This article explains why many Indian farmers opposed agricultural market liberalisation despite widespread evidence of intermediary exploitation. It develops the concept of dependency-induced preference formation to show how long-term reliance on intermediaries shaped farmers' risk perceptions and policy preferences.
The study uses a conceptual political-economy approach, drawing on secondary sources, policy documents, academic literature and qualitative insights from farmer interviews in Punjab. It links Farmers' Protest 1.0 (2020–21) and Protest 2.0 (2024–25) to examine how institutional dependence shaped reform resistance.
The analysis shows that intermediaries reduce day-to-day transaction risk through credit, inputs, logistics and dispute resolution, while also deepening farmer dependence. These arrangements create preferences for predictable, state-backed systems and increase the perceived risks of disintermediation. Resistance to liberalisation and renewed demands for legal minimum support price therefore reflect a rational response to perceived uncertainty rather than misinformation or irrationality.
The article relies on secondary evidence and conceptual synthesis rather than primary microdata. Future research should test the proposed mechanism using farmer-level data on intermediary ties, procurement exposure, perceived uncertainty and trust in enforcement.
The article reframes farmer protest as a rational, institutionally conditioned response to historical dependence. It contributes to political economy, behavioural economics and policy-process literature by showing why reforms fail when credible risk-mitigating institutions are absent.
