We analyze the Indian Removal Act of 1830 from a political-economic perspective, covering both the determinants of the congressional voting on the Act as well as the downstream consequences — treaties and the physical removal of the tribes — of the Act’s passage. We find, first, that ideology was the primary determinant of vote choice on Indian Removal in the House. Other factors — like partisanship and sectionalism — were important on their own, but in “horserace” analyses House member ideology trumps all other factors. We also find that the vote on Indian Removal mattered electorally for House members, but in a somewhat nuanced way. First, vote choice on Removal was not significantly related to the choice to seek re-election. Second, members who supported Removal in Anti-Jackson districts won significantly less often than those who voted against removal. And, finally, members who supported Removal in Anti-Jackson districts saw their vote shares decline significantly. We also find, in a systematic analysis of all roll call votes in the 21st House leading up to election day, that Indian Removal was not only a consequential policy for members’ elections in 1830, but that it was the most consequential policy of the 21st Congress for electoral purposes.
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25 July 2023
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Research Article|
July 25 2023
Congress and the Political Economy of the Indian Removal Act Available to Purchase
Jeffery A. Jenkins;
Jeffery A. Jenkins
Price School of Public Policy,
University of Southern California
, Los Angeles, CA, USA
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Thomas R. Gray
School of Economic, Political and Policy Sciences,
The University of Texas at Dallas
, Dallas, TX, USA
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Antebellum Political Economy Conference, University of Southern California. We thank Jeff Lewis, Joel Sievert, and Daniel S. Smith for data and presentation help and Leticia Arroyo Abad, Noel Maurer, and APE Conference attendees for comments.
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An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Antebellum Political Economy Conference, University of Southern California. We thank Jeff Lewis, Joel Sievert, and Daniel S. Smith for data and presentation help and Leticia Arroyo Abad, Noel Maurer, and APE Conference attendees for comments.
Online ISSN: 2693-9304
Print ISSN: 2693-9290
© 2023 J. A. Jenkins and T. R. Gray
2023
J. A. Jenkins and T. R. Gray
Licensed re-use rights only
Journal of Historical Political Economy (2023) 3 (2): 237–276.
Citation
Jenkins JA, Gray TR (2023), "Congress and the Political Economy of the Indian Removal Act". Journal of Historical Political Economy, Vol. 3 No. 2 pp. 237–276, doi: https://doi.org/10.1561/115.00000052
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