Slaying the giant of corruption in Africa: analysing the rhetoric-reality gap under Africa agenda 2063

Corruption is a pervasive issue affecting nations worldwide, with severe consequences in Africa (Njangang et al., 2024). It undermines governance and development through petty and grand corruption, systemic abuse of power, and state capture, which infiltrates public institutions and private enterprises. Even though scholars such as Wathne and Stephenson (2021) argue that corruption and its consequences are inherently difficult to measure, the African Development Bank (AfDB) estimates that corruption costs Africa approximately $148 billion annually, diverting resources from healthcare and education, stifling economic growth, exacerbating inequality, and eroding public trust (Abdulai, 2024). François Valérian, Chair of Transparency International, described corruption as a global threat that weakens democracy and stability, a concern acutely felt in Africa (Transparency International, 2025). These points underscore the barrier that corruption poses to achieving sustainable economic growth, effective governance, and stability, which are essential for development in Africa (Gebrihet, 2024).

The AU introduced Agenda 2063, “The Africa We Want,” which envisions corruption as a thing of the past by 2063. Agenda 2063’s anti-corruption framework operates through three mechanisms: the AU Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (AUCPCC), setting legal standards for preventing corruption; the African Governance Architecture (AGA), coordinating governance reforms through peer reviews; and the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), monitoring compliance with governance norms (AU, 2015b). The APRM is a key component of the AGA that serves as a self-monitoring tool for AU member states to enhance governance policies and practices. The First Ten-Year Implementation Plan (2014–2023) of Agenda 2063 sets two benchmarks: 70% of Member States adopt AUCPCC-compliant anti-corruption frameworks, including independent agencies and transparent procurement systems, and 70% of citizens perceive public services as corruption-free (AU, 2015a). These strategies aim to unify continental efforts, reinforce institutional integrity, and reduce illicit financial flow.

A decade into agenda 2063, goals have shown limited progress. Countries with anti-corruption commissions, including Botswana, Ethiopia, Nigeria, and South Africa, face political interference, inadequate funding, and weak enforcement (Chetty and Pillay, 2017; Gebrihet and Pillay, 2023). Reforms aimed at enhancing transparency are undermined by compromised judiciaries, weak accountability, and entrenched elite dominance (Goelzhauser and Cann, 2014). While existing studies have examined broad governance and anti-corruption reforms in Africa (Gaitonde et al., 2016; Jahnke and Weisser, 2019; Amoah et al., 2022; Gebresilassie et al., 2024; Gebrihet, 2024; Gebrihet et al., 2024; Hope, 2024), there is a gap in the literature evaluating how Agenda 2063’s anti-corruption objectives have translated into tangible progress against the First Ten-Year Implementation Plan milestones. This gap highlights the need to assess why reforms have failed to generate substantive outcomes.

This study frames the rhetoric-reality gap in Africa’s anti-corruption efforts through the lens of the symbolic policy theory. Symbolic politics help explain how the ambitious anti-corruption goals of Agenda 2063 often function more as rhetorical commitments than actionable plans, projecting reformist ideals while obscuring structural constraints such as elite impunity and weak enforcement mechanisms (Kaufman, 2017). Using data from the Index of African Governance (IIAG), this study analyses the anti-corruption effort trends across 13 African countries to contribute to the governance literature. It theorizes the rhetoric-reality gap because of symbolic policymaking that prioritizes image building over capacity building, offering insights into the dynamics of institutional legitimacy and public trust in African governance. This study proposes a revised Second Ten-Year Implementation Plan (2024–2033) to address this gap through context-specific strategies.

This study addresses four questions:

Building on the findings from the four research questions, this study critiques both AU’s first (2014–2023) and second (2024–2033) Ten-Year Implementation Plans, and proposes a revised Second Ten-Year Implementation Plan (2024–2033) for the AU, along with new country-level plans for the sample states for the same period, featuring targeted strategies to reduce corruption and strengthen accountability and governance.

This study employs mixed methods to examine anti-corruption strategies under Africa Agenda 2063, integrating the quantitative analysis of IIAG data (2014–2023) with qualitative case studies. The methodology examines the rhetoric-reality gap in anti-corruption efforts, focussing on AU’s aspirational goals. It combines governance metrics with contextual qualitative insights to assess six dimensions of fighting corruption (anti-corruption mechanisms, corruption in state institutions, public-sector corruption, private-sector corruption, procurement procedures, and public perception of corruption) across 13 selected African countries.

The primary data source is the IIAG (2014–2023), which provides governance metrics for 54 African countries across five anti-corruption dimensions aligned with Agenda 2063. The IIAG integrates both objective and perception-based indicators. Objective indicators capture measurable outcomes but risk overlooking systemic corruption embedded within power structures. Perception-based indicators reflect societal experiences but are inherently subjective and may vary across contexts. To address these limitations, qualitative case studies drawing on national policy documents (such as anti-corruption strategies and legislative reforms), Transparency International reports, IMF governance assessments, and Afrobarometer surveys (Afrobarometer, 2023; IMF, 2023; Transparency International, 2023) are used to complement the quantitative metrics. This triangulation enhances the robustness of the analysis and provides a more balanced understanding, while acknowledging that no single approach can fully capture the complexity of corruption.

Thirteen countries (Botswana, South Africa, Zambia, Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Nigeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Tanzania, Ethiopia, Uganda, Cameroon, and Gabon) were selected based on four criteria: (1) geographical diversity (West, East, Southern, Central, and North Africa), (2) varied governance systems (democratic, semi-authoritarian, hybrid regimes), (3) anti-corruption performance levels (high, medium, low, based on IIAG rankings), and (4) complete IIAG data for 2014–2023.

This study uses symbolic politics theory to understand the gap between what African governments say about fighting corruption and their actions. According to Edelman (1985), symbolic politics refers to the use of speech, laws, or institutions to make it look like they are solving problems, even when real action is missing. These symbolic actions help them win a short-term public trust and international support without making real changes. In the African context, governments often sign agreements such as the AUCPCC, pass anti-corruption laws, or create agencies. These steps are meant to align with Agenda 2063, which sets goals, such as having 70% of AU Member States adopt anti-corruption laws and ensuring that 70% of citizens feel that public services are free from corruption. However, these measures often remain on paper and lack strong enforcement or political backing.

Studies have shown that symbolic reform is common in African countries. Gebresilassie et al. (2024), Gebrihet (2024), Gebrihet and Eidsvik (2024), Gebrihet and Gebresilassie (2024), and Gebrihet and Pillay (2023) argue that many governance and anti-corruption institutions in Africa exist mainly to create reform. But, Lewis (2021) and Cheeseman and Peiffer (2023) explain that these actions are often taken to satisfy international donors or public opinion rather than to disrupt corrupt networks. Englebert and Dunn (2019) describe this as symbolic institutionalism, in which governments build institutions to meet expectations, but these institutions do not work effectively.

The cases of Ethiopia, Nigeria, and South Africa illustrate how symbolic politics operate in practice. In Ethiopia, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s 2025 televised claim of “miracle development” and 8.1% economic growth, presented as an achievement of continental and even global significance, stands in sharp contrast to widespread displacement, school closures, and a multidimensional poverty rate of 72%, affecting 86 million people, half of whom are children (UNDP & OPHI, 2024). Trade misinvoicing causes 55–80% of Ethiopia’s illicit financial outflows (AfDB, 2024). In Nigeria, anti-corruption efforts appear robust through institutions such as the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) and Buhari’s role as an AU anti-corruption champion (Afrobarometer, 2020); however, public trust is low, corruption remains widespread, and billions are lost annually to illicit flows. In South Africa, the Zondo Commission exposed large-scale state capture, with asset recovery rising from R2.9 billion in October 2022 to R11 billion by March 2025, while 76.2% of citizens still fear reporting corruption (Corruption Watch, 2025). These cases highlight how governments use anti-corruption narratives as symbolic tools for projecting legitimacy.

The study employs a three-part analytical model comprising progress, projection, and plan in order to systematically examine anti-corruption efforts.

Progress model: Evaluates performance against Agenda 2063’s First Ten-Year Plan (2014–2023) benchmarks. Key indicators include:

1. Deviation from 2014: The difference between the average score over the last nine years (2015–2023) and the reference score in 2014. This measurement indicates the extent to which overall performance deviated from the 2014 baseline over a decade.

This formula helps assess whether a country’s corruption control has improved or declined relative to its 2014 level. A positive value indicates overall progress, whereas a negative value indicates deterioration.

1. Average Annual Change (AAC): is the average of the year-to-year differences, where each difference is the value in the current year minus the value in the previous year divided by the number of intervals (9).

This formula assumes a linear trend, implying that current improvements provide a reasonable estimate of future changes if similar conditions persist.

1. Gap to 70% of the Target in 2023: This measures how far the 2023 score is from 70% of the desired target. The 70% score is the benchmark within the First Ten-Year Implementation Plan (2014–2023). The gap is determined as follows:

A positive value signifies that the country has exceeded the 70% threshold, whereas a negative value indicates the opposite.

Projection model: Estimates long-term trends toward corruption-free Africa by 2063, using the Annual Pace Required (APR). It is calculated as:

This determines the minimum yearly improvement needed to bridge the gap between the 2023 score and 100 within 40 years, assuming linear progress over the 2023–2063 horizon with 100 as the continental target. This value indicates whether AAC is sufficient to meet the target. If the AAC meets or exceeds the APR, the goal is achievable under current trends; otherwise, additional efforts are needed. This indicator helps to shape the Second Ten-Year Implementation Plan (2024–2033) by setting realistic benchmarks, highlighting gaps, and informing strategies to accelerate progress.

Plan Model: The APR supports the 2033 milestones by providing a linear trajectory from the 2023 baseline, with 10-year multiplication calculating the expected improvement over the decade (2024–2033). The formula is:

This approach results in country- and dimension-specific targets that guide the priorities of the Second Ten-Year Plan. These targets are informed by 2023 scores, AAC trends, and continental anti-corruption best practices. The APR’s linear projection ensures that 2033 milestones are achievable, providing a measurable framework for tracking progress and adjusting strategies to align with the long-term vision of Agenda 2063.

This study incorporates volatility analysis to capture IIAG score fluctuations (2014–2023), using standard deviations across six dimensions:

Linear projections (AAC and APR) assume steady progress, overlooking volatile conditions. As detailed in  Appendix, the volatility analysis accounts for disruptions (e.g. political instability and reform shocks) that linear indicators may overlook. Case studies address this by capturing nonlinear dynamics and local complexities, ensuring a comprehensive approach to the anti-corruption objectives of Agenda 2063.

Under the First Ten-Year Implementation Plan (2014–2023) of Africa’s Agenda 2063, the AUCPCC was positioned as a central instrument for advancing anti-corruption reforms. By 2023, the initiative sought to unify anti-corruption efforts and recover billions lost through illicit financial flows. It also set the target of ensuring that 70% of citizens perceived public services as efficient and corruption-free, thereby rebuilding eroded trust. In addition, the plan emphasized legislative oversight as a mechanism to hold leaders accountable and to limit elite control over public resources. If achieved, these targets could reshape Africa’s future by reducing the billions of dollars lost annually to corruption and by fostering sustainable development. However, this vision prompts examination: Has it achieved tangible results in the first 10 years? The next section explores whether this transformation has been realised or remains unattainable.

This section examines the anti-corruption strategies implemented by African countries, highlighting a decade of progress and challenges within the framework of Agenda 2063.

Anti-corruption mechanisms, as defined by the IIAG, encompass policy frameworks, legislative reforms, and institutional structures (e.g. anti-corruption agencies and AUCPCC compliance) designed to combat corruption. Table 1 presents the effectiveness of the anti-corruption mechanisms, highlighting past progress, future projections, and proposed plans.

Morocco and Côte d’Ivoire showed significant gains of 23.63 and 17.29 percentage points, respectively, reflecting reform commitment and institutional innovation. These gains align with AGA’s emphasis on e-governance and transparency, as Morocco’s digital platforms (e.g. Idarati) and Côte d’Ivoire’s Haute Autorité pour la Bonne Gouvernance reflect AUCPCC-compliant reforms. Morocco’s digital platforms (e.g. Idarati, the Open Data Portal, and online complaint systems) have enhanced transparency and reduced administrative corruption (Barodi et al., 2025; Radouane and Soukaina, 2023). Côte d’Ivoire’s reforms, including the Haute Autorité pour la Bonne Gouvernance and the active media, have strengthened public scrutiny. Their annual growth rates (4.17 and 2.09 percentage points) indicate momentum, though their gaps to the 70% 2023 target (−25.40 and −28.00 percentage points) suggest that promising cases struggle with low institutional baselines.

Tunisia, Benin, and South Africa have faced setbacks. Tunisia and Benin saw declines of −24.21 and −16.62 percentage points from 2014 scores, respectively, showing erosion of anti-corruption efforts. Tunisia’s −5.86 percentage points annual drop reflects poor AUCPCC implementation, with instability undermining anti-corruption agency independence, contrary to AGA’s institutional autonomy goal. South Africa’s 28.19 percentage points drop stems from elite capture and accountability failure.

Other countries have exhibited either marginal or prolonged stagnation. Cameroon saw virtually no change (−1.37 percentage points), indicating institutional stagnation. Uganda (2.20), Zambia (−11.97), and Ethiopia (−4.63) remained far below the target benchmarks, facing persistent enforcement and governance challenges. Gabon (−6.31) and Tunisia (−24.21) would require annual improvements of over 2.08 and 2.23 percentage points respectively to bridge the gap by 2063, an ambitious pace to achieve.

These findings show that while reform is possible and progress can occur, most countries face structural and institutional constraints that hinder sustainable improvement. This divergence in performance highlights context-specific factors, including leadership commitment, civil society engagement, and governance innovation.

The First Ten-Year Implementation Plan on anti-corruption mechanisms proved overly ambitious, with goals often misaligned with the continent’s institutional realities. To place countries on a more feasible trajectory toward Agenda 2063, this study proposed a Second Ten-Year Implementation Plan (2024–2033) anchored in three strategic pillars: digital governance, independent anti-corruption bodies, and civic accountability ecosystems. These pillars serve as corrective mechanisms to institutional deficiencies and are operationalised through context-specific strategies aimed at achieving the 2033 anti-corruption targets. Digital governance reforms, such as the expansion of e-procurement platforms, digital tender systems, and public dashboards, can enhance transparency, reduce discretionary power, and improve oversight in service delivery. Strengthening the autonomy and capacity of national anti-corruption bodies, through legal safeguards and independent audits, is critical to ensuring enforcement free from political interference.

Civic accountability ecosystems, supported by whistleblower protections, investigative journalism, and community-led monitoring, are essential to sustaining public engagement and fostering a culture of integrity. AGA provides technical assistance, facilitates intergovernmental dialogue, and fosters alignment between national and continental priorities. Implementation at the national level can be reinforced through APRM-guided audits and reform monitoring, which provide countries with technical feedback, peer comparisons, and credible evaluation of progress. While national ownership remains central, cross-country experience sharing and regional coordination are vital to aligning efforts with continental governance objectives.

This section assesses corruption levels in state institutions, defined as the judiciary, legislature, and executive branches, which are distinct from the public sector’s service delivery systems (AU, 2015b). Table 2 presents performance data based on the IIAG indicators of judicial independence, legislative oversight, and executive accountability. The results show differences among countries.

Benin and Tanzania stand out for their progress in institutional integrity. The Benin score improved by 11.61 percentage points over the past decade (AAC: 1.98). This reflects the political will under President Patrice Talon, who prioritised governance reforms through Programme d’Actions du Gouvernement (PAG) 2021–2026, focused on transparency and efficiency (IMF, 2023). Benin’s reforms align with AUCPCC’s judicial transparency standards, but are constrained by executive influence over the High Council of the Judiciary, a gap in AGA’s push for judicial independence. The president chairs the High Council of the Judiciary, overseeing judicial appointments and sanctions. This role has raised concerns regarding potential executive interference. Critics argue that institutional independence remains a concern because of executive influence over the judiciary.

Tanzania shows promise with a 10.10 percentage point increase (1.54 annually). The country’s anti-corruption efforts include dismissing corrupt officials and establishing a specialised corruption court. Actions such as the 2017 IPTL/Escrow scandal prosecutions, targeting public and private actors, demonstrate a commitment to fighting corruption (Transparency International, 2024). By contrast, Botswana, a continental model of good governance, saw its anti-corruption standing decline by 4.82 percentage points (−1.17 annually). This decline, even after surpassing the 70% benchmark in 2023, reveals the risk of institutional complacency. Botswana’s regression shows the limitations of symbolic anti-corruption bodies without AGA-aligned enforcement mechanisms for institutional autonomy.

Other countries show varying degrees of backsliding. Côte d’Ivoire (−4.26 percentage points), Gabon (−3.56), and Morocco (−2.56) experienced moderate declines, raising questions about system effectiveness. In Côte d’Ivoire, this decline contrasts with progress in other anti-corruption domains, suggesting a gap between policy reforms and enforcement. Cameroon’s minimal changes (−1.13 percentage points) shows institutional stagnation. Its 2023 score of 13.7 indicates a decline requiring annual improvement of 2.16 percentage points, which is impossible without transformational reform. Stagnation in many countries shows that anti-corruption efforts often act as symbolic gestures, while systemic corruption continues because of weak enforcement and a lack of political will.

The proposed Second Ten-Year Implementation Plan (2024–2033) targets corruption in state institutions through judicial independence, legislative integrity, and executive accountability. Achieving the 2033 anti-corruption targets requires that countries undertake context-specific reforms to address institutional weaknesses and reinforce checks and balances. Key measures include institutionalising transparent, merit-based appointments within the judiciary to reduce political interference; expanding the mandates and resourcing of specialised anti-corruption courts; enforcing public asset disclosure systems for elected and appointed officials; digitising management systems and legislative procedures to increase transparency and reduce opportunities for manipulation; and strengthening parliamentary and independent oversight bodies to monitor executive conduct. AGA supports governments by providing technical guidance and facilitating the adoption of governance frameworks that reinforce judicial autonomy, legislative transparency, and executive accountability. Concurrently, APRM conducts in-country assessments, monitors reform progress, and fosters experience sharing to help countries address institutional weaknesses and enhance oversight mechanisms.

This section analyses corruption levels in the public sector, specifically focussing on government service delivery systems such as licencing and taxation, while distinguishing these from state institutions like the judiciary or legislature. Table 3 examines the absence of theft and bribery within these services using the IIAG data. The data revealed significant progress and setbacks.

Benin and Tanzania showed strong performance. Benin achieved an increase of 16.08 percentage point increase (AAC: 3.11). These gains stem from establishing the High Commission for the Prevention of Corruption (HCPC) in 2020. The HCPC initiates judicial proceedings, complementing the Court for the Repression of Economic Crimes and Terrorism (CRIET) established in 2018. CRIET has been resolved in prosecutions, such as the 2022 sentencing of officials from the Port of Cotonou (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2024; IMF, 2023). Tanzania posted a 16.71 percentage point gain (AAC, 2.59). Its progress stems from reforms, including a dedicated corruption court for prosecuting public officials implicated in bribery and theft (Transparency International, 2024). Conversely, several countries have experienced stagnation or regression. Zambia experienced the sharpest decline, losing 9.58 percentage points (AAC:−1.01), indicating persistent weaknesses in governance. Gabon and Botswana also regressed, with Botswana’s performance declining 1.60 percentage points.

Both Benin and Botswana exceeded the 70% benchmark of AU Agenda 2063 by 2023, with Tanzania reaching 67.8. Their circumstances differ: Benin’s progress is recent and reform-driven, while Botswana achieved this status earlier, but faced a decline. This signals institutional fragility, and highlights the importance of sustained reforms to prevent backsliding.

The proposed Second Ten-Year Implementation Plan (2024–2033) addresses public sector corruption through professionalising public administration, reducing bribery-prone interactions, and strengthening oversight. Achieving the 2033 anti-corruption targets requires tailored reforms that align with national contexts. Main strategies include codifying independent anti-corruption commissions, enforcing merit-based recruitment, expanding the jurisdiction of specialised corruption courts, and deploying digital systems, such as payroll platforms, licencing portals, and public registries, to reduce opportunities for bribery and fraud. Additional measures such as community-led integrity audits, decentralised oversight, and internal public sector integrity units further enhance transparency and accountability. AGA supports governments by providing technical assistance and promoting the adoption of digital tools and governance frameworks aligned with AU standards. It facilitates policy harmonisation and helps embed transparency into national reform agendas. APRM complements these efforts by assessing public sector governance, identifying institutional gaps, and promoting experience sharing among member states.

This section examines corruption levels in the private sector, defined as non-governmental business activities, distinct from public-sector service delivery. Table 4 assesses the extent of corrupt practices in government interactions using the IIAG data.

Tanzania has made progress, achieving an 18.91 percentage point increase over the last decade (AAC, 2.60). Benin has followed an 11.52 percentage point improvement (AAC: 2.68) since 2014. Cameroon and Côte d’Ivoire have also shown encouraging results. Despite lower baselines, both demonstrate that progress is possible when appropriate institutional and regulatory measures are implemented. However, several countries experienced stagnation and regression. South Africa, once among the regional governance leaders, recorded an annual decline of −1.24, reflecting a breakdown in corporate ethics and regulatory enforcement. The Zondo Commission revealed how private firms facilitated the hollowing of key state institutions, such as the South African Revenue Service (SARS) (APRM, 2022). Morocco (−0.34) and Gabon (−0.24) posted modest declines, suggesting limited reform momentum. Zambia and Côte d’Ivoire present mixed pictures; while Côte d’Ivoire approaches the 70% benchmark set by Agenda 2063, Zambia has significant ground to cover.

The 70% benchmark for 2023 in Agenda 2063 serves as a critical target for reducing private sector corruption. Botswana exceeded this mark, scoring 86.4 in 2023. Côte d’Ivoire is within its reach, suggesting positive prospects. By contrast, Nigeria (43.70 percentage points gap) and Uganda (38.60 percentage points gap) face significant challenges.

The proposed Second Ten-Year Implementation Plan (2024–2033) targets private sector corruption through transparency via mandatory disclosures, market incentives through Corporate Integrity Certification Systems (CICS), and public-private partnerships in high-risk sectors. These reforms aim to reduce illicit financial flows, foster corporate accountability, and promote equitable development across the continent. Tailored national interventions include mandating beneficial ownership disclosures to expose companies, piloting CICS in sectors vulnerable to corruption such as extractives, requiring third-party audits, digitising procurement data, and strengthening coalitions for corporate compliance. Industry-specific anti-bribery standards, community oversight of contracts, and open data tools serve as mechanisms to curb elite capture and promote ethical business practices. National efforts require more than isolated reforms, they demand coordination, standards, and external accountability. AGA plays a strategic role by helping governments design policies that not only comply with African Union instruments, but that are also practically implementable in complex, often under-regulated markets. It facilitates cross-sectoral dialogue, encourages adoption of digital tools for corporate transparency, and pushes for consistency across jurisdictions, particularly on issues like beneficial ownership and conflict-of-interest rules. APRM acts as both a mirror and a motivator. Through its country review missions, it sheds light on gaps in corporate governance, often overlooked by internal actors, and creates pressure for reform by highlighting comparative performance.

How fair and transparent are the government procurement processes in African countries? Table 5 examines three dimensions: competitive bidding frequency, exclusion of companies involved in misconduct, and the absence of corruption in public procurement.

Over the past decade, Tunisia has led regional procurement reform, with a 25.50 percentage point improvement (AAC: 3.82). Central to this transformation is the TUNEPS launched in 2012 (Hteit, 2023). By 2023, over 90% of public entities had used the platform to digitize the procurement cycle and reduce human discretion and rent seeking. TUNEPS aligns with the Open Contracting Data Standard, and by 2022, it had made over 50,000 contracts public. By 2023, more than 30 companies were excluded from bidding. In 2020, more than 1,200 complaints were processed online, leading to contract cancellations. In contrast, Botswana and Zambia saw steep decline. Botswana’s score fell by 29.29 points (AAC: −3.41), and Zambia’s by 25.87 points (AAC: −3.36), reflecting weakened regulatory enforcement and oversight gaps. South Africa (AAC: 0.71) and Gabon (AAC: 1.19) have recorded modest gains. Nigeria is particularly concerning, with no improvement over the decade (AAC: 0.00).

By 2023, Tunisia was the only country to surpass 70% of the target in agenda 2063. Many others, including Benin, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Tanzania, and Uganda, fell short, although Cameroon showed slight improvement (AAC: 0.04). The widespread regression in Botswana, Zambia, and Nigeria suggests that procurement reforms often serve as symbolic gestures, projecting transparency to satisfy audiences while systemic issues such as lax enforcement and political interference persist.

The proposed Second Ten-Year Implementation Plan (2024–2033) strengthens public procurement through digitalisation, legal harmonisation, and independent oversight. These reforms aim to reduce fiscal leakages, curb discretion in contracting, and enhance transparency across procurement cycles. Tailored national interventions include expanding e-procurement systems such as Tunisia’s TUNEPS and Morocco’s digital platforms, aligning procurement rules with Open Contracting Data Standards (OCDS) in Benin and Nigeria, and enforcing competitive bidding in South Africa. Countries like Ethiopia, Cameroon, and Uganda can digitize procurement infrastructure and bidding processes, while Gabon and Tanzania can establish oversight commissions to monitor compliance. Côte d’Ivoire can enforce conflict-of-interest rules, and Zambia can consolidate fragmented systems through APRM-guided integration. Botswana can recover past gains by adopting a TUNEPS-style model. National efforts to improve procurement transparency require more than digital tools, they demand institutional anchoring, legal coherence, and sustained accountability.

All countries must enforce OCDS compliance through legally binding frameworks to ensure transparency and accountability during procurement. The AGA can reinforce these efforts by facilitating the adoption of AU standards, and supporting the development of regulatory frameworks that enhance transparency. The APRM can monitor procurement practices through its evaluation processes and identify good practices that enhance efficiency and openness. Both play a vital role in institutionalising transparent procurement systems and aligning national reforms with continental governance priorities.

How do citizens perceive corruption fighting in their countries? Table 6 examines this by analysing public trust in official honesty, bribery prevalence in accessing services, and satisfaction with anti-corruption efforts. The findings present a fragmented landscape: while some countries show meaningful progress, many fall short of commitments under agenda 2063.

Benin has shown progress, gaining 28.66 percentage points over the last decade (AAC 4.8). It is on track to reduce corruption through institutional reforms such as the National Integrity System Assessment. Leadership under the President Patrice Talon has increased public confidence. According to Afrobarometer (2023), the perception of worsening corruption has decreased from 61% in 2014 to 48% in 2021–2023. However, the nepotism persisted. 23% of citizens reported paying bribes, suggesting that an IIAG score of 85.3 may overstate improvements. Tanzania gained 14.97 percentage points (AAC: 1.48). Data from Afrobarometer (2023) show that 77% of Tanzanians believed corruption had declined, and 83% approved government efforts, up to 67%. Bribery fell from 28% to 19% between 2014 and 2021–2023, respectively. These reflect reforms, such as specialised corruption courts and stronger enforcement, narrowing the rhetoric-reality gap.

Uganda, Botswana, and Côte d’Ivoire have shown declining public trust. Uganda dropped 15.97 percentage points (AAC -2.4), with 67% perceiving worsening corruption in 2021–2023, an increase from 59%. Government approval fell to 19%, and bribery remained at 53%, matching the IIAG score of 32.3. Botswana lost 12.64 percentage points (AAC −2.76) (Afrobarometer, 2023). Half of its citizens perceived increasing corruption, and approval decreased from 54% to 42%. Bribery increased to 17%, questioning earlier achievements. Côte d’Ivoire’s 15.74 point drop aligns with low approval (33%) and 29% bribery, showing gaps between pledges and reforms (Afrobarometer, 2023).

As of 2023, only Benin and Tanzania surpassed the 70% target for citizens to perceive the government’s anti-corruption efforts. Nigeria and Gabon ranked among the worst performers, with perceptions of corruption of 63 and 82%, respectively. These gaps show a disconnect between the anti-corruption rhetoric and citizens’ experiences.

The proposed Second Ten-Year Implementation Plan (2024–2033) places public perception at the core of anti-corruption reforms, emphasising independent citizen feedback mechanisms, transparency, and empowerment. Although countries may differ in context, the reform strategies are largely transferable and should be approached as a shared agenda. Initiatives such as community engagement platforms, civic education campaigns, open contracting portals, public dashboards, citizen surveys, community accountability forums, and civil society monitoring can be effectively adapted across contexts to foster participation and improve oversight. Measures to enhance transparency, including livestreaming court proceedings, publishing procurement data and asset declarations, serve to strengthen institutional credibility. The AGA can strengthen public perception by promoting continental standards and supporting citizen-focused reforms aligned with AU instruments. The APRM enhances public trust by encouraging transparency, showcasing reform progress, and institutionalising accountability through participatory assessments. Strong, binding whistleblower protections remain essential to safeguard civic participation and reinforce public confidence in anti-corruption efforts.

Anti-corruption performance in Africa is rarely linear, challenging the assumptions of steady institutional progress embedded in Agenda 2063. Volatility emerges at the intersection of political dynamics, institutional capacity, and enforcement mechanisms. Leadership instability, elite capture, and donor-driven interventions often produce episodic reform gains that may unravel without structural embedding. Conversely, independent anti-corruption agencies, judicial capacity, consistent enforcement, and active civil society engagement act as stabilizing forces. This framework suggests that short-term improvements, such as policy adoption or institutional creation, do not guarantee sustainable reform if political interference is high or institutional autonomy is limited.

Empirical evidence from IIAG data (2014–2023) demonstrates marked disparities in volatility across countries (Table A1,  Appendix). Tunisia exhibits the highest fluctuations, with public procurement (SD = 22.13) and anti-corruption mechanisms (SD = 19.03) swinging widely. These oscillations reflect post-Arab Spring political instability, frequent cabinet reshuffles, and episodic reform implementation, illustrating how legal reforms alone cannot stabilize governance in politically fluid contexts. South Africa displays moderate volatility in public perception (SD = 8.65), closely linked to systemic corruption scandals, including the State Capture investigation and the Zondo Commission (APRM, 2022). Despite robust formal institutions, inconsistent enforcement and elite capture eroded public trust, showing that institutional strength without political accountability cannot guarantee stability. Ethiopia’s near-static performance (SD = 0.65) indicates stalled reform: anti-corruption rhetoric and donor-supported initiatives (Transparency International, 2022) failed to generate measurable institutional change due to structural bottlenecks, weak bureaucratic autonomy, and limited prosecutorial capacity. In contrast, Benin demonstrates incremental but sustained improvements (SD = 13.81), highlighting that politically insulated reforms and consistent bureaucratic embedding can generate measurable, long-term governance gains.

Volatility is thus not merely statistical; it reflects underlying political and institutional dynamics. Leadership transitions, entrenched patronage networks, and bureaucratic fragility amplify the risk that reform gains will be reversed. Donor-driven interventions, while crucial for capacity-building, may inadvertently foster dependency or episodic compliance, producing temporary improvements rather than durable change (Brinkerhoff, 2010; Gebrihet, 2024). Evidence from transitional democracies in Eastern Europe and Latin America supports this interpretation: anti-corruption progress in these contexts similarly fluctuates with political cycles and elite bargaining, underscoring the structural vulnerability of reforms in semi-democratic systems (Grzymala-Busse, 2007; Mungiu-Pippidi, 2015).

For Agenda 2063’s Second Ten-Year Plan, these findings underscore the necessity of context-specific, evidence-driven strategies. Policies must account for political cycles, institutional fragility, and historical patterns of reform reversal. Strengthening prosecutorial independence, embedding anti-corruption institutions within resilient political and bureaucratic structures, and leveraging citizen monitoring can reduce volatility. Linking episodic gains to systemic enforcement and autonomy can transform fragile progress into sustainable governance.

This section applies symbolic politics theory to explain the persistent gap between the AU’s anti-corruption promises under Agenda 2063 and the actual outcomes observed across the continent. As Edelman (1985) argued, political actors often use symbolic policy frameworks, institutional reforms, and ambitious targets, not to achieve meaningful results, but to manage perceptions, gain public approval, or satisfy international expectations. Thus, the First Ten-Year Implementation Plan (2014–2023) of Agenda 2063 appears more symbolic than transformational.

Agenda 2063’s anti-corruption targets, such as having 70% of Member States, adopt robust legal frameworks, and 70% of citizens perceive corruption-free services, serving as image building. They projected an image of commitment without necessarily addressing political and institutional realities. These targets were designed to demonstrate alignment with AU ideals rather than to reflect feasible reforms. Symbolic politics theory shows how leaders prioritize image-building over change, especially when reforms threaten elite interests or expose weaknesses.

Empirical evidence has confirmed that many countries are far from these targets. At the start of the implementation period in 2014, the average performance across key indicators, such as effective anti-corruption institutions (30.4%), integrity in procurement (34.1%), and public trust in government actions (54.2%), was already low (Table 7). Setting a uniform 70% target without accounting for these baseline realities exemplifies the symbolic use of policy targets: bold on paper, but lacking grounding in empirical data.

The First Ten-Year Implementation Plan’s failure to incorporate context-specific mechanisms, such as citizen-led accountability and regionally adapted strategies, shows how symbolic commitments can overshadow genuine reform efforts. AGA and APRM could have played a stronger role in tailoring anti-corruption strategies to different national realities. However, their potential was underutilised, and their recommendations often lacked enforcement weight, again highlighting how the architecture itself risks becoming symbolic if not backed by political will and institutional capacity. The anti-corruption efforts of Agenda 2063 were shaped by the need to present a unified, optimistic image of African governance progress. However, in many cases, this resulted in surface-level compliance with AU norms, rather than structural changes.

To move beyond the limitations of symbolic reform, the Second Ten-Year Implementation Plan (2024–2033) proposed in this study anchors anti-corruption efforts in realistic targets, empirical baselines, and context-specific strategies. Symbolic commitment must be supported by enforceable accountability mechanisms, independent oversight institutions, and meaningful citizen engagement. Without these structural safeguards, Africa’s anti-corruption agenda under Agenda 2063 risks repeating a cycle of high rhetoric and weak implementation, which can further erode public trust and undermine institutional legitimacy.

The AU’s Second Ten-Year Implementation Plan (2023–2033) under Agenda 2063 aims to strengthen governance by leveraging AGA and AUCPCC to address enforcement gaps identified in the First Ten-Year Implementation Plan (AU, 2024). However, the AU’s 60/100 CPI target remains unrealistic, given the stagnant 40.15% IIAG score (Table 7), with only a 0.7% improvement in nine years. This target resembles an image building, one that signals resolve, but lacks a credible path to impact. The problems of the Second Ten-Year Plan are similar to those of the first plan.

AGA’s Africa Governance Report flags weak enforcement and AUCPCC noncompliance (AU, 2024). Despite 48 countries signing the AUCPCC, inaction persists. As reported by the AfDB, Kenya loses KSh 608 billion each year due to corruption, which accounts for 7.8% of its GDP (Kinyanjui, 2025) and Nigeria has lost $182 billion since 1999 (Hoffmann et al., 2017). Public frustration is widespread, with 58% of Africans perceiving rising corruption, aligned with IIAG’s 3.86 percentage point perception drop (Transparency International, 2023). Global crises, such as COVID-19, have further strained governance focus (AU, 2024).

The AU (2024) Second Ten-Year Implementation Plan expresses optimism about the potential for e-governance and the synergy between AGA and RECs, highlighting South Sudan’s digital tools and Sudan’s $130 million asset recovery. In addition, Tunisia’s e-procurement system could be expanded through AGA’s coordination. However, the IIAG’s only 0.7% improvement in nine years show that these innovations often appear as reform signs, yet rarely endure without structural support. Weak data, political interference, and AU’s limited enforcement power make the 60/100 CPI target unfeasible unless reform is institutionalised and independently monitored (AU, 2024).

Table 7 highlights the uneven trajectory of six continental anti-corruption dimensions over the past decade, revealing areas of progress alongside persistent weaknesses and setbacks. While institutional mechanisms designed to combat corruption recorded a modest overall increase of 2.00 points, the most pronounced improvements occurred in the integrity of state institutions (+4.84) and, to a lesser degree, within the private sector (+1.78). Progress in public sector corruption indicators remained limited (+1.53), reflecting only incremental gains in administrative accountability and oversight. Notably, the decline in public procurement procedures (−1.07) underscores persistent challenges in ensuring transparency, enforcing regulatory frameworks, and curbing informal or opaque practices.

The most concerning trend is the sharp decline in public perception of anti-corruption efforts (−3.86), indicating growing scepticism toward reforms that are often perceived as symbolic or politically induced image building. The average anti-corruption score rose only marginally, from 39.45 in 2014 to 40.15 in 2023, reinforcing the conclusion that existing strategies have produced limited systemic changes. This gap between normative commitments, such as those articulated in African Union frameworks, and tangible governance outcomes underscores the need for more accountable, inclusive, and locally responsive anti-corruption models.

The proposed Second Ten-Year Implementation Plan (2024–2033) strategically recalibrates Africa’s continental anti-corruption agenda to address the enforcement deficiencies that constrained progress under the First Plan. Africa will achieve an average anti-corruption score of 43.68% by 2033, representing a reasonable increase of 3.96 points from current levels. Attaining this target necessitates consistent annual improvements ranging from 1.29 to 1.72 points across the continent’s heterogeneous governance contexts. This measured strategy reflects a realistic alignment with prevailing institutional capacities while simultaneously signalling a decisive departure from prior stagnation.

Addressing the complex realities of corruption across African states demands tailored responses to country-specific challenges, beginning with the scaling of digital governance tools. E-procurement platforms have demonstrated the ability to reduce contract costs and curb rent-seeking behaviours. By fostering standardised transparency across AU member states, these platforms become a critical foundation for reform. Yet the wide 29.89% gap to the aspirational 70% target underscores the need for substantial investments in technical capacity, interoperability, and legal harmonisation.

Strengthening state institutions is essential to sustain progress in governance reforms. The plan mandates rigorous audited compliance with the African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance, aiming to resolve chronic failures in reporting and accountability. It focuses on enhancing judicial independence, legislative oversight, and executive transparency. The complementary roles of the AGA’s technical assistance and the APRM’s monitoring ensure institutional reforms produce meaningful reductions in state capture and corruption.

Transforming the public sector also requires dismantling entrenched patronage networks through merit-based recruitment and professionalisation of public administration. With widespread adoption of the National Programmes of Action, transparent hiring practices, robust whistleblower protections, and strengthened oversight bodies are being embedded to restore public trust and break cycles of clientelism. Harmonised governance frameworks and legal coherence facilitated by the AGA provide the necessary foundation for these reforms.

In the private sector, Corporate Integrity Certification Systems incentivize adherence to anti-bribery and transparency standards, especially in sectors vulnerable to corruption such as extractives and construction. Mandatory ownership disclosures, third-party audits, and multi-stakeholder coalitions involving governments, civil society, and private actors strengthen accountability. In-depth reviews by the APRM identify governance weaknesses and offer actionable recommendations, while the AGA guides alignment of corporate laws with AU conventions to reinforce continent-wide standards.

Public procurement reforms further support transparency by promoting Open Contracting Data Standards-compliant digital platforms that enhance data accessibility and auditability of government contracts. Drawing lessons from successful digital procurement models, the plan encourages competitive bidding, enforcement of conflict-of-interest rules, and blacklisting of noncompliant firms. Monitoring by the APRM helps identify obstacles and share best practices.

Public confidence can be addressed by emphasising transparency, civic engagement, and protection of whistleblowers, with specialised training for investigative journalists and legal reforms designed to safeguard informants. These efforts confront the significant trust deficit, as citizen perceptions of corruption shape governance legitimacy.

The vision of a corruption-free Africa articulated in Agenda 2063 remains aspirational because it reflects a narrow conception of corruption as a technical problem that can be corrected through laws, regulatory agencies, or institutional reforms. This framing does not adequately capture the depth of the problem. Corruption in many African countries is woven into the structures of political settlements, the operation of patronage systems, and the daily strategies through which citizens and officials manage scarce resources. It functions as a means of consolidating power, sustaining fragile coalitions, and compensating for weak or exclusionary state institutions. In practice, this makes corruption less a deviation from governance than a central element of how authority and access are organized.

Expectations of eradication overlook these entrenched realities and the incentives that reproduce them. Eliminating corruption would require profound shifts in political economies, social norms, and state–society relations that cannot be engineered within a single decade. The proposed Second Ten-Year Implementation Plan reflects this recognition by moving away from the language of total eradication toward pragmatic goals of measurable, incremental progress. Achieving such gains, however, will demand consistent commitment of resources, political leadership that resists state capture, and gradual cultural change that redefines the legitimacy of public authority. Given the diversity of governance contexts and uneven institutional capacities across the continent, these transformations will not occur uniformly, reinforcing why the aspiration of a corruption-free Africa must be understood as a distant horizon rather than an attainable near-term outcome.

Agenda 2063 situates the elimination of corruption at the core of Africa’s development vision, yet the first decade of implementation reveals a wide disparity between rhetoric and reality. Countries such as Benin and Tanzania demonstrate that incremental improvements are possible, while experiences in Botswana, South Africa, Ethiopia and Nigeria point to stagnation and reversal where enforcement has weakened and political elites operate with impunity. These patterns show that corruption persists as an integral feature of political settlements and governance systems, rather than a challenge that can be resolved through legal frameworks alone.

The reliance on bold targets, such as the 70% benchmark for performance and trust indicators by 2023, illustrates the symbolic function of anti-corruption commitments. They signal intent but rarely reflect political and institutional realities. Oversight bodies including the APRM and AGA have highlighted these gaps, nevertheless their authority remains too limited to compel compliance. Even where legal provisions exist, enforcement is often selective, under-resourced, or undermined by political interference.

Future strategies must move beyond rhetorical ambition and adopt approaches that are credible, measurable, and firmly grounded in the political and institutional realities of individual states. Continental targets such as raising the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) to 60 by 2033 cannot be achieved through benchmark-setting alone; they require consistent enforcement, active citizen oversight, and continental institutions with genuine sanctioning authority. The experience of the First Ten-Year Plan demonstrates that bold commitments are often undermined by weak implementation. In this light, the target of 60 outlined in the AU’s Second Ten-Year Implementation Plan (2024) appears unrealistic. Based on observed trajectories, this study projects that Africa is more likely to reach an average score of 43.68 by 2033, assuming current rates of incremental improvement are sustained.

A corruption-free Africa in 2063 will remain a distant horizon rather than an imminent achievement. Yet the aspiration retains normative value, serving as a collective vision that can mobilize reform, strengthen regional solidarity, and sustain pressure on governments. The challenge for the Second Ten-Year Implementation Plan is to translate that vision into incremental but durable improvements, ensuring that anti-corruption is pursued not as symbolic performance but as a lived reality in governance and public life.

This study assesses anti-corruption trends in Africa’s Agenda 2063 with some limitations. First, reliance on the IIAG, composite indices, and aggregated scores may oversimplify the corruption landscape by masking nuanced factors. This limitation is mitigated by triangulating insights from Afrobarometer (2023), IMF (2023), and Transparency International (2023), enhancing the depth of analysis. Second, projections to 2033 assume linear trends based on 2014–2023 data, overlooking potential disruptions such as governance crises or economic shocks that could alter trajectories in volatile contexts. To address this, the quantitative analysis was triangulated with case studies capturing country-specific dynamics and volatility, providing a more nuanced understanding of possible deviations from projected trends. Third, while assessing 13 countries is vital to showcase Africa’s overall status in relation to Agenda 2063, more in-depth individual country-level assessments would yield deeper, context-specific insights and more detailed results.

This appendix quantifies the non-linear nature of anti-corruption progress by calculating the standard deviation (SD) of IIAG scores (2014–2023) for 13 countries across six dimensions (Tables 1 and 6). High standard deviations indicate significant fluctuations, while low values suggest stability or stagnation. These metrics, referenced in Sections 4 and 14, highlight the need for context-specific reforms to address disruptions in the Second Ten-Year Plan (2024–2033).