This paper aims to examine how the emergence of cryptocurrency introduces novel violent crime typologies, such as “wrench attacks,” where offenders use physical coercion to compel victims to transfer digital assets, and how crypto’s characteristics disrupt Rational Choice Theory’s (RCT) risk/reward balance.
This is a conceptual paper integrating literature on offender decision-making, cyber-physical crime and historical crime harvests (Pease, 1997) within the RCT framework, comparing crypto-enabled extortion to non-crypto equivalents.
Cryptocurrency enables asset transfers that are attractive for criminals, amplifying perceived rewards while mitigating risks, unlike traditional cash-based extortion. By making high-risk offenses more appealing, crypto has presented a new “crime harvest.” Rather than invalidating RCT, this paper identifies specific boundary conditions under which its core variables are most susceptible to disruption and offers four testable propositions to guide future empirical inquiry.
This paper specifies conditions under which crypto disrupts RCT’s risk/reward calculus, offers testable propositions for hybrid opportunity structures and presents wrench-attack-specific policy recommendations through emerging regulatory frameworks (EU Markets in Crypto-Assets; UK Financial Services and Markets Act 2023).
