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Purpose

This study aims to examine how repeated, unmonitored opportunities for dishonesty and repeated free riding problems influence cheating and prosocial behaviour across individuals with deontological and consequentialist moral preferences.

Design/methodology/approach

Using three experimental games, namely the Trolley Game, the Repeated Public Good Games and the Repeated Die Rolling Game, this paper examines the effect of individuals’ moral preferences on their prosocial and honest behaviour. The Trolley Game was adopted to elicit individuals’ moral preferences, including deontological and consequentialist preferences, before they participated in two economic games – the repeated public good game and the repeated die game.

Findings

The findings show that deontologists deviated from their moral principles and engaged in dishonesty after exposure to unfair wealth distribution practices, such as public goods games that allow free-riders to enjoy the same benefits as high contributors. Both groups became more prosocial when their self-reported payoffs in the repeated die-rolling game were not subject to the threat of inspection.

Research limitations/implications

A practical implication of these findings is that social policies can cultivate prosocial behaviour by actively demonstrating trust. For instance, repeatedly entrusting morally inclined social workers with public funds intended to help disadvantaged individuals may reinforce prosocial behaviour among the social workers.

Originality/value

The authors experimental findings contribute to the moral and ethical systems literature by demonstrating that deontological commitments may erode when ethical agents operate within systems characterised by unfair wealth distribution, such as public goods environments that permit free-riding.

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