterns and insights related to resilience factors in the energy sector (Gioia et al., 2013; Corbière and Larivière, 2020). This, both at the organizational and individual levels, thus captures nuances in how companies navigated the energy crisis.

In parallel, the analysis of annual reports began with a thematic coding procedure, focusing on the presence of resilience factors (see an exemplification of our Code Book in Table 1 hereafter). The quantitative analysis was conducted by reading the reports and systematically assessing the frequency of resilience factors across the 98 reports. Rather than merely counting the total number of mentions of each factor mentioned, we used a proportion-based approach, identifying the percentage of companies referencing at least once specific resilience factors. This aligns with best practices in qualitative thematic analysis and ensures a balance in factor importance (Saldaña, 2015). Resilience factors were further categorized under broader themes: e.g. teamwork was grouped under human resources, which was then categorized under resources.

The two comparative variables, i.e. legal form and size, were also used and operationalized as follows:

1. Legal form with four categories: non-autonomous public enterprises, autonomous public enterprises, private enterprises and cooperatives.

2. Company size, based on a classification by the number of full-time equivalents (FTEs). This yielded four categories: micro enterprises (MCEs; 1–10 FTE); small enterprises (SMEs; 11–50 FTEs), medium enterprises (MDEs; 51–250 FTE) and large enterprises (LAEs; more than 250 FTE).

The identified resilience factors and their clusters reflect the perspectives of the analyzed reports and opinions expressed by the interviewees. Our comprehensive analysis offers a nuanced understanding of how energy companies prioritize and manage resilience in the face of global uncertainties. Three main clusters can be highlighted from the annual reports (see Figure 1 for their relative weight: numbers are the share of companies citing the related factor as important for their resilience). Many companies cite resources as their main resilience factor, in particular, resources available to produce renewable energies, financial and human resources (teamwork and a skilled workforce) and also material resources such as technological and network infrastructures. The second cluster is Strategy, which alludes to business and energy diversification, procurement and efficiency strategies. Finally, capacity building is another cluster, yet relatively less important comparatively. Capacity building includes collaboration with other actors (e.g. companies and authorities), development of green energies, investment in infrastructures, communication, risk management and the development of structural capacities.

These three resilience clusters and their respective components also correspond to the resilience factors mentioned by our interviewees.

Based on the annual reports analysis, we hereafter present the relative weight of all detected resilience factors composing the above-mentioned three clusters (resources, strategy and capacities). We paid particular attention to the factors related to renewable energies. In the Resource cluster, we considered resources enabling the company to produce renewable energy. Besides, “Energy efficiency strategy,” notably “Securing supply,” “Load shedding plan” and “Information system security” (in fact, a warning system regarding the security of supply/expenditure in renewable energy) were retained for cluster Strategy. Finally, “Development of renewable energy production” was taken into account in the Capacity cluster. From the thematic analysis of both sources, it appears that human resources and procurement strategies were particularly emphasized, followed by green energy production, as shown in Figure 2.

As highlighted by all the interviewees, human resources is the most important factor in the Resource cluster (51/98), followed by the availability of green energy production facilities (41/98) as well as financial and material resources (21/98):

(Interviewee of a large non-autonomous public company)

The importance of green energy production facilities as a resilience factor is relativized by several interviewees. They all agree on their importance from a general strategic viewpoint and regarding the resilience of a system (for example, at the country or city level, and its energy provision security). However, green energy production facilities are less important for the resilience of their company:

Coming to the detailed results for the Strategy cluster, Business development strategies, especially those devoted to energy transition, are considered as important resilience factors. The general procurement strategy is underlined as being crucial. Indeed, as confirmed by interviews, even companies with a relatively high share of their own production of renewable energies need to buy additional energy on the market. If some companies already had mid- or long-term strategies regarding procurement and securing supply before the energy crisis, others had to learn how brutal the market can be during a crisis and in the absence of a procurement strategy. In addition, they had to buy extremely expensive energy at short notice. Without exception, interviewees confirmed that procurement strategies, in other terms risk management (27/98), have taken on a much more important role since the energy crisis. Figure 3 gives an overview of the ranking of resilience factors as per the companies’ strategy.

Although to a lesser extent, collaboration with other firms and political authorities leads the resilience factors (14/98) in the Capacity cluster. Interviewees consider these factors also as important as well, because collaboration (with federal, cantonal and/or local public authorities, suppliers and sometimes competitors) may increase resilience. One interviewee illustrates the importance of cooperation with the following experience:

If some annual reports also mention the importance of their capacity to develop green energy (10/98) and invest in infrastructures (8/98), interviewees underline that this capacity is conditioned by external factors, such as opposition coming from interest groups (environmental defense organizations).

Communication with customers, risk management in a broad sense and structural resources are also highlighted by several interviewees as being important resilience factors. Figure 4 ranks the different levers of OR capacity.

Table 2 presents the importance of each resilience cluster type/number of resilience factors related to renewable energies by legal status, based on the quantitative analysis of the yearly reports mentioned. It is worth recalling that our thematic analysis of the reports identified three main clusters: Resources, Strategy and Capacity. As a general guideline, a theme mentioned by at least half of the members of the subgroup is considered to be potentially important.

It appears that all companies, whatever their legal form, report resources and strategies as their most important resilience factors. However, some differences appear among legal forms. First, non-autonomous public companies mention capacity building more often as an important resilience factor relative to private companies and significantly more often compared to autonomous public companies and cooperatives. However, the small number of cooperatives (n = 5) may limit the generalization of these results. Second, while human resources are deemed crucial in private companies, the share of cooperatives and autonomous public companies emphasizing green energy production as a key resilience factor is significantly higher. Finally, in none of the legal forms was the strategy for the development of green business models considered important.

When asked about the importance of their enterprise’s legal form for its resilience, most interviewees evaluated it only as moderate or even insignificant. Interviewees from small and large non-autonomous public companies either felt they had sufficient decision-making competence during the crisis or considered that the factors determining resilience do not depend on short-term, rapid decisions:

If the results regarding the legal form’s influence seem somehow ambiguous, the influence of the size variable is clearer. Resources and strategies are consistently reported as the most important resilience factors across all company sizes. However, LAEs and MDEs significantly differ from SMEs and, to a lesser extent, MCEs in the capacity resilience cluster. Surprisingly, the production of renewable energy is not considered as particularly important in large companies. Once again, human resources are identified as a critical factor, and that is for companies of all sizes, except for MCEs. Yet, this must be interpreted prudently because of the weak number of companies in this group: n = 5 (see Table 3 hereafter).

Several interviewees emphasized that in times of crisis, the legal status of a company becomes less significant compared to its size. Larger energy suppliers, regardless of their legal status, are perceived as having a systemic impact and are more likely to benefit from financial support from federal and/or cantonal authorities. This notion reflects a well-known phenomenon in the Swiss banking sector, often referred to as “Too big to fail.” ^[3] Interviewees from large companies highlighted that a bigger size allows for the distribution of a heavier workload across more employees, access to more structural resources and higher priority from suppliers and public authorities when it comes to material needs or financial support. However, interviewees from smaller companies also see advantages in their size during crises. The fact that employees are familiar with local conditions and infrastructure enables them to be more responsive in emergency situations.

A key limitation of this study is reliance on 2022 data – a year of exceptional disruption in the energy sector. This context-specific snapshot may not reflect resilience strategies in more stable periods. Besides, while our thematic analysis was rigorous, the interpretive nature of qualitative coding carries inherent risks of researcher bias. Moreover, focusing exclusively on Swiss energy companies limits the generalizability of our findings to other contexts. Our inferences also rest on three boundary assumptions:

1. (A1) mentions in annual reports approximate organizational salience, though they may under- or over-represent tacit practices.

2. (A2) The crisis year 2022 may not capture resilience portfolios in ordinary conditions.

3. (A3) Our coding records presence/absence rather than intensity, potentially compressing variation.

Future research could build on the results presented here by developing longitudinal resilience indices, extending analyses to cross-national settings and tracing how resilience factors shift across time, sectors, or crisis types. It would also be useful to complement operational efficiency measures with human and global costs – such as burnout, incidents and corrective expenditures – to better test Medeiros and Saurin’s (2025) propositions at the firm level. Finally, configurational approaches (fsQCA, SEM-PLS) could shed light on how bundles of antecedents differ by organizational size and governance.

Our findings carry several practical implications. Resilience strategies in the energy sector cannot be one-size-fits-all. Adaptations are necessary depending on organizational size. Smaller firms need support to build long-term capacities, while larger companies can leverage structural advantages for stronger collaboration and coordination. Our results underscore the value of cross-sector learning as well. Private actors stand to gain from the strategic foresight embedded in public governance frameworks, while public utilities could benefit from the agility and procurement practices that characterize private firms. Finally, the evidence points to the importance of bundled approaches to resilience. Policymakers should encourage the integration of human, strategic and infrastructural capabilities into coherent frameworks, supported by agile information-sharing during crises. Such frameworks are particularly vital for smaller or less autonomous public firms, and their effectiveness could be enhanced through standardized guidance that promotes inter-organizational coordination.

This research was motivated by the increasing urgency to understand how organizations, particularly in the Swiss energy sector, build resilience amid overlapping crises. Our evidence shows a clear hierarchy of resilience antecedents – human resources and procurement strategy dominate, while capacity building (collaboration, investments and structural capabilities) intensifies with firm size. This pattern aligns with a micro–meso distribution of resilience efforts: smaller firms emphasize immediate resource adequacy; larger firms invest in medium- to long-term organizational capabilities. Critically, the limited effect of legal form – relative to size, strategy and culture – suggests that governance practices and capabilities outweigh formal status in shaping resilience salience (Hillmann and Guenther, 2021).

How do these findings compare with previous research? First, the emphasis we place on human resources aligns with prior research underscoring the role of culture, communication and people systems in shaping resilience (Chen et al., 2021; Morales et al., 2019). Second, the central role of procurement strategy contributes a new perspective to energy-sector studies, which have often focused on macro-level factors (Ingram et al., 2023). Our results show that organizational-level procurement choices significantly conditioned both crisis exposure and cost during 2022. Third, the importance of capacity building in larger firms reflects resource-dependence arguments made in the context of critical infrastructures (Panteli and Mancarella, 2015). At the same time, it resonates with Medeiros and Saurin’s (2025) claim that sustained organizational investments help reduce reliance on costly individual improvisations over time. Finally, the limited effect of legal form adds nuance to ongoing debates on public–private differences. Our evidence suggests that strategy and culture can outweigh formal organizational status, while the advantages of public entities, such as institutional proximity, may be offset by bureaucratic frictions (Giovannini and Giauque, 2024).

Why implementation lags. The gap between strategic intent and operational capacity – especially in SMEs – reflects binding constraints in people/time and validates the short-term bias toward resources over capacity building. This raises concerns about the underutilization of long-term capacity building in smaller entities, despite its strategic relevance. Moreover, institutional frictions were frequently mentioned as significant barriers to resilience. These include delays in decision-making because of political oversight of public entities, regulatory instability linked to evolving energy policies, and societal resistance to infrastructure modernization (e.g. opposition from environmental interest groups). Public companies, while benefiting from stronger ties with authorities, must navigate complex administrative layers that may impede agile responses during crises. Private companies, although more flexible, sometimes lack access to institutional support or financial guarantees.

A conceptual consolidation of these relations is provided in Figure 5 [inspired by Raetze et al. (2021)] that summarizes the core resilience factors identified (resources, strategy and capacity building) and how they interact with organizational characteristics (size, legal form and institutional context) to influence resilience performance dimensions such as adaptability, continuity, responsiveness and alignment.

Human resources dominate (51/98), consistent across legal forms and sizes. This corroborates people-centric mechanisms of resilience – culture, symmetrical communication and competence development – and supports the micro–meso view that without adequate staffing and skills, firms default to individual workarounds (de Medeiros and Saurin, 2025). Furthermore, this finding aligns with the current state-of-the-art theory on OR, which insists on acquiring and managing strategic human resources to support OR (Kim, 2021).

Green production capacity is strategically core but not always an immediate resilience buffer at the firm level – interviewees frame it as a system-level asset (security of supply, long-term positioning) rather than a short-term shock absorber. This distinction echoes Ingram et al. (2023), who call for separating long-term stressors (transition pressures) from acute shocks when operationalizing resilience in energy firms (Yu et al., 2023).

In the cluster Strategy, business development strategies and general procurement strategies were highlighted as crucial. The necessary diversification of energy sources has been pinpointed by previous research (MacGregor, 2021). The post-2022 elevation of procurement risk management indicates a learning effect from price spikes and scarcity, shifting strategy from opportunistic purchasing to hedged, multi-horizon sourcing – an organizational lever largely under-specified in prior macro-level energy resilience work (Ingram et al., 2023).

Collaboration with other firms and political authorities – highlighted in both interviews and 14 annual reports – emerged as the leading resilience factor in this cluster. Interviewee accounts highlight that resilience-building capacities rely heavily on the quality and responsiveness of inter-organizational coordination. In fact, collaborative governance structures and institutional agility were particularly salient during the crisis period (Sesini and Hawkes, 2022). That collaboration, rising with firm size, suggests that NG capabilities (public or private) are partly scale-dependent, enabling access to priority allocations, institutional support and joint risk-sharing – organizational investments that lower reliance on individual improvisations (de Medeiros and Saurin, 2025).

Overall, our initial research questions and intuitions are coherent with the findings obtained. The results not only confirm several established theoretical assumptions but also offer original insights – particularly regarding the role of organizational size and the limited influence of legal form, which importantly contributes to the resilience literature.

The analysis revealed that LAEs and MDEs place a significant emphasis on capacity building, while smaller enterprises prioritize human resources. This original finding deserves further investigation: is capacity building a blind spot for smaller companies? If so, is it a problem of limited professionalization, or are smaller companies simply absorbed by issues related to resources and strategy to the extent that they have no time left to think about capacity building? Finally, we highlight that the regulatory environment can enhance or restrict resilience strategies, particularly in public energy companies.

Based on existing research and industry insights, it remains difficult to definitively conclude whether public or private energy companies manage resilience more effectively, because each sector is characterized by its own strengths and constraints. Private energy companies are generally characterized by greater flexibility and responsiveness to market fluctuations (Linnenluecke, 2017), as well as a stronger customer orientation that supports efficient service delivery. However, these firms may still face challenges in maintaining financial resilience. Conversely, public energy companies benefit from institutional backing and long-term stability because of their alignment with public policy objectives. Yet, they often struggle with bureaucratic rigidity (Kaufmann et al., 2019).

In this research, the distinctive role of the energy sector suggests that resilience strategies are shaped primarily by governmental policies and international energy market dynamics, which may limit their direct applicability to less regulated industries such as retail or manufacturing.

It is worth recalling another important finding: size, not legal form, is the primary differentiator of capacity-building salience. Indeed, the literature on public-private differences highlights that, although public organizations in Switzerland are constrained by bureaucratic frameworks, they often promote anticipatory and proactive organizational cultures, effective information management and strong leadership to enhance resilience (Soguel et al., 2025; Bozeman et al., 2025). Compared to previous studies, which often rely on general frameworks or single legal forms, our research offers a more differentiated perspective by combining qualitative and quantitative data across public, private and hybrid companies in the same national context.

Our interview testimonies converge on the systemic importance of, and access to, buffers for larger firms (e.g. priority from authorities/suppliers), while local embeddedness enhances smaller firms’ responsiveness. This pattern suggests that it is capability configurations, rather than formal status, that drive resilience. Because the energy sector often relies on critical infrastructures, the need for structured risk management and multi-level governance (federal, cantonal and municipal) is what significantly shapes the resilience of public energy companies, comparatively to other sectors.

Finally, our study points to the potential synergistic impact of resilience factors in line with configurational theories. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this perspective is rarely adopted despite its potential as a reinforcement lever. A bundling perspective is thus needed to develop stronger resilience strategies. For instance, financial resources may be combined with strategic management and robust human resources (Duchek, 2020; Hillmann and Guenther, 2021).

Interview guide – Resilience factors in energy companies: what role for the energy transition?

• Your company, like many others, has recently had to cope with a number of shocks (Covid-19 and the conflict between Russia and Ukraine). Would you say that your company is in good/poor health today? Why or why not?

• What are the main challenges facing your company in terms of security of energy supply? What measures has your company taken to overcome these challenges?

• What practices or strategies have you developed to deal with them?

• In your experience, what practices or strategies have been particularly effective in dealing with disruptive events (rate them on a scale of 1–10)?

• Do you think being a public/private company has made a difference to your resilience?

• Can you explain the role/level of importance that the following elements have played in your company’s resilience (rate them on a scale of 1–10):

  • Financial and material resources.

  • The structure of your company.

  • (For public sector companies: institutional positioning [municipality, canton, etc.])

  • The human qualities and skills of your staff.

  • The leadership/management style of team or department heads.

  • Ability to work as part of a team.

• What changes have you put in place to prepare for other major events?

• What role does your company’s collaboration with other stakeholders play in your company’s resilience?

• How does your company work with public authorities and other stakeholders to ensure a stable energy supply?

• What arguments do you put forward to reassure your partners about your ability to ensure a stable and reliable energy supply?

• How important have these projects been for your resilience?

• What factors (internal and external) have played a key role in your company’s ability to adapt to the energy transition?

• To what extent does awareness of the energy transition encourage you to become more innovative?

• Can you give us examples of where your business has been resilient?

• How have lessons learned from past events been incorporated into your company’s resilience practices and strategies?

• Where could your company further improve its resilience?

• How does your company plan to strengthen its resilience in the future?