The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of compulsory presence of female members due to gender quota on corporate boards on firms’ credit ratings.
We investigate the impact of female directorial appointment on a firm’s credit rating using firm-level panel data in a regression framework with industry- and year-fixed effects to account for unobserved heterogeneity. Further, to address endogeneity, we employ the difference-in-differences (DiD) technique by exploiting the changes in the corporate board composition induced by the exogeneous gender quota regulation. We also employ the Oster (2019) approach to test for omitted variable bias.
In this paper, we find that the firms that appoint female members on corporate boards post-gender quota mandate (treatment firms) enjoy improved credit ratings as compared to firms that had female members on corporate boards before the gender quota mandate (control group firms) became effective. The findings are robust to alternate definitions of credit rating, treatment and post variables.
We employ an alternative econometric technique, such as Oster’s (2019) specification, to show that the involvement of female directors on corporate boards helps firms in improving firm’s credit ratings. We also identify corporate risk measured using stock return volatility and cash flow volatility as the potential channels through which female directors’ involvement on corporate boards leads to the improvement in firms’ credit ratings.
