This study aims to examine how the population’s reaction to crisis information dissemination can influence household preparedness. While crisis communication plays a crucial role in national emergency response strategies, the effectiveness of such communication depends on how receiving populations interpret and act upon the information. The research investigates the relationship between crisis information dissemination and household preparedness.
The study uses data from 15 household qualitative interviews from 2019 to 2021 on the crisis information brochure, “If Crisis or War Comes”, across Sweden, using the Situational Crisis Communication Theory (SCCT) framework to explore how crisis communication is perceived in light of household preparedness. The analysis focusses on perceptions and significance of the brochure using thematic analysis.
Results reveal that population reactions can mediate the relationship between crisis information dissemination and household preparedness across five themes. While Sweden’s high trust in authorities can facilitate crisis communication, it may also limit proactive engagement with preparedness efforts by focusing on the information rather than the process. Furthermore, incorporating information on the roles of societal institutions, such as banks, could improve the receiving population’s understanding of crisis preparedness within a broader societal framework.
The research offers practical implications for policymakers, emphasising the need for tailored communication strategies that enhance individual and societal preparedness.
Research contributes to crisis communication literature by shifting the focus from government-led dissemination efforts to the receiving population’s perspective. By integrating SCCT, the study provides previously unexplored insights into how population perception can alter the relationship between crisis information and preparedness.
1. Introduction
The dissemination of crisis information is crucial for developing effective emergency responses to public health events at an epidemic level (Zhang et al., 2023). When government and organisational entities are tasked with communicating information about an impending event, an ongoing situation, or an event that has already occurred but continues to have lasting effects, the manner in which the message is conveyed becomes critically important (Ortega and Scartascini, 2020). In response to recent geopolitical and security developments over the past decade, countries such as Sweden have adopted a proactive approach to addressing these challenges vis-à-vis communication with the Swedish population. The Russian invasion of Ukraine only sought to intensify communication via multiple channels, including sensitisation campaigns. For example, War in Our Time is a six-part television series produced by the Swedish Armed Forces exploring the threats posed by war or conflict to Sweden and outlining how the nation, as a collective, can respond and counter these threats.
Crisis communication refers to agencies’ or organisations’ methods and strategies to manage information and shape meaning before or during a crisis (cf. Coombs, 2007). As such, in this study, communication is a one-way (directional) approach to present, clarify, and contextualise essential information, as opposed to the traditional two-way exchanges. Crises encompass various circumstances, ranging from natural disasters, public health emergencies, and governmental scandals to man-made disasters, such as terrorism, cyber-attacks, and war. Crisis communication is based on the belief that well-crafted messages can positively impact populations affected by the crisis, ultimately benefiting responsible agencies (Coombs and Holladay, 2014). The focus of such information dissemination on households can significantly enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of public crisis preparedness and response efforts (Kelenske, 2011) and ensure that the information is readily accessible, easily understandable, and practical for use (Simmons, 2024; Nukpezah and Soujaa, 2018).
Household preparedness during crises, disasters, pandemics, or military conflicts is a significant concern for governments as they strive to ensure public safety and security through effective crisis communication strategies (e.g., Nilsson et al., 2016; Zhang et al., 2016). Similar to public communication, which involves deliberate efforts to inform or influence the behaviours of large audiences (Rice and Jahn, 2020), crisis communication differs in terms of the level of interest and the range of stakeholders engaged with crisis-specific information. An example is the informational brochure titled “If Crisis or War Comes”, which the Swedish Civil Defence and Resilience Agency (MCF) distributed to 4.8 million households in 2018. It addressed public preparedness for crises and armed attacks on Sweden and covered warning systems, shelter use, self-protection, and evacuation procedures. It can include potential changes in laws and regulations, such as temporary travel bans and restrictions on large gatherings (Johnston et al., 2020; Hyland-Wood et al., 2021). This enhances the nation’s preparedness in crisis or potential conflict (Paul and Das, 2023).
As Johansson et al. (2023) noted, the Swedish population highly trusts their authorities and one another. However, this strong trust in authorities may hinder individuals’ capacity to effectively receive, comprehend, and act upon crisis-related information. The Swedish household preparedness brochure had previously been distributed in 1943, 1952, 1961, and 2018 (Farbøl et al., 2024), and the Swedish Contingency Agency (MSB) emphasises that this dissemination is not new by referencing earlier editions in the current brochure. However, 2018 reflected the broader and more complex nature of today’s threats, from climate change to terrorist attacks and cyber threats to military confrontations (Farbøl et al., 2024). While optimal household preparedness rests on effective and robust crisis communication and information dissemination (Johnston et al., 2020; Kikoski, 1993), we argue that the effectiveness of crisis communication on household preparedness is influenced by the population’s responses to the disseminated information. This can sometimes lead to deviant or atypical response patterns, resulting in sub-optimal household preparedness, ultimately impacting overall national preparedness. Thus, societal and emergency response readiness capabilities depend significantly on individual households’ ability to fulfil preparedness responsibilities effectively (Landahl and Cox, 2009; Kelenske, 2011). For example, Petridou et al. (2019) argued that Sweden demonstrates a state-oriented risk culture, where individuals believe that crises and disasters can be prevented, thus positioning the state as a central planner responsible for managing potential emergencies.
Despite its significance within crisis literature (e.g. Coombs and Holladay, 2014), the relationship between crisis information dissemination and household preparedness has rarely been studied from the perspective of the receiving population’s reactions. As such, the current article aims to fill this gap by investigating the conceptual pathways that could be associated with crisis information dissemination and household preparedness. Specifically, the study sought to answer the following research question:
How can population reaction to crisis information dissemination impact the level of household preparedness?
Adopting a simple yet powerful framework – Situational Crisis Communication Theory (SCCT) (Coombs, 2007) – we analysed and identified the nature of the relationship between crisis communication and household preparedness. SCCT categorises crises into three clusters: victim, accidental, and preventable. Public reactions are generally more sympathetic when an organisation is perceived as a victim. However, reactions tend to be harmful when the organisation is viewed as responsible for causing the crisis. We view population reaction to crisis information dissemination as emphasising the perceived importance or lack thereof of the information contained within it to the enhancement of crisis preparedness among households. Employing inductive approaches, we collected interview data from respondents across Sweden to investigate the research question. The findings reveal that the content of the message and how it was disseminated acted as a mediator of the desired outcome of the information dissemination goal, intervening in the typical agency–citizen communication trajectory between crisis information dissemination and household preparedness. Authors suggest that future dissemination of preparedness information should be complemented by details on the role of essential societal institutions, such as banks, in enabling recipients to develop a comprehensive understanding of the practical implications of crisis information.
The subsequent sections of this paper are organised as follows. We will begin by reviewing the relevant literature regarding the significance of household preparedness, crisis information dissemination and public communication in Section 2. We will then outline our inductive approach to the qualitative method in Section 3 before presenting our findings presented in Section 4. Subsequently, we will discuss our results and study implications in Section 5 and, finally, present this study’s conclusions in Section 6.
2. Literature overview
2.1 Household preparedness
Households must acknowledge their collective responsibility for preparedness by implementing preventive measures to mitigate potential harm (Donahue et al., 2014, p. 90). According to Kim and Kang (2010, p. 472), household preparedness encompasses “any preventive action taken by households before or during emergencies, including seeking, processing, and sharing relevant information, financial expenditure, and psychological sacrifices aimed at minimising possible harm”. The importance of household preparedness is highlighted by the focus it receives from governments, organisations, and the media (Nukpezah and Soujaa, 2018). However, questions remain about how well the findings on risk perception apply to influencing preparedness actions. The Protection Motivation Theory (PMT), proposed by Rogers (1975, 1983), helps us understand the mechanisms behind people’s reactions and the gaps between awareness and action. The adoption of preventive measures depends on individuals’ perception of threat and their assessment of coping strategies. According to PMT, people are more likely to act when they recognise a significant risk, have access to measures that can help reduce losses, and feel capable of implementing those measures.
Although preparedness is vital for effective emergency response (Kaneberg et al., 2016), evolving security and crisis management approaches necessitate more transparent methods for communicating uncertainty and fostering greater individual accountability for personal safety in a crisis (Ruggiero, 2017). In this context, crisis communication is critical and can truly be a matter of life and death (Sellnow and Seeger, 2021).
According to Kaneberg et al. (2021), significant trust challenges exist regarding society’s safety and security. In high-trust societies, reliance on authorities can create a false sense of security, overshadowing the need for individual responsibility in their preparedness – a need that is increasingly recognised. Modern changes in safety and security, driven by geopolitical and socioeconomic instability, do not happen in isolation; instead, new and evolving disruptions complicate our understanding and management of these issues.
Bengtsson and Brommesson (2022) suggest that while trust in institutions can lead to more efficient resource allocation and better overall preparedness, excessive trust in authorities can paradoxically hinder individual household preparedness. This, in turn, impacts overall safety and security across different functions. It is crucial to understand the underlying mechanisms of trust, such as how it can foster complacency or shift responsibility onto the state, especially in high-trust contexts. In high-trust societies such as Sweden, where information capabilities are crucial for effective household preparedness, collaboration among organisations and individuals is essential (Kaneberg et al., 2016). This collaborative effort is fostered and strengthened through trust. While high trust can lead to complacency, it can also encourage community engagement and proactive measures rather than hinder them. However, trust is not only important when studying crises directly. As trust is often said to be easy to damage but takes a long time to build, it is also important to examine trust and crisis communication once the immediate crisis phase has ended (MSB, 2024a).
Public preparedness, particularly at the household level, is vital for fostering public awareness and involves effective crisis communication (Paul and Das, 2023) to the public. This communication addresses the shifting landscape of safety and security, encompassing a wide array of threats and instabilities that modern societies face, including the increasing vulnerability of technology-dependent communities, which can lead to communication disruptions (Larsson, 2021; Baker and Ludwig, 2016; Lentzos and Rose, 2009; Huysmans, 2008). Governments and administrative agencies are increasingly urged to enhance their capabilities in providing crisis information and public services (Graham et al., 2015; Chatfield and Reddick, 2018). This strategy seeks to integrate security and crisis management, ensuring the safety of states, societies, and individual households (Polcarová and Pupíková, 2022). Within this framework, Larsson (2021) highlights Sweden’s return to a more traditional view of national and sovereign security, characterised by a concept of total defence that reflects the changing geopolitical landscape. The involvement of government agencies through the adaptation of laws, businesses collaborating with agencies and other businesses, and the engagement of professionals is essential for addressing the gaps that arise during the pre-crisis and post-crisis phases (Antai and Hellberg, 2024).
2.2 Crisis information dissemination
The purpose of crisis information dissemination is to support and facilitate the development of emergency responses to epidemic-level public health events, disasters, conflict, or war (cf. Zhang et al., 2023), as crisis communication strategy can profoundly affect public perceptions (Pöppel et al., 2021; Hambrick et al., 2015; Glantz, 2010). Risk communication (Petridou et al., 2019) refers to information disseminated by government agencies to citizens about potential future crises that may affect the public. The main goal of this is to provide information to address inherent tensions usually within society. As Covello (1992) describes, this process involves “exchanging information among interested parties about the nature, magnitude, significance, or control of a risk” (p. 359).
Such exchanges can be examined through several theoretical frameworks that seek to explain the relationship between information dissemination and household preparedness communication during crises. These frameworks emphasise that the public must understand both the nature of the risk and its potential impact to be motivated to take appropriate preparedness actions (Basolo et al., 2009).
According to the Elaboration Likelihood Model (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986; Petty and Cacioppo, 1981), persuasion can be achieved by pursuing two primary routes, including a central route and a peripheral route. Central occurs “when motivation and ability to scrutinise issue-relevant arguments are relatively high” (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986) and peripheral occurs when motivation or ability to think deeply is low, causing attitudes to be determined by superficial cues, such as the attractiveness or credibility of the source, emotional appeal, or the number of arguments presented. These cues can either create direct associations with the message or act as indirect signals that shape perceptions of the message’s credibility (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986). As such, clear and well-structured messages encourage central information processing, resulting in deeper understanding and stronger memory retention. Greater message clarity enhances cognitive engagement and supports more effective behavioural responses.
Attribution Theory (Kelley and Michela, 1980) is a psychological framework that explains how people interpret and attribute causes to events, behaviours and outcomes. suggests that individuals naturally seek plausible mechanisms or explanations for events, also known as antecedents, which in turn influence their behaviour, referred to as consequences. Messages perceived as unbiased and independent are generally seen as more credible and trustworthy (Serman and Sims, 2023). As a result, communication free from commercial influence is considered more legitimate, encouraging stronger public engagement and responsiveness.
Similar to attribution theory in terms of its disciplinary origin and cognitive frameworks for explaining how people process and respond to information, information processing theory (e.g. Eastman, 2021), based on the work of Atkinson and Shiffrin (1968) and Craik and Lockhart (1972), differs from attribution theory in that it focusses on the stepwise process by which a population receives, decodes, stores, and uses information. Conversely, attribution theory is more concerned with the reasons for an event, seeking to understand why it occurred in the first place. This theory is closest to SCCT, which is adopted in this paper.
The effectiveness of an authority in reducing the negative impacts of a crisis is closely tied to its reputation and strengthened by strategic crisis communication. These communication strategies aim to understand public concerns and alleviate fear, distress, and anxiety during a crisis (Taylor and Kent, 2014; Agostino and Arnaboldi, 2016). Highlighting the reputation of Swedish authorities has been a crucial aspect of the crisis communication process, significantly influencing public perceptions. Before creating the brochure, the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB) formed a reference group that included representatives from the Swedish Armed Forces, county administrative boards, central authorities, voluntary organisations, religious communities, and various municipalities (MSB, 2018).
Echoing the views of Johansson et al. (2023), it is evident that during crises, individuals tend to seek out information because of heightened anxiety. In our fast-paced media landscape, information spreads at an astonishing rate. For example, after the terrorist attack in Stockholm in 2017, half of the Swedish population was aware of the incident within just one hour (MSB, 2024b). When examining the role of anxiety – a prevalent emotion during crises – the dynamics of information consumption become more intricate (Xu and Sattar, 2020). Anxious individuals possess a strong craving for information (Clore et al., 2014). The interconnectedness of crisis, anxiety, and the need for information is frequently highlighted by researchers (Johansson et al., 2023). In the initial phases of a crisis, providing excessive information is rarely a concern, as many seeking clarity are grappling with anxiety (Van der Meer and Jin, 2020). One might assume that individuals who are anxious and actively seeking information would enhance their understanding of the crisis. However, research shows that such individuals often do not benefit from the information they gather; rather, they may find their anxiety intensifying as they absorb more data over time (cf. Johansson et al., 2023; Van der Meer and Jin, 2020; Clore et al., 2014).
2.3 The Situational Crisis Communication Theory model and population reaction to crisis information
Developed by Coombs (2007), the SCCT framework provides guidance on how organisations should communicate during crises to protect their reputation and maintain stakeholder trust. It proposes that public reactions to a crisis are shaped by the perceived level of responsibility that an organisation bears for an event. SCCT categorises crises into three clusters: victim, accidental, and preventable. Public reactions are generally more sympathetic when an organisation is perceived as a victim. However, reactions tend to be harmful when the organisation is viewed as responsible for causing the crisis. Here, we conceptualise the state as an organisation that delivers crisis information through its agencies, as described within the SCCT framework. Within the accidental cluster, the purpose of crisis information dissemination and its implications are considered unintentional or uncontrollable by the responsible organisation (Coombs, 2007). From an organisational perspective, the theory outlines four strategies managers can use to manage the reactions and perceptions of stakeholders as well as the reputation of the organisation. These include the following:
rejection strategies, which involve denying the crisis and deflecting blame;
diminishing strategies, which include excuses and justifications;
rebuild strategies, focusing on compensations and apologies; and
encouraging strategies, aimed at reassuring and motivating the public.
Coombs (2018) also differentiates between operational and reputational crises. Operational crises are driven by specific events, whereas reputational crises stem from public perceptions. In this context, the attribution of responsibility is vital; the more responsibility and intentionality attributed to an authority, the greater the threat to its reputation (Coombs, 2018). Given that the Swedish population places high trust in its leadership, we, therefore, categorise the situation that led to the dissemination of crisis preparedness information – a series of events including the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008 and the annexation of Crimea in 2014, as well as the ensuing war since then – as an operational crisis.
While the SCCT provides a decision-making framework for crisis managers, it also allows for developing strategies to understand what is communicated from the target of such information dissemination campaigns to mitigate reputational damage. However, this study focusses on the responses to disseminated crisis information and how that affects the original purpose of crisis communication. As such, in Figure 1, we conceptualise the goal of the relationship between crisis communication and household preparedness as the ability to enhance national preparedness in the event of disruptive events such as natural and man-made disasters, including conflict or an armed attack on the nation (Zhang et al., 2023)
Conceptual relationship between crisis information, household preparedness, and national preparedness
Source: Authors’ own work
Conceptual relationship between crisis information, household preparedness, and national preparedness
Source: Authors’ own work
In this study, the receiver is the Swedish public (the households), as they interpret the authority’s message or the issue that prompted the information through the brochure. According to Larsson (2021), preparedness in today’s rapidly evolving society creates a strong interconnection between citizens and the state, embedding crisis preparedness into the fabric of everyday life as an ever-present dimension. In this context, household preparedness functions as the glue that binds state security ideals (crisis information) with broader state preparedness (national preparedness) efforts. As such, the relationship in Figure 1 reflects the crisis information dissemination paradox, whereby communication strategies implemented by responsible authorities and agencies can simultaneously promote household preparedness and contribute to the wider objective of national preparedness. This extends the idea of the practicality paradox beyond a descriptive notion to an actionable framework for fostering coordinated resilience building. Assuming the conceptual model (Figure 1), we apply the SCCT framework to this conceptualisation to analyse a given operational crisis by responsible agencies, including the four response strategies suggested by the SCCT framework (Figure 2). It is assumed here that these strategies formed the basis of the crisis information dissemination campaign.
The model begins with a box labelled Crisis X. Arrows lead to four vertically arranged boxes labelled Denial, Diminishing, Rebuilding, and Bolstering. Dashed arrows from Denial and Diminishing point to an oval labelled Crisis Information slash preparedness Dissemination. Solid arrows from Rebuilding and Bolstering also point to this oval. A dashed two-way arrow connects Crisis Information slash preparedness Dissemination and Household Preparedness. A solid one-way arrow points from Household Preparedness to National Preparedness.Operationalisation of the SCCT model for crisis information dissemination
Source: Authors’ own work
The model begins with a box labelled Crisis X. Arrows lead to four vertically arranged boxes labelled Denial, Diminishing, Rebuilding, and Bolstering. Dashed arrows from Denial and Diminishing point to an oval labelled Crisis Information slash preparedness Dissemination. Solid arrows from Rebuilding and Bolstering also point to this oval. A dashed two-way arrow connects Crisis Information slash preparedness Dissemination and Household Preparedness. A solid one-way arrow points from Household Preparedness to National Preparedness.Operationalisation of the SCCT model for crisis information dissemination
Source: Authors’ own work
Second, SCCT is applied to the analysis of population perceptions of the information contained in the campaign brochure “If Crisis or War Comes” in a bid to understand how such perceptions might affect the quality of preparedness of households for crisis. Thus, we seek to classify the relationship between crisis information dissemination and household preparedness and how that might affect national preparedness.
3. Method
This study investigates the impact of crisis information communication on household preparedness practices. Focusing on the Swedish crisis information dissemination campaign, the research examines household responses to the campaign’s brochure and its content over three years (2019–2021), using a mix of longitudinal and cross-sectional interview studies.
3.1 Data collection
Individuals and households form the basis for national crisis preparedness, as they constitute the target of crisis dissemination campaigns (Kohler et al., 2020). We conducted 15 semi-structured interviews (Kvale, 1996, p. 14), each lasting 20–45 min, with household respondents living in 9 different counties covering 14 municipalities as a representative sample of Swedish households. Some interviews were conducted in Swedish, while others were conducted in English, depending on the respondents’ language skills. All interviews were recorded, transcribed, and translated into English when necessary. All respondents’ consent to provide information about their household’s preparedness was obtained on tape as the very first step of the interview. The consent was based on a clear promise that the information provided would only be used for research purposes. Respondents were promised anonymity, and their names would be replaced by a code list. After 15 interviews, we reached saturation with a diverse group of respondents, varying in Swedish proficiency, economic status, and living conditions, all of which influence their responses to crisis preparedness information from the authorities. Our data revealed different living circumstances, yet many respondents expressed satisfaction with their homes, and not many understood the responsibility for their households’ crisis preparedness.
Interview questions probed individual reactions to the information in the distributed brochure and the status of their household preparedness according to the disseminated information. In Sweden, municipalities and county councils serve as jurisdictional units with defined spheres of authority. They are governed by councils (assemblies) and standing committees, including an executive committee.
County administrative boards oversee and coordinate activities across the county, including crisis preparedness and civil defence. Meanwhile, municipalities concentrate on local preparedness and emergency response, ensuring that households are equipped for emergencies by offering information, resources, and support (Montin, 2014). We used a combination of theoretical sampling and snowball sampling to select interviewees (Bryman and Bell, 2011). Our sample criteria were based on household type and composition, location, and living arrangements, which were independent of age, gender, or occupation. Some interviewees were directly contacted based on earlier and current personal contacts, while others were identified through referrals. Participants are identified by a code of “R” for respondents and a randomly assigned number for each interview (R1; rental apartment to R15; own house) to protect their anonymity. Table 1 provides a summary of the households that participated in this study.
Participants and household composition
| Code | Household composition | Type of housing | County – municipality |
|---|---|---|---|
| R1 | 3:1 adult, 2 children | Rental apartment | Stockholm County – Tyresö |
| R2 | 3:1 adult, 2 children | Rental apartment | Stockholm County – Henninge |
| R3 | 4:2 adults, 2 children | Own house | Stockholm County – Nacka |
| R4 | 3:2 adults, 1 child | Courtyard | Blekinge County – Karlskrona, |
| R5 | 2:1 adult, 1 child | Own house | Uppsala County – Uppsala |
| R6 | 2:1 adult, 1 child | Own house | Stockholm County – Huddinge |
| R7 | 2:2 adults | Own house | Stockholm County – Tyresö |
| R8 | 3:2 adults, 1 child | Own apartment | Värmland County – Arvika |
| R9 | 4:1 adult, 3 children | Own apartment | Uppsala County – Uppsala |
| R10 | 3:2 adults, 1 child | Own house | Skåne County – Höör |
| R11 | 2:2 adults | Own apartment | Stockholm County – Hässelby |
| R12 | 2:2 adults | Courtyard | Västerbottens County – Umeå |
| R13 | 3:3 adults | Rental apartment | V-Götaland County –Uddevalla |
| R14 | 6:2 adults, 4 children | Own house | Östergötlands County – Linköping |
| R15 | 2:2 adults | Own house | Västerbottens County – Vindeln |
| Code | Household composition | Type of housing | County – municipality |
|---|---|---|---|
| R1 | 3:1 adult, 2 children | Rental apartment | Stockholm County – Tyresö |
| R2 | 3:1 adult, 2 children | Rental apartment | Stockholm County – Henninge |
| R3 | 4:2 adults, 2 children | Own house | Stockholm County – Nacka |
| R4 | 3:2 adults, 1 child | Courtyard | Blekinge County – Karlskrona, |
| R5 | 2:1 adult, 1 child | Own house | Uppsala County – Uppsala |
| R6 | 2:1 adult, 1 child | Own house | Stockholm County – Huddinge |
| R7 | 2:2 adults | Own house | Stockholm County – Tyresö |
| R8 | 3:2 adults, 1 child | Own apartment | Värmland County – Arvika |
| R9 | 4:1 adult, 3 children | Own apartment | Uppsala County – Uppsala |
| R10 | 3:2 adults, 1 child | Own house | Skåne County – Höör |
| R11 | 2:2 adults | Own apartment | Stockholm County – Hässelby |
| R12 | 2:2 adults | Courtyard | Västerbottens County – Umeå |
| R13 | 3:3 adults | Rental apartment | V-Götaland County –Uddevalla |
| R14 | 6:2 adults, 4 children | Own house | Östergötlands County – Linköping |
| R15 | 2:2 adults | Own house | Västerbottens County – Vindeln |
Secondary material remains a key data source (Bryman and Bell, 2011; Patton, 2015). Hughes and Goodwin (2014, p. 26) describe them as typically, including written text, images or recordings; these materials can shed light on human experiences related to specific life events, historical periods or social changes, even though they were not explicitly created with the intent to document such aspects.
Thus, unlike interviews, documents are created independently without a researcher’s intervention (Merriam and Tisdell, 2015). Secondary material for this study primarily consisted of documents pertinent to the research, which were analysed and used to undertake triangulation within the study. Documents are identified by a code consisting of “D” for documents and a randomly assigned number for each document (D1 to D10) for convenience. Table 2 presents a list of the most relevant secondary documents, the publisher, and the date of publication.
Secondary materials sources used in the study
| Code | Document title | Publisher | Type of document | Publication date |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| D1 | Brochure: If a Crisis or War Comes | Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB) | Crisis information to the Swedish public | June 2018 |
| D2 | If Crisis or War Comes: our shared preparedness | Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB) | Follow-up of the brochure “If Crisis or War Comes” | May 2018 |
| D3 | Research plan for a safer society | Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB) | Research plan | October 2018 |
| D4 | Household crisis preparedness in theory and practice | Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB) | Project description of the household’s preparedness | July 2019 |
| D5 | Creating a resilient nation: Sweden assessed the brochure – If Crisis or War Comes | Defense academy department of political science. | Master’s thesis in politics and war | Spring 2018 |
| D6 | Guidance for communication during crises | Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB) | Methods with a focus on behaviour change from the COVID-19 pandemic | August 2021 |
| D7 | Crisis communication and trust in the Multi-Public society | Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB) | Study on societal crises influencing crisis communication | May 2024 |
| D8 | Strengthening civil preparedness | Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB) | Capability national risk assessment | November 2021 |
| D9 | Revamping crisis resilience and security in the post-pandemic world | Royal united services institute for defence and security studies and MSB | Shifts and long-term impacts of crises. | June 2020 |
| D10 | Impact measurement of the brochure – If a Crisis or War Comes | Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB) | A follow-up survey on the brochure “About the crisis or war in Sweden” | April 2019 |
| Code | Document title | Publisher | Type of document | Publication date |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| D1 | Brochure: If a Crisis or War Comes | Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency ( | Crisis information to the Swedish public | June 2018 |
| D2 | If Crisis or War Comes: our shared preparedness | Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency ( | Follow-up of the brochure “If Crisis or War Comes” | May 2018 |
| D3 | Research plan for a safer society | Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency ( | Research plan | October 2018 |
| D4 | Household crisis preparedness in theory and practice | Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency ( | Project description of the household’s preparedness | July 2019 |
| D5 | Creating a resilient nation: Sweden assessed the brochure – If Crisis or War Comes | Defense academy department of political science. | Master’s thesis in politics and war | Spring 2018 |
| D6 | Guidance for communication during crises | Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency ( | Methods with a focus on behaviour change from the COVID-19 pandemic | August 2021 |
| D7 | Crisis communication and trust in the Multi-Public society | Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency ( | Study on societal crises influencing crisis communication | May 2024 |
| D8 | Strengthening civil preparedness | Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency ( | Capability national risk assessment | November 2021 |
| D9 | Revamping crisis resilience and security in the post-pandemic world | Royal united services institute for defence and security studies and | Shifts and long-term impacts of crises. | June 2020 |
| D10 | Impact measurement of the brochure – If a Crisis or War Comes | Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency ( | A follow-up survey on the brochure “About the crisis or war in Sweden” | April 2019 |
3.2 Data analysis
We used the SCCT framework as our theoretical model for developing reaction responses. The framework defines three response clusters: victim, accidental, and preventable levels, and four strategies to manage such reactions (Coombs, 2007). We chose this model because of its robustness, which allows it to probe both aspects of the information dissemination spectrum. However, this study focusses on the receiving part of the spectrum and their reactions to crisis information. Collected data was analysed by looking for common patterns, phrases, expressions, and words with relevance to the main themes of our study (Mäntylä et al., 2018). Our protocol for handling the interview data was as follows: First, the data were coded based on participants’ reactions to the brochure’s content and their interpretations of the information from diverse perspectives (e.g. Strauss and Corbin, 1990). Data was coded based on the authors’ knowledge of the events of the dissemination campaign. The responses were subsequently categorised along themes relating to “Reaction/Response/attitude towards the Brochure (RQ1)” (Figure 3) and “Significance of brochure (RQ2)” (Figure 4). Figures 3 and 4 present the thematic coding structure and results of these questions. Second, we applied cognitive operations to the collected data to gain further insight into the representations of the underlying responses. Through this process, 13 codes were summarily generated for the “Reaction/Response/attitude towards Brochure (RQ1)” cluster, and 15 codes were identified to represent the “Significance of brochure (RQ2)” cluster. Third, these codes were further aggregated into broader constructions based on insights from the literature (e.g. Kumar et al., 1993). Finally, we analysed the relationship among the three main concepts highlighted in this study to understand the influence of population responses/reactions to crisis information campaigns and household preparedness.
The diagram presents 13 rectangular statements on the left: Coordination or adaptation of the business or commercial sector; Doubts or perceive information as propaganda; Increased awareness; Need for business incentives; No or little reaction; Oversimplification or exaggeration of security situation; Preparedness information seems unrealistic; Serves as a reminder; Shows conflicting information; Source of fear; Source of information; Source of preparedness information; Support individual home preparedness. Arrows connect these statements to four central boxes labelled Information, Propaganda, Support, and Coordination. Information and Propaganda both point to Communication. Support and Coordination both point to Practicality of information.Data coding structure for response/reaction to the information brochure
Source: Authors’ own work
The diagram presents 13 rectangular statements on the left: Coordination or adaptation of the business or commercial sector; Doubts or perceive information as propaganda; Increased awareness; Need for business incentives; No or little reaction; Oversimplification or exaggeration of security situation; Preparedness information seems unrealistic; Serves as a reminder; Shows conflicting information; Source of fear; Source of information; Source of preparedness information; Support individual home preparedness. Arrows connect these statements to four central boxes labelled Information, Propaganda, Support, and Coordination. Information and Propaganda both point to Communication. Support and Coordination both point to Practicality of information.Data coding structure for response/reaction to the information brochure
Source: Authors’ own work
The diagram presents 15 rectangular statements on the left: Support individual responsibility for preparedness; Aids government contingency plans; As an educational tool; Create common understanding of security or safety; Depicts a changing security situation; Directives seem unrealistic; Effectiveness; Frequent information updating; Helped raise security doubts; Helps raise awareness; Indicates a threat to the population; Indicates time, coordination and resources to rebuild preparedness infrastructure; Needs updating with complementary information and resources; Seriousness of Preparedness is lacking in brochure description; Shifting responsibilities of preparedness. Arrows connect these statements to three boxes on the right labelled Preparedness Support, Distrust, and Threat. Multiple arrows converge on each of the three boxes.Data coding structure for the significance of brochure information
Source: Authors’ own work
The diagram presents 15 rectangular statements on the left: Support individual responsibility for preparedness; Aids government contingency plans; As an educational tool; Create common understanding of security or safety; Depicts a changing security situation; Directives seem unrealistic; Effectiveness; Frequent information updating; Helped raise security doubts; Helps raise awareness; Indicates a threat to the population; Indicates time, coordination and resources to rebuild preparedness infrastructure; Needs updating with complementary information and resources; Seriousness of Preparedness is lacking in brochure description; Shifting responsibilities of preparedness. Arrows connect these statements to three boxes on the right labelled Preparedness Support, Distrust, and Threat. Multiple arrows converge on each of the three boxes.Data coding structure for the significance of brochure information
Source: Authors’ own work
All data analyses were conducted manually (Crick, 2021), as it is credible and effective for analysing qualitative data. Microsoft Excel and QDA Miner Lite software were used to organise and manage the data. Both theme questions, RQ1 and RQ2, were coded by different researchers, which meant that intercoder agreement statistics, such as Cohen’s κ, were not applicable in this case. However, co-coder and co-author debriefings were used to enhance analytical rigor and consistency of the coding process. To prevent further researcher bias, the first coding level was done independently by one team member, and the second level coding was done independently by another researcher. The team thoroughly discussed inconsistencies that were identified (Catelani et al., 2021).
4. Results and findings
To explain the impact of the population’s reaction to crisis information dissemination for household preparedness, this section presents the results derived from our data analysis. The following sections describe these identified constructs: communication, practicality (of information), preparedness support, distrust, and threat (Figures 3 and 4). Our empirical findings indicate that several underlying assumptions and response categories within SCCT did not fully capture the crisis communication dynamics observed in this context. Consequently, we adapted and iteratively refined the application of the framework to better reflect the context-specific realities and communication processes identified in the data. This adaptive use illustrates how the SCCT can be extended and evolved beyond its conventional boundaries, enabling it to account for broader, as well as reverse forms of crisis communication, particularly those oriented towards public preparedness, collective resilience, and systemic coordination, rather than solely towards those of organisational image repair.
4.1 Communication: getting the message out
The recurring message in the brochure, as well as in the accompanying secondary materials, emphasised the shared responsibility of everyone living in the country (D8; D1). These materials argue that well-informed citizens form a crucial part of Sweden’s ability to face various threats:
The brochure can act as a message and knowledge platform for information to the public (D5, D6, D7). In the context of our interviews, the response attitudes were not much different, as respondents referred to the brochure as mainly a source of (preparedness) information, as stated by R8, own apartment):
[…] the brochure, as I remembered, had information about various crises that could happen to us and information about war. It contains a list of different things that you should prepare at home to get through the first few days.
While information communication was aptly stated as a first response to the brochure, coordination with other aspects of society raised perceptions of conflicting information among respondents. For example:
[…] I think the state, municipalities, and businesses should take greater responsibility for household preparedness. This must be interconnected; for example, the brochure recommends burning with wood, while heating in stoves and open fireplaces at home is regulated by the state (R2, rental apartment).
4.2 Practicality (of information): step-by-step process to preparedness
This theme emphasised the practicality of the information, i.e. a way of educating people about what they can do in a crisis, items they need to have at home (e.g. water, cash, dry food, etc.), and whom to call for help, etc. organised in a stepwise manner in the brochure, including online support links (D2).
Responses on this theme emphasised practical aspects of preparedness during a crisis. They were seen as encouraging a shared understanding to generate public interest in the government’s efforts to enhance safety. For example:
[…] I see the brochure as a communication tool that is easy to grasp. I was most curious about the pedagogy overall. When the brochure first came out, people started talking to each other about crisis planning; if I understand correctly, people started to think more about these issues, and in some cases, some people I know were also taking concrete action (R7, own house).
“I realised that it was about preparing to manage on your own for at least seven days if something serious happened”. Thus, this was seen as a means of preparedness support, such as “[…]to increase the preparedness and that individuals are responsible for their planning” (R2, rental apartment).
However, there were issues of practicality raised in terms of the adequacy of practical support for preparedness because there are differences between citizens living in a city apartment and those who live in the countryside. The information brochure, it is argued, tended to assume city living for its population, given its lack of differentiation of the different Swedish regions.
4.3 Preparedness support information: keeping the public informed
Respondents perceived this theme as a way in which the population is kept informed about the ongoing situation in the country, distinguishing it clearly from the previous theme, which focused on the practicality of the information concerning preparedness. As responded by R2, (rental apartment):
I think the state uses the brochure to inform the population.
However, the respondents understood the information to include preparation for possible war, for example:
[…] the brochure, as I remembered, had information about various crises that could happen to us and about war (R8, own apartment).
Responses agreed that the brochure highlighted the importance of maintaining essential services during a crisis and the role of well-informed households in achieving that:
I thought that it was a serious security situation that Swedish people needed to pay a lot of attention to the current situation. […] in the household environment, for example, other ways of acquiring items, more food, more firewood, extra medicines, gasoline, etc. (R2, rental apartment).
However, responses indicate that the brochure did not contribute much to their shared understanding of the security uncertainty facing the country at the time. At the same time, some related this information as a call for resistance, based on the Swedish constitution, affirming that:
[…] that our country’s sovereignty and independence shall always be defended (R15, own house).
The results indicated the brochure’s effectiveness in raising awareness, particularly in workplace settings like hospitals and schools. For example, some organisations introduced a management plan to identify key personnel and their essential tasks during a crisis. These plans were not integrated with household preparedness efforts among employees. Changes in colleagues’ attitudes, increased awareness, and more discussions about crisis planning, including water, food, and power preparedness, were observed. For example, R4 (Courtyard) stated:
I noticed that workplaces increased their preparedness. […] schools, hospitals and business actors like supermarkets could do much more to encourage the households in their planning
4.4 Distrust: blaming the message
Respondents argued the need for coordination and adaptation with the commercial sector. Shifting responsibility from the government to the local level and then to households requires a cohesive system. In their view, there are several responsibilities in the Swedish system, and each provides different information to cover their share of responsibility. For example, the brochure should have suggested various “fun” coordinating activities. It is about finding a balance instead of scaring people. It is rewarding that the brochure comes to the households, but to understand its primary meaning, Swedish people need a broader discussion about why Sweden is as vulnerable as it is, now.
I was not surprised because based on the media, news and other reports, I know there are changes in the wrong direction that demand a safety focus. It felt the brochure was not a serious approach meant to inform an important message (R8, own apartment).
Respondents highlighted the limited storage capacity of grocery stores to handle sudden shifts in consumer demand for preparedness. Hence, collaboration among stores will be essential to establish emergency stockpiles without complications. While the information brochure emphasises household responsibility, respondents perceived little progress in broader preparedness initiatives, comprehensive enough to support such preparedness. R2 (rental apartment) points out the following:
[…] there is excellent information in the brochure regarding crisis or war, but the rest of the society must keep up with the same line of thought. For example, the brochure suggests having cash at home, but the system will not work if neither banks nor vending machines work. I think the state has not taken this seriously, and the brochure becomes unrealistic -if what is stated in the plan cannot be implemented
This indicates that attaining such preparedness as prescribed by the brochure might require significant government intervention to, for example, store larger quantities of required material, which is unlikely to happen unless preparedness-purchasing behaviour changes. As such, this theme seems to cast doubts about the practical usability of the brochure in times of crisis or war, as all citizens must be able to understand and trust that the given guideline will work. While the brochure recommends having access to cash always, such action is to be undertaken before a crisis and not after, countering the argument that banks and automated teller machine (ATMs) could quickly fail under heavy withdrawal, under preparedness scenarios.
I think that the information spreading is critical to increase preparedness and make individuals responsible for their planning […] County Administrative Board should have more responsibility for information and crisis planning, for example, informing how firefighters respond, and taking over the control of commercial actors, banks, and other important players that should act when something serious happens (R2, rental apartment).
4.5 Threat: interpreting the threat in external changes
In the context of our interviews, respondents lack sufficient understanding of potential threats and the altered security landscape, primarily because of the prevalence of misinformation. As such, the distribution of the informational brochure is crucial not because a crisis is imminent or the threat of war has significantly increased, but because the broader regional environment remains highly vulnerable, necessitating the dissemination of accurate and reliable information. For example, R3 (Own house) argues:
Spreading information about the threats to Sweden remains critical, although the message is that threats have not escalated; when I read about the current political instability around the world in the media, these have significant impacts on the escalation of different threats to the people in Sweden. […] the problem is that Swedish people are not fully or properly informed.
Within this theme, the perception seems to lie in the fact that the brochure was seen in some ways as conveying a signal of external security changes, which could also be seen as a threat to the nation.
With the brochure, the state wanted to remind people of the current threats to the Swedish people. Even if it was long ago that war occurred and Sweden was exposed to a serious threat, there are still new and different threats on the Swedish household horizon that people must be aware of and prepared for (R9, own apartment).
5. Discussion
While previous studies have investigated crisis preparedness at the communication phase (e.g. Petridou et al., 2019), the changing communication dynamics between information dissemination and household preparedness within fast-moving information environments have received scarce attention. Agency–citizen relationship communication is typically unproblematic in societies where citizens highly trust their public officials. While this seemed to be the case in response to the agency responsible, this did not hold for the message being conveyed. Kikoski (1993) emphasises that effective communication occurs only when the message is mutually and accurately understood; the findings revealed a mixed reception of crisis information within the study population, and further barriers insinuated challenges in reaching marginalised groups as well as issues related to the public’s trust in the authorities’ information. The study results are framed by applying the SCCT framework to classical crisis communication theory. They are illustrated in Figure 5, highlighting the population’s role as a mediator between crisis information and preparedness.
The model is divided into Agency Reaction and Population Reaction. On the left, a box labelled Crisis X points to four vertically arranged boxes labelled Denial, Diminishing, Rebuilding, and Bolstering. Dashed arrows from Denial and Diminishing point to an oval labelled Crisis Information or preparedness Dissemination. Solid arrows from Rebuilding and Bolstering also point to this oval. A solid arrow leads from Crisis Information or preparedness Dissemination to a box labelled Population Reaction. A solid arrow leads from Population Reaction to an oval labelled Household Preparedness. A dashed two-way arrow connects Crisis Information slash preparedness Dissemination and Household Preparedness. A solid arrow points from Household Preparedness to an oval labelled National Preparedness.Population reaction as a mediator of crisis information
Source: Authors’ own work
The model is divided into Agency Reaction and Population Reaction. On the left, a box labelled Crisis X points to four vertically arranged boxes labelled Denial, Diminishing, Rebuilding, and Bolstering. Dashed arrows from Denial and Diminishing point to an oval labelled Crisis Information or preparedness Dissemination. Solid arrows from Rebuilding and Bolstering also point to this oval. A solid arrow leads from Crisis Information or preparedness Dissemination to a box labelled Population Reaction. A solid arrow leads from Population Reaction to an oval labelled Household Preparedness. A dashed two-way arrow connects Crisis Information slash preparedness Dissemination and Household Preparedness. A solid arrow points from Household Preparedness to an oval labelled National Preparedness.Population reaction as a mediator of crisis information
Source: Authors’ own work
This supports the idea that such crisis information dissemination processes are rarely straightforward, as depicted in Figure 1, but identifies the intervening process that leads from crisis dissemination through population reactions to the outcome status of household preparedness. This trajectory depicts how the population’s reaction to information, in this case, influences how households prepare for potential crises or conflicts.
While the effectiveness of authorities in mitigating the impacts of a crisis depends mainly on their reputation and strategic crisis communication, results suggest that certain aspects of the population may be sceptical of the information, which can lead to cynicism and a lack of trust in authorities. The assertion that the brochure conveyed uncertainty was evident in the interview data, as reflected in broad messages such as “Be prepared; stay informed; get involved” (MSB, 2018). These messages were often not fully understood by the intended recipients, highlighting the issue of contextual clarity in the messages. Hence, difficulties in taking the message seriously (e.g. R2 (own apartment), R3 (own house), R15 (own house) might have been experienced among the study population. This may indicate new insights into the existing literature in that crisis information dissemination in the case studied in this paper was not aimed at understanding public concerns and alleviating fear or anxiety, as suggested by Taylor and Kent (2014) and Agostino and Arnaboldi (2016). The information dissemination goal of household preparedness (D1) within Sweden’s total defence posture presented a somewhat different rationale for crisis communication.
Providing actionable and straightforward crisis preparedness information, as developed by the theme of practicality of information, is not yet developed within the literature. This was shown to prompt people to compare actions and how they would do things if different from what was stated in the brochure. It was thus perceived as a tool that facilitated shared responsibility, emphasising the need for individuals to take charge of their preparedness. However, the lack of regional differentiation was a limitation in addressing Sweden’s population’s varied landscapes and circumstances. This was linked to the perceived mixed reactions to the brochure’s main message. It was somewhat unclear whether its purpose was to encourage greater preparedness among Swedes or signal that a serious situation had already unfolded. (e.g. R1, rental apartment). Consistent with earlier research (e.g. Larsson, 2021), perceptions emphasised how the dual focus on safety and security can place stress on household preparedness, while at the same time, both are required for effective communication (Kikoski, 1993).
Our broader results suggest that the brochure achieved its goal of raising preparedness awareness and served as an educational tool to inform citizens about actionable steps they could take during a crisis, such as using available resources and knowing whom to contact for assistance. However, the effectiveness of this goal of household preparedness can be argued to be sub-optimal due to the receiving population’s perception of the information within the brochure. The designers of the information brochure did not account for the effect of the population’s reaction on actual preparedness, which appears to have been influenced by various indicators. For example, less than half of the study population reported following the brochure’s itemised instructions from start to finish, indicating the level of perceived preparedness.
5.1 Conceptualisation of information dissemination themes
To explain the relationships among the themes emerging from the information dissemination reaction analysis, Figure 6 presents a relational framework that integrates our findings. The relational model illustrates how organisational information dissemination themes (communication, preparedness support, and the practicality of information) shape population-level reactions via the distrust and threat perception themes. Because distrust can negatively affect communication and how it is received across the population, it can go on to affect the desired practicality of the information being disseminated, which remains the responsibility of the disseminating organisation or agency. This, in turn, influences broader preparedness outcome goals of the governmental agency. As such, the relational model identifies the point where institutional efforts, via carefully curated information and worded communications, and household responses meet as the constant struggle to set the right tone for clear interpretation for enabling populations to transform such communication into action.
The model is divided into three sections titled Organisational Preparedness, Population perception slash reaction, and National Preparedness. In Organisational Preparedness, three boxes appear vertically: Communication; Practicality of information; and Preparedness Support. Dashed two-way arrows connect Communication and Practicality of information, and Practicality of information and Preparedness for Support. In Population perception or reaction, two boxes appear: Distrust and Threat. Solid arrows connect Communication to Distrust, Distrust to Practicality of information, and Threat to Practicality of information. A double-headed arrow connects Practicality of information and Threat. A solid arrow leads from Preparedness of Support to Threat. On the right, a box labelled National Preparedness receives a solid arrow from the Population perception or reaction section.Relational conceptualisation of information dissemination reaction to crisis
Source: Authors’ own work
The model is divided into three sections titled Organisational Preparedness, Population perception slash reaction, and National Preparedness. In Organisational Preparedness, three boxes appear vertically: Communication; Practicality of information; and Preparedness Support. Dashed two-way arrows connect Communication and Practicality of information, and Practicality of information and Preparedness for Support. In Population perception or reaction, two boxes appear: Distrust and Threat. Solid arrows connect Communication to Distrust, Distrust to Practicality of information, and Threat to Practicality of information. A double-headed arrow connects Practicality of information and Threat. A solid arrow leads from Preparedness of Support to Threat. On the right, a box labelled National Preparedness receives a solid arrow from the Population perception or reaction section.Relational conceptualisation of information dissemination reaction to crisis
Source: Authors’ own work
Building on these relationships, the strengthening of preparedness involves ensuring that disseminated information is practical, comprehensible, and directly relevant to household needs, including the development of clear communication strategies, actionable guidance, and support mechanisms that enable households to translate messages into concrete preparedness behaviours. To do this, the operationalisation of these efforts focused on effective information dissemination, agency-population trust, and the understanding of how threat perceptions are calibrated within exposed populations must be understood.
Overall, the framework shows that information dissemination outcomes are logically dependent on the quality and clarity of trust and threat perception contained within the information. Just as clear, practical, and trustworthy communication can determine household engagement, the effectiveness of preparedness activities depends on the strength of foundational messaging and support systems that structure how households interpret and respond to emerging threats.
5.2 Theoretical contributions
Our study contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, applying the Coombs (2007)SCCT model, we conceptualise the relationship between information dissemination and household preparedness via population reaction to disseminated information. The results indicate that the information brochure was perceived as a communication tool providing practical information to the population. Conversely, the brochure’s content was perceived as supportive of individual preparedness. However, respondents identified gaps between specific instructions and the practicality of their implementation, suggesting that some aspects of the information were not thoroughly thought through. This could be attributed to a perceived lack of trust in the formal institutional framework for facilitating direct mediation between agencies, businesses, and the population (Antai and Hellberg, 2024). Although the results identified in this study did not match those of Coombs’s (2007)SCCT clusters as argued earlier (i.e. victim, accidental and preventable), the interviews showed that several issues, collectively termed information factors, were seen as potential mediators that likely changed the way respondents reacted to the disseminated information, given the institutional trust of crisis management in high-trust societies such as Sweden (Johansson et al., 2023). Thus, this finding aligns with Ortega and Scartascini (2020) regarding the impact of messages sent in times of crisis. Such information factors can affect how the population seeks, identifies, develops, undertakes and maintains information crisis preparedness. This study thus advances a theoretical contribution by demonstrating the adaptive flexibility of the SCCT beyond corporate and reputational contexts. By refining the framework to focus on household preparedness, the study contributes to the theoretical evolution of SCCT, positioning SCCT as a contextually responsive framework capable of addressing diverse crisis communication environments beyond its original organisational focus.
6. Conclusion
We have argued that the usual trajectory of agency–citizen communication – the stepwise directional relationship between crisis information dissemination and household preparedness – can be mediated by population reaction to disseminated information due to several factors. These factors include clarity of purpose of information, lack of connection of information with the commercial sector, geography, and a lack of understanding of the actual information being disseminated. The need for accelerated information dissemination was informed by the continuously changing geopolitical and security situation in many world regions, which might not be as clear to parts of the population. In high-trust countries, crisis communication is generally well-developed and effective during emergencies. However, disseminating information, such as in the brochure “If Crisis or War Comes”, may present challenges when the public does not perceive an imminent crisis. This can affect governmental strategies for population crisis preparedness and their role in total defence.
Based on Coombs’s (2007) SCCT model and in-depth interviews across southern Sweden, we investigated the relationship between crisis information dissemination and household preparedness from a Swedish perspective. The interview results indicated that both the message’s content and its dissemination method served as mediating factors in achieving the intended goal of information dissemination: household preparedness. The following five themes emerged from the study: communication, practicality (of information), preparedness support, distrust, and threat. Although the analysis revealed that only certain types of responses towards the brochure (RQ1) and perceptions of importance (Significance of brochure, RQ2) were identified, the interview results identified other areas of concern affected by the brochure and its information content.
Our findings have significant implications for crisis communication research and practice, highlighting how recipients of crisis information interpret and mediate such messages in the absence of an imminent crisis or conflict. This includes a precise specification of the role of necessary societal institutions, such as banks, to allow receivers of such information to develop a complete picture of the practicality of such information. For example, such information and communication strategies could include clearly demonstrated coordinated plans with financial institutions and retailers for maintaining access to cash for, say, a defined period of time following a crisis, as well as showing procedures with retailers to ensure continuous and rational as well as timely distribution and restocking of essential services and materials. The study also offers valuable insights for public decision-makers, emphasising the role of effective communication in shaping intended goals, considering the mediation effects identified in this study.
Despite these findings, promising avenues for future research remain. Our study has primarily focused on the relationship between crisis information and household preparedness, guided by public perceptions of disseminated information. However, it is acknowledged that the identified information factors, including clear purpose, non-commercial context, geographic factors, and limited comprehension of the disseminated information, within this study need to be situated within the broader information and communication literatures, even though the present study does not theoretically identify and describe these factors. As such, future research should explore their theoretical grounding and plausible mechanisms in greater depth within the context of total defence. Future research could also explore the extent to which different crisis information dissemination strategies contribute to or minimise this mediation effect in the relationship between crisis information and household preparedness.


