This paper investigates the “more or less” puzzle of information disclosure in blockchain-enabled supply chains by examining how manufacturers strategically determine disclosure levels and blockchain adoption strategies in response to platforms’ commission structures and sales format choices.
Departing from prior studies, we develop a three-stage game-theoretical model to characterize heterogeneous information credibility across sales formats and dual effects (expansion and reduction) of blockchain.
Results show that the optimal sales format and blockchain adoption depend critically on the trade-off among the blockchain effect, information disclosure costs and the double marginalization problem (DMP). When the expansion effect dominates, it generates sufficient revenue to both offset costs (e.g. disclosure costs, adoption costs) and mitigate the DMP. However, the manufacturer discloses less information with greater credibility, demonstrating that “less is more” when blockchain serves as a substitute for trust. Under the reduction effect, excessively high platform commissions prove counterproductive, whereas a low or moderate commission rate in the agency format preserves the manufacturer’s adoption incentives. Blockchain in the two sales formats can create a win-win outcome under certain conditions.
The findings provide important managerial insights. In practice, manufacturers should avoid redundant information disclosure when leveraging blockchain. Platforms can refrain from extracting excessive surplus via high commission rates; instead, they should set moderate rates that leave sufficient margins for manufacturers to invest in blockchain.
