If a society does not identify with purchase of illegal goods, consumers will undertake more psychological burden when buying the goods. The purpose of this paper is to explore the effect of social norm of anti‐piracy on social welfare.
This paper uses a theoretical model to consider that although consumers will select piracy goods for the concerns of net utility, due to pressure from social norms, consumers are not wiling to purchase piracy goods.
The results show that enhancement of social norm of anti‐piracy will improve overall social welfare; however, the social norm of anti‐piracy must be limited to certain scope. Extreme social norm of anti‐piracy, in comparison to the situation without social norm of anti‐piracy, will lower overall social welfare.
If complete laws and strict enforcement cannot curb piracy, we can boldly assume that mature and high degree of “rule of low” is the force to restrain purchase of piracy goods. The paper examines the relations between social norm of anti‐piracy and social welfare.
