What information do members of Congress (politicians) use when they trade stocks? The purpose of this paper is to attempt to answer this question by investigating the relationship between an aggregate measure of trading by members of Congress (aggregate congressional trading) and future stock market returns.
The authors follow the empirical framework used in academic work on corporate insiders. In particular, they aggregate 61,998 common stock transactions by politicians over the 2004–2010 period and estimate time series regressions at a monthly frequency with heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust t-statistics.
The authors find that aggregate congressional trading predicts future stock market returns, suggesting that politicians use economy-wide (i.e. macroeconomic) information in their stock trades. The authors also present evidence that aggregate congressional trading is related to the growth rate of industrial production, suggesting that industrial production serves as a potential channel through which aggregate congressional trading predicts future stock market returns.
To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is the first to document a relationship between aggregate congressional trading and stock market returns. The media and scholarly attention on politicians’ trades have mostly focused on the question of whether politicians have superior information on individual firms. The results from this study suggest that politicians’ informational advantage may go beyond individual firms such that they potentially have superior information on the overall trajectory of the economy as well.
