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Keywords: Principal–agent problem
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Journal Articles
Retention contracts with asymmetric information: optimistic approach vs pessimistic approach
Available to Purchase
Journal of Financial Reporting and Accounting (2023) 21 (1): 156–177.
Published: 28 June 2022
... the disciplining option using two different retention contracts: optimistic contract and pessimistic contract. Information asymmetry Principal–agent problem Moral hazard Retention contracts This research boosts the board of directors' theoretical literature. Hermalin and Weisbach's (2001) survey paper...
