This study aims to assess whether the accountability system for executives’ management and investment behavior can enhance the investment efficiency of state-owned enterprises (SOEs).
This study uses a multi-period difference-in-differences (DID) approach to assess the impact of the operational accountability system on the investment efficiency of SOEs, leveraging the implementation of the system as a natural policy experiment.
The implementation of the operational accountability system significantly enhances the investment efficiency of SOEs. Mechanism analysis reveals that the accountability system increases investment efficiency through the channels of lowering executive opportunistic behavior and raising executive risk management awareness. Further research finds that state audits and the regional legal environment significantly moderate the relationship between the operational accountability system and investment efficiency of SOEs. Additional analysis finds that the accountability system’s promotion effect on investment efficiency of SOEs is more obvious in companies that receive a lot of media attention and are closely monitored by small- and medium-sized investors.
The scope focuses on SOEs under SASAC supervision; findings may have limited generalizability to non-state enterprises or other jurisdictions.
This paper provides practical inspiration and policy suggestions for how to help high-quality development of SOEs through accountability mechanisms.
This paper provides empirical evidence for the promotion of investment efficiency of SOEs by operational investment accountability system, confirming its theoretical and practical significance.
