I want what you want! Negotiating the public interest in lobbying and public affairs Open Access

The notion of “the public interest” has been much debated among scholars in communication management and public relations (e.g. Messina, 2007; Brunner and Smallwood, 2019). Scholars from political theory and political science have launched a plethora of different understandings of this concept (Bozeman, 2007; Flathman, 1966). Thus, it has been argued that scholarship within communication management and public relations should embrace this diversity and the plurality of the concept, emphasize its process-oriented nature, and interact with the public interest in a manner acceptable to society (Ihlen et al., 2018; Ihlen and Raknes, 2020; Johnston, 2016; Raknes and Ihlen, 2020; Valentini et al., 2020, 2017). Also, scholars studying the political aspect of communication management, qua lobbying, and public affairs have theorized about organizations and the public interest (Ihlen and Raknes, 2020; Davidson, 2023). These studies have demonstrated how organizations go about communicatively constructing a link between themselves and the public interest. Some organizations contend that their existence contributes positively to the public interest, while others argue that a specific proposal is rooted in the public interest. In essence, determining who holds the authority to define the public interest is fundamentally a question of power. Consequently, resourceful interest groups possess the capacity to advance their specific agendas under the guise of promoting the public interest. Grasping the intricacies of this process is crucial for comprehending the role of lobbying in liberal democracies (Lindsey and Teles, 2017; Bitonti, 2019).

While the research literature has drawn attention to how different organizations argue that their policy suggestions meet the public interest, there has been less research on the competition between different conceptions of the public interest. Even less attention has been devoted to how the key stakeholders or target groups for lobbyists, namely the politicians, evaluate the public interest. Thus, in this paper, we seek to advance the literature on lobbying and strategic communication by looking at the construction and evaluation of public interest topics from the perspectives of lobbyists and politicians who work within the same policy area. Analyzing politicians and lobbyists within the same policy area enables us to examine the dynamics of conflicting public interest claims and how they are juxtaposed.

Most lobbying studies are done in the context of the U.S. and the E.U. (Bunea and Baumgartner, 2014; Mahoney and Baumgartner, 2009). However, most European democracies have proportional elections, which create multi-party systems and a rather complex environment for interest group influence (Lijphart, 2012). Thus, the argumentative strategies of lobbyists should be studied more closely in other contexts than the U.S. and the E.U. to get a more comparatively robust notion of lobbying as a communicative practice. Thus, in this paper, we will look closer at the politicians and the lobbyists who work within the energy and environment sector in Norway, which is considered a typical multi-party system in Northern Europe (Lijphart, 2012). The data consists of interviews with 13 politicians who were members of the Standing Committee of Energy and the Environment (SCEE) and 17 lobbyists working against the same committee from 2017 to 2020. The policy area of energy and the environment is particularly suited to study conflicting interpretations of the public interest since the policy area is ripe with policy dilemmas (Gullberg and Skodvin, 2011). In the Norwegian context, the dominant position of the petroleum industry heightens the conflict between building a viable economy and saving the environment (Ihlen, 2009). Norway is also an interesting case, given the country’s central position in the European energy market. Consequently, in the paper’s first section, we ask: What kind of public interest topics are common in lobbying campaigns against the SCEE? (RQ1).

We then move on to the question of how politicians evaluate the claims about the public interest put forward by public relations practitioners and lobbyists. Hence, in the second part of the paper, we ask: How do politicians evaluate the public interest claims lobbyists make, and what kind of conception of the public interest do politicians adhere to? (RQ2).

In the next section, we present a theoretical framework to analyze the construction and evaluation of public interest claims in lobbying campaigns. The different public interest claims lobbyists make will be analyzed through the rhetorical theory of topos, while the different conceptions of the public interest politicians adhere to will be analyzed through theories of the public interest, which are adapted to the constraints of liberal democracy. We then present our methodological approach, followed by the empirical analysis. Lastly, the paper is rounded off with a conclusion discussing the further implications of the study and limitations and possibilities for further research.

Most studies of the communication of lobbyists use the theory of framing (De Bruycker, 2016; Klüver et al., 2015). In this study, however, we rely on the concept of topos, which in our view is theoretically richer when analyzing how lobbyists find and invent their arguments. The theory of topos is multi-dimensional and enables us to look at how lobbyists find and identify public interest topics from several perspectives simultaneously (Leichty, 2018).

The concept of topos has its roots in ancient rhetoric as a notion to help rhetors structure their arguments (Miller, 2000; Wallace, 1972). As a theory, it takes advantage of the human mind’s tendency to categorize and generalize when thinking about topics (Corbett and Connors, 1999). However, the term topos, or topics, is subject to debate in rhetorical theory, with various interpretations among classical rhetorical scholars. The most accepted understanding is that topics are a general method for locating arguments (Herrick, 2017).

In this study, we distinguish between four understandings of topics (Gabrielsen, 2008). First, topics can be perceived as heuristics employed to discover arguments. Second, topics serve as a method for pinpointing collective arguments or commonplaces. Third, topics are tools for exploring shared values and perspectives within society. Fourth, topics manifest in various forms of inference. Our specific emphasis in this paper revolves around topics as a heuristic for discovering arguments and a quest for collective arguments or commonplaces. The understanding of topos as a heuristic for finding arguments is like what Aristotle labeled special topics, which in classical thinking often were connected lists or mental maps where rhetors could look for relevant arguments (Kjeldsen, 2007). Topos, as a search for commonplaces, or loci communes, are tied to ways of arguing that are so common that they can be applied in all situations. Thus, a rhetor that has run out of arguments or relevant content can always seek refuge in commonplaces. In the analysis, we will illustrate how both these understandings of topics are relevant in understanding how lobbyists navigate lobbying campaigns to identify pertinent public interest topics. Thus, the concept of topos is relevant for the analysis of RQ1, where we try to figure out what kind of public interest topics lobbyists rely on when they try to convince members of the SCEE.

In RQ2, we examine how politicians evaluate the lobbyists` public interest claims. To do this, we need a clearer understanding of the public interest and how it can be conceptualized. The idea of the public interest is central in the history of political philosophy, sometimes under different names such as “the common good”, “public good” or “general welfare” (Bitonti, 2019; Simm, 2011). The most famous definition is coined by Lippmann (2017) who described the public interest as “what men would choose if they saw clearly, thought rationally, acted disinterestedly and benevolently” (p. 50). Furthermore, Bozeman (2007) has suggested that the public interest can be understood as “the outcomes best serving the long-run survival and well-being of a social collective construed as a ‘public’” (p. 12).

Historically, the public interest has been hotly debated in political philosophy and associated with different schools of political thought. According to Zarecor (1959), “it would be perfectly plausible to interpret the history of political theory as a series of attempts to formulate the best possible method of serving the public interest” (p. 277). Consequently, the concept is central to how politics should be understood and how we can reach acceptable decisions on a societal level (Simm, 2011; Flathman, 1966).

The concept has also been debated in a recent study of 58 Norwegian organizations that showed how 57 made some kind of public interest claim when asked how they argued for their lobbying positions in meetings with decision-makers (Ihlen and Raknes, 2020). Thus, one may agree with Simm (2011, p. 555) that this versatility is an advantage for the scholarship on the public interest since “perhaps it is this openness to reinterpretation that has secured the concept its longevity and continued usefulness for thousands of years.”

Bitonti (2019) suggests five different types of public interest conceptions, which can be labeled as formal, substantive, realist, aggregative, and procedural conceptions of public interest. The formal conception of the public interest is quite like the medieval understanding of the concept, where the public interest is what the formal authority says it is. The substantive view, on the other hand, has an exact and substantial idea of how the public interest should be defined. This understanding is often connected to totalitarian philosophical systems such as Plato’s idea of a republic led by philosophers or Marx’s vision of a communist utopia (Bitonti, 2019). In the realist understanding, the only thing that exists is the raw power struggle between different conceptions of the public interest.

We suggest that, within a liberal democratic framework, none of the three last-mentioned interpretations of the public interest holds relevance and may lead to potentially illiberal outcomes. The authoritarian implications are evident in the formal and substantive versions of the public interest. Furthermore, the realist notion that a public interest is nonexistent lacks coherence within a democratic context. Despite variations in how political actors define and comprehend the public interest, these actors hold ideological convictions that extend beyond mere tactics to gain power. Democracy and a free exchange of opinions would not be possible under the conditions stipulated by the realist conception of the public interest.

Subsequently, by applying the ideal of a liberal democracy model, we are left with an aggregative and procedural understanding of the public interest. Within both frameworks, the public interest is perceived as relativist, emerging from the peaceful power struggle among various groups. Consequently, multiple public interests can exist, and the notion of what aligns with the public interest is subject to evolution over time. In the aggregative perspective, emphasis is placed on the democratic structure, with the public interest being epitomized by the established “rules of the game” (Bitonti, 2019). This understanding of the public interest is close to that of liberal thinkers such as Karl Popper and John Rawls. According to Rawls (2005) “political liberalism […] does not try to fix public reason once and for all in the form of one favored political conception of justice” (p. 451).

Conversely, the procedural interpretation of the public interest places greater importance on the deliberative process. In this context, only options that adhere to rational and impartial deliberation standards can be deemed to align with the public interest (Habermas, 2015). Therefore, the public interest must emanate from a process of rational deliberation among rational actors, culminating in a consensus that defines the optimal choice in the public interest.

Despite Habermas characterizing his disagreement with Rawls as a family dispute, there are discernible distinctions between the procedural and aggregative perspectives on the public interest (Finlayson, 2019; Fjørtoft, 2007). Broadly speaking, one could contend that the Habermasian concept of the public interest must adhere to more stringent ideals of discourse ethics. In this framework, the debate should be maximally open, with all stakeholders able to express their views and be attentively heard. When confronted with more compelling arguments, participants are expected to adapt their opinions to accommodate the needs and interests of others (Habermas, 1996). Conversely, Rawls does not prescribe an ideal doctrine to which public debate must conform. Instead, he views the public interest as an outcome of a free exchange of opinions, potentially leading to an overlapping consensus where individuals can agree on principles of justice despite disagreements on other matters (Finlayson, 2019). Although these concepts may appear abstract, both Rawls and Habermas share a pragmatic vision of influencing the reasoning process employed by politicians and interest organizations as they justify their claims.

To answer the research questions, the first author conducted a range of qualitative interviews, including 13 members of the SCEE and 17 lobbyists working against the SCEE from 2017–2021. The interviews were connected to a larger research project on lobbying activity towards the SCCE, and interviews were conducted at different times to control for the effect of changes in government and external crises such as the COVID-19 pandemic. The period from 2017-2021 was chosen because it covered a whole parliamentary period where several large issues that involved public interest concerns were debated in parliament. The analysis in this paper looks on the direct meetings between the lobbyists and politicians. Thus, our focus is on the arguments presented in direct meetings with decision makers and we are not including indirect strategies such as media materials and other campaign materials in the analysis (Binderkrantz, 2014).

In  Appendix 1, we have provided a list of the questions that specifically addressed how lobbyists develop public interest arguments and how politicians evaluate these arguments. The questions were constructed to be as open as possible to get an unbiased version of how lobbyists and politicians handle these complicated issues.

The sample of politicians from the SCEE was quite experienced and influential within their political parties. Of the 13 politicians interviewed, 10 had either held positions as ministers or state secretaries before the interview or took up these positions during the study. Furthermore, the interviewed politicians represented all the political parties in the Norwegian parliament – Stortinget – except the Christian Democrats, the Green Party, and the Red Party. The Green Party and the Red Party were excluded because they played a minor political role in the period of this study.

As mentioned in the introduction, the SCEE is a fertile ground for studying the clashes between different public interest claims. The committee makes decisions in matters related to oil, energy, watercourses, and environmental protection and corresponds to both the Ministry of the Environment and the Ministry of Oil and Energy. Thus, highly disputed topics such as the development of new oil fields, hydroelectric development, and issues related to regional planning are frequently discussed in the committee.

The lobbyists in the study were drawn from four clusters of organizations that dominated the lobbying activity against the committee and with which the members of the SCEE reported having frequent contact. These were the energy industry, environmental organizations, the oil industry, and the unions. In general, the interest groups surrounding the committee mirror the particular structure of the Norwegian energy sector where the oil industry and the energy-intensive industry account for 75% of exports and roughly 1/3 of exports (Gullberg, 2015). At the same time, Norway has a growing sector with renewable energy such as hydropower and wind-power which is competing with the petroleum industry for conducive regulations and the politicians’ attention (Singh, 2012).

12 of 17 (approximately 70%) of the lobbyists had held positions or been employed by a political party at the national level before they became lobbyists. Three of the interviewed lobbyists went from lobbying to political positions during this study, further illustrating the revolving door between politics and lobbying. (A list of the interviews can be obtained from the corresponding author).

The interviews typically lasted for 40–60 min. All the interviews were transcribed and approved by the participants. The transcript resulted in 320 single-spaced pages, and most of the politicians’ interviews were performed at their offices in Stortinget. Interviews with the lobbyists were often conducted during seminars where they participated or at their offices.

The transcript of the public interest questions of the study was around 50 pages and was imported to NVivo. The coding was both conceptual-driven and data-driven (Richards, 2020). Transcripts of the interviews were coded in two cycles by the main author, again inspired by the methods literature (Saldaña, 2021). The second round was conducted using NVivo software where the categories were collapsed, and patterns of similarity were detected. Going back and forth between the code book and the empirical material resulted in the development of new categories connected to the specific public interest claims that different interest organizations emphasized, such as creating jobs, securing revenue for the State, or saving the environment. The codebook for the different categories and examples of the coding can be found in the  Appendix 2².

RQ1 reads, “What kind of public interest topics are typical in lobbying campaigns towards the SCEE?” In the coding process, we noticed that several commonplace versions of the public interest topos were in play when we asked the lobbyists what they considered compelling arguments in lobbying campaigns. One oil lobbyist underscored the necessity of aligning one’s interests with those of the nation: “You must put your proposal in a national context. The question is what your proposal means for Norway” (Oil Lobbyist 4, author’s translation). Another environmental lobbyist equated the goal of lobbying as making the world a better place:

At a broad level, lobbyists articulate an understanding of the collective welfare that closely aligns with the definition presented by Bozeman (2007) in the theoretical section. In this context, the public interest is conceptualized as safeguarding the public’s well-being over the long term. Additionally, straightforward arguments like “do what is good for Norway “or “secure a better future for the country” closely align with the notion of topos as “shared, generally unquestioned perspectives and values” (Kjeldsen, 2019, p. 226). Thus, lobbyists strive to establish common ground with politicians they seek to influence by relying on commonly accepted beliefs that are rarely challenged. After all, who would oppose actions that benefit Norway or secure a more prosperous future for the country? By asserting that their proposals contribute to the national interest of Norway, lobbyists aim to persuade politicians that they share a common moral community (Billig, 1987). In this regard, the public interest rhetoric employed by lobbyists resembles the rhetoric of royals, characterized by “uncontroversial statements with a platitudinous moral tone” (Billig, 1988, p. 196). Despite potential differences, both groups employ commonplaces to convey shared objectives with politicians.

Positing that a proposal one advocates for or the organization one represents is devoted to the “common good” serves as a mere rhetorical starting point. From the lobbyists’ standpoint, the challenge lies in identifying more tangible applications of the public interest concept. An environmental lobbyist contended that working for the “common good” could encompass endeavors like securing jobs, increasing financial prosperity, or preserving valuable natural resources (Environmental Lobbyist 5, author’s translation). As a result, the public interest topos is not solely a commonplace but also functions as a heuristic, providing lobbyists with a framework to explore and formulate persuasive arguments (Gabrielsen, 2008). Therefore, once a lobbyist has decided that his or her arguments must support “the common good,” he or she must decide whether to anchor the argumentation in creating jobs, saving the environment, improving public health, or some other public interest topic (Ihlen and Raknes, 2020)

In Table 1, we have summarized the answer to RQ1 and the different public interest topics employed. The analysis illustrates that despite having distinct rhetorical entry points, lobbyists working towards the SCEE emphasize similar public interest topics, including job creation, generating state revenue, environmental protection, and cost-effectiveness. Interest organizations instinctively intertwine their core activities with the public interest, leading the oil industry to assert its role in safeguarding the Norwegian welfare state and the energy sector positioning itself as a solution to the climate crisis. Unions emphasize job creation and preservation of jobs, while environmental organizations focus on combating climate change and protecting the environment. Nevertheless, the public interest topics put forth by lobbyists involved in the SCEE are not one-dimensional. This analysis does not tell us anything about the effectiveness of public interest topics. However, it says that wrapping arguments in public interest rhetoric is a prerequisite for a fair hearing among political decision-makers.

Lobbyists also utilize what we have termed “supporting public interest topics” to enhance the appeal of their proposals to politicians. This analysis challenges findings in studies suggesting that the arguments pursued by lobbyists are merely a consequence of the type of organization they represent rather than a strategic choice (De Bruycker, 2016). Therefore, the analysis suggests that the constituencies represented by lobbyists serve as a rhetorical starting point, and lobbyists navigate from this initial standpoint to incorporate public interest topics not directly tied to the concerns of their constituencies. Consequently, oil lobbyists may assert that they can generate revenue and jobs while caring for the environment. Conversely, environmental lobbyists contend they combat climate change while contributing to job creation. Intriguingly, cost-effectiveness emerges as a shared public interest theme for union lobbyists, energy lobbyists, oil lobbyists, and environmental lobbyists. This underscores the pivotal role of cost-effectiveness as a guiding principle in Norwegian climate policy, as well as the influential position of the Ministry of Finance in the Norwegian decision-making system (Gullberg and Skodvin, 2011). However, cost-effectiveness is a double-edged sword because the argument favors established industries that are already cost-effective and hampers the development of renewable energy markets which are in the process of becoming cost-effective (Singh, 2012).

During the coding process, a distinction was made between “public interest as a commonplace” and “public interest as a heuristic.” We observed lobbyists frequently alluding to both interpretations when discussing public interest topics. The tension between the public interest as a general concept and the more particular public interest topics highlights the dilemma all rhetors face as they are torn between universal principles and practical application in a specific situation (Miller, 1987). Rhetorical argumentation always pertains to a specific subject, and the public interest topos serves as a heuristic, aiding lobbyists in identifying persuasive arguments within a specific policy arena (Gabrielsen, 2008). Within the energy and environmental policy domain, the quest for compelling public interest topics typically revolves around cost-effectiveness, job creation, and reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Had we incorporated a more extensive array of interest organizations from various policy sectors, the examination of the list of specific topics might have been broadened to encompass aspects such as democracy, public health, education, or human rights, as highlighted in other studies (Ihlen and Raknes, 2020).

As mentioned, most studies of the communicative aspects of the public interest focus on the lobbyists. Thus, in RQ2 we ask, “How do politicians evaluate the public interest claims lobbyists make, and what kind of conception of the public interest do politicians adhere to?”

The coding revealed that when politicians were questioned about effective lobbying arguments, they returned to the same platitudes as the lobbyists. A member of the SCEE conceded that arguments emphasizing “it is good for Norway, that it is the right politics for the future” consistently left the most significant impression (SCEE Member 7, author’s translation). Another member underscored the importance of demonstrating how one’s cause contributes to the greater good, stating, “It is, of course, to show how your cause is important for the greater good” (SCEE Member 6, author’s translation). Thus, politicians and lobbyists agree that the public interest rests in platitudinal commonplaces. Politicians and lobbyists express sentiments close to the general definitions of the public interest, where the public interest is defined as decisions that give welfare and benefits to the whole public (Bozeman, 2007; Lippmann, 2017). In this respect, these overarching conceptualizations of the public interest are a form of what rhetorical theory labels sensus communis or doxa, which are the taken-for-granted opinions and shared beliefs in a society (Jasinski, 2001).

The assessment of politicians also clarifies why lobbyists working towards the SCEE frequently integrate multiple public interest topics. Lobbyists appear to recognize that politicians grapple with what we can term “public interest dilemmas” where various arguments based on different ideals are in conflict. As a result, lobbyists cannot solely depend on a single public interest assertion because politicians aspire to address multiple issues simultaneously.

The assessment of SCEE-member 7 demonstrates that politicians are very open to political suggestions that can help them solve the public interest dilemmas they are struggling with. Interestingly, the important question is not who the lobbyists represent but whether they can help find solutions that are both profitable and help to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.

This leads us to the second part of RQ2, where we ask what kind of conception of the public interest the politicians adhere to. When questioned about whether they had guiding principles for their decision-making when various interest organizations advocated for different solutions, the initial recourse for SCEE members was to refer to their party program. However, party programs often do not provide clear solutions in complex cases, requiring SCEE members to rely more on their individual conceptions of the public interest. Some members contended that they possessed distinct principles that they applied to assess policy proposals:

These evaluations illustrate why lobbying proposals lacking public interest rhetoric are unlikely to fare well in the policy process. The predominant public interest dilemma for SCEE members revolves around balancing the topos of the economy and the topos of the environment. The way members conduct these assessments is contingent on their party program and political standpoint. Generally, the Socialist Left Party, the Liberal Party, and the Green Party are inclined to prioritize environmental arguments. At the same time, the Labor Party, the Conservative Party, and the Progressive Party tend to give more weight to economic considerations. Consequently, this public interest dilemma is equally pertinent for an SCEE member positioned firmly on the more business-friendly right-wing of the political spectrum.

The public interest dilemmas that politicians grapple with underscore the significance they place on the input from lobbyists. Some members characterized their interaction with lobbyists as a continuous dialog concerning Norway’s climate paradox. This paradox involves the coexistence of a lucrative oil industry alongside Norway’s international commitment to the Paris Accords and its portrayal as a climate-friendly nation (Alstadheim, 2010). Thus, the members of the SCEE are sometimes truly confused and struggle to balance the public interest topics of the environment and the economy against each other.

The point to emphasize here is crucial yet relatively straightforward. Politicians frequently lack a clear idea of the optimal solution to a public interest dilemma. They experience the reality of a pluralistic society where fixed solutions to social problems are elusive (Bitonti, 2019). Much like political philosophers, members of the SCEE are engaged in the endeavor to discern not only solutions that align with their program but also those that best harmonize different public interest considerations. The often-tumultuous nature of politics compounds this state of ambiguity and unclear preferences. Policy processes and issues are transient, requiring decisions to be made within their designated time slots for the political machinery to function smoothly. Thus, “quite often time constraints force politicians to make decisions without having formulated precise preferences” (Zahariadis, 2014, p. 67). The absence of a definite understanding among SCEE members regarding the public interest and the optimal means of achieving it renders them receptive to suggestions from lobbyists on how to navigate these dilemmas.

Lacking a clear idea does not equate to a lack of principles. In the theoretical section, we posited that the aggregative and procedural perspectives represent distinct approaches to reasoning about the public interest. The aggregative view perceives the public interest as the aggregation of interests derived from peaceful struggle. On the other hand, the procedural view aligns more with the Habermasian concept of an ideal speech situation, wherein a fair procedure is more likely to yield a fair outcome (Bitonti, 2019; Johnston, 2017). As mentioned earlier, members of the SCEE grapple with the challenge of reconciling the environmental and economic considerations. Some SCEE members went to great lengths to acknowledge that they were open to embracing the persuasive power of superior arguments, even if they initially held a different position:

The depiction of SCEE-member 9 distinctly highlights an aspect of deliberation in the interaction between lobbyists and politicians. In a deliberate process, the various parties might “not only accept compromises but also end up having very different opinions compared to when the process started” (Öberg and Svensson, 2012, p. 249). The process described above has similarities with Bozeman’s (2007) “pragmatic idealism” inspired by the work of John Dewey. Here, the pursuit of the public interest hinges on a rational process of argumentation, in which the participants “keep in mind an ideal of the public interest, but without specific content, and then moving toward that ideal, making the ideal more concrete as one moves toward it” (Bozeman, 2007, p. 13).

While deliberation appears to have a role in lobbying, most SCEE members functioned within a procedural conception. In this perspective, the legitimacy of public interest claims was contingent on their capacity to harmonize different interests. The notion of balance is pivotal to the legitimacy of decisions, and solutions that lack proper equilibrium between the claims of different interest organizations are deemed undesirable. Repeatedly, SCEE members emphasized that they listened to, but were never bound by, the interest organizations attempting to influence them.

It is intriguing to observe that interest balance is closely tied to an ideal of “independence,” where SCEE members safeguard their integrity by asserting their willingness to consider opposing views. Additionally, they distance themselves from the notion that certain interest groups “dominate” their decisions. The notion of “finding political solutions that are not in one side or the other” or to “never take input” from just one side points to a Rawlsian understanding of politics where the decision makers have a “politics of difference perspective” in which “the public interest is to be found out via discussion between the voices of different perspectives” (Naurin, 2007, p. 119). From this viewpoint, it is advantageous that many interest organizations convey similar messages because “if many voices say approximately the same thing, the policy solution is likely to go in that direction” (Naurin, 2007, p. 121). Therefore, if politicians believe that the public interest can be discerned by listening to dissenting voices, it makes sense for lobbyists to simultaneously invoke multiple public interest claims.

Using the rhetorical notion of topics as an analytic framework, we have illustrated how lobbyists find public interest topics that they think will resonate with politicians in the policy field of energy and the environment. Even though the lobbyists in the sample represent different organizations, they rely on very similar public interest topics, such as reducing greenhouse gas-emissions, creating jobs, being cost-effective, and creating revenue for the state. Invoking public interest topics is not simply an effect of the type of organization the lobbyists represent, but a strategic choice where the lobbyists could bring different public interest topics into play (Uhre and Rommetvedt, 2019). Thus, oil lobbyists can argue about how they contribute to saving the environment, and environmental lobbyists can discuss creating jobs. The reason why lobbyists in the Norwegian context invoke several public interest topics at the same time is probably connected to the multi-party setting. To win approval for policy ideas, lobbyists need to convince several political parties to win a majority, and they know that different parties have different starting points regarding how they resolve public interest dilemmas. This finding illustrates why lobbying should be studied in contexts other than the E.U. and the U.S., where lobbyists seem to rely on more one-dimensional argumentative strategies (Mahoney, 2007; Woll, 2012).

Furthermore, even though the public interest can be hard to define, both lobbyists and politicians clearly understand that the public interest is a topical commonplace. Politicians and lobbyists acknowledge that the most effective arguments in lobbying campaigns refer to “the common good” or can help create “a better future for the country.” The fact that lobbyists and politicians have quite similar ideas about the public interest and why it is useful indicates that lobbyists in this study have intimate knowledge about how politicians think and reason and can use this insight to their advantage. When lobbyists are packaging their proposals in public interest rhetoric, they use the most basic strategy of identification where they tell politicians “I am like you” and “I want what you want” (Day, 1960). As mentioned in the methodological section, most of the lobbyists in the sample were resourceful and had higher education and previous political experience. Thus, the study corroborates the often-found claim that former politicians are the best lobbyists (Godwin et al., 2012).

Even though the study does not conclude about the effectiveness of different public interest topics, the findings say something about why public interest topics are effective on the general level. One of the most interesting aspects of the study is how uncertain politicians are when they are trying to weigh different public interest topics against each other. In general, the politicians seem to have an ambivalent relationship concerning whether lobbying can help promote the public interest. A central finding is that politicians struggle with “public interest dilemmas” where different ideal-regarding arguments are pitted against each other. Thus, lobbyists can exploit the uncertainties politicians are struggling with by presenting policy solutions that presumably can help them realize several idealized goals simultaneously.

Finally, it is interesting to note that members of the SCEE subscribe to both the aggregative and procedural conception of the public interest. The dominating picture, however, is that the members of the SCEE see it as their job to listen to different interest organizations and try to balance the claims and information they provide. Thus, there seems to be a bipartisan agreement that seeking out opposite views is desirable. That politicians are trying to balance different interests against each other is no guarantee that the results of the policies they agree on are in the public interest. As Simm (2011) has pointed out, both the Rawlsian and Habermasian notions of the public interest suffer from a naïve idea that a fair procedure gives a fair result. Much of the contemporary critique of lobbyism is that it produces outcomes detrimental to the public interest despite lobbyists adhering to the rules of the game (Baumgartner and Leech, 1998). The challenge is that the universe of interest organizations surrounding politicians in their daily work is always biased towards the resourceful. In Denmark, with a political system quite similar to the Norwegian, the most resourceful lobbyists dominate all lobbying arenas and “follow the money” is a good guideline for studying their influence (Binderkrantz, 2014, p. 221). The same tendency is evident in a recent analysis of Norwegian lobbyists (Wollebæk and Raknes, 2022). Thus, the public interest is vulnerable to policy capture, where lobbyists can successfully frame their policy ideas in public interest rhetoric even though they are pursuing private interests (Lindsey and Teles, 2017).

Consequently, if politicians believe that balancing the demands of the interest organizations that are right in front of them will serve the public interest, they might fail to see those interests who are not organized and those who do not have the skills and resources to show up with the right message at the right time. If lobbying should serve the public interest, there should probably be limits on using raw power and mechanisms for consulting and including less resourceful groups in decision-making (Naurin, 2001). Several public relations and communication management scholars have suggested that the public interest should be more central in the literature (Johnston, 2017; Messina, 2007). They all argue that the practice can serve the public interest by improving the quality of the debate or improving the professional standards of professionals. However, within the sphere of lobbying and public affairs, this study questions how and under what circumstances this can be done.

The findings in this study are relevant concerning the ongoing debate about the increased power of interest groups at the E.U. and national levels. The COVID-19 pandemic illustrated how powerful economic interest groups can win economic concessions under the banner of public interest concerns. In the Norwegian context, the Norwegian oil industry gained a massive tax relief due to a successful lobbying campaign in 2020, where the main argument was that without tax relief, jobs would be lost all over the country. In retrospect, many politicians acknowledged that the claims of the industry were self-serving and that the tax cuts only increased profits for the oil companies and reduced income for the Norwegian state. In the ongoing debates about the future of the energy system in Europe, politicians are bombarded with conflicting public interest claims from interest groups. They must participate in difficult debates about who shall bear the cost for a painful transition to a green economy. Here, lobbying researchers can play an important role in putting the public interest claims of interest groups under critical scrutiny.

This study has obvious limitations in its focus on one specific country and one specific policy issue. Energy policy is also decided on the EU-level and would be interesting to explore if the same public interest arguments that dominate on the national level also work on the EU-level or if different institutional designs impact the type of arguments that are used (Gullberg, 2015). Moreover, further studies should analyze how politicians dealing with sectors besides energy and the environment relate to the public interest and, just as importantly, how politicians in other countries relate to the public interest and lobbying. It could be particularly interesting to look at other countries with similar consensus-oriented political systems such as Denmark, Sweden, and the Netherlands, and evaluate whether the public interest challenge unfolds in the same way here (Lijphart, 2012). However, in the U.S. political system with its majoritarian institutions, there might be more room for self-serving arguments when these align with the preferences of the policymakers (Woll, 2012; Godwin et al., 2012). Another challenge arises from the difficulty of empirically pinning down the distinction between the procedural and aggregative conception of the public interest, as these are abstract concepts derived from political philosophy. Consequently, our operationalization for these concepts is open to scrutiny. However, this study underscores that the public interest is a slippery concept. Still, it has empirical value since both politicians and lobbyists relate to it and if we should abandon the concept, “we will simply have to wrestle with the problems under some other heading” (Flathman, 1966, p. 6).

1. What do you consider good or persuasive messages in a lobbying situation?

   Probe: Could you give some examples?

2. Some people argue that politicians are skeptical of lobbyists because they represent special interests. Is that a challenge you face in your work?

   Probe: If, no, why is it not a challenge? If yes, how so?

3. How do you develop arguments related to this challenge?

   Probe: Are there any strategies you use to overcome this challenge?

1. What do you consider good or persuasive messages in a lobbying situation?

   Probe: Could you give some examples?

2. Some people argue that politicians must think of the public interest while interest groups represent narrow group interests. Do you think that is a challenge?

   Probe: If no, why not? If yes, how is it a challenge? How do you develop arguments related to this challenge?

3. Interest groups often have conflicting solutions on different political issues. How do resonate your way towards a solution on issues where interest groups disagree?

   Probe: Do you have any specific principles you rely on?

Source(s): Authors’ own creation